*1 reasons, For I in these concur COLUMBIA HOSPITAL CORPORA judgment.
Court’s
TION OF HOUSTON
Columbia
d/b/a
Center, Petitioner,
Bellaire Medical
OWEN, concurring.
Justice
correctly
only
decides the
Court
MOORE,
al., Respondents.
et
Jesse
it,
join
I
issue
is before
opinion.
Court’s
The Petitioner
this
No. 01-0293.
case,
Telthorster,
Mark
asked the Court to
Supreme Court of Texas.
only
decide
whether the need-versus-risk
applied
Montgom
factors
in Wadewitz v.
Argued Feb.
(Tex.1997),
ery,
cial if officer (i)
the act was made exercise of a discre (ii) faith;
tionary duty; performed good
(iii) scope in the of his or her official
authority.” urged Telthorster has not this recognize privilege
Court to similar to
that described in section 132 of the Re (Second)
statement of Torts for law en they
forcement officials when use force for effecting recap an arrest or briefing
ture. The in this case does not any type privilege
advocate or similar negligence
rule of law in cases.
Thus, I privilege while think that concurring opinion would Enoch’s
Justice merit, I apply may have would not decide privilege recognize
whether to such a until full briefing argument
we have on that
point.
tory modify the court cap. We therefore appeals’ judgment,4 remanding this case to the trial court.
I undergoing Katherine Moore died after surgery at Columbia Bellaire Medical Cen- (“Columbia”) husband, ter 1996. Her daughters, (collectively and estate “the two Moores”) hospital sued the and Kath- treating physicians erine’s two under wrongful death and survival statutes. The Moores, jury allocating found for the caus- negligence al between Columbia and the physicians finding the Moores’ actual damages to be million. The trial court $3 applied the Act’s K cap to reduce actual Columbia’s Faust, Cooper, R. Brent Diana L. Coo- $1,305,691, liability to another per Scully, Jung, & P. Michael Strasbur- $300,487.79 in Price, Dallas, Cole, ger & Linda Joan capped to the amount. Walker, The two Jackson <& Alan B. Daughtry, Houston, physicians judgment. settled after Al- for Petitioner. trial though judge’s application of the Frankel, Richard Hackerman Peterson damages cap gave disputes rise to other Manela, Houston, Frankel & Respon- appeals, only resolved the court of dents. us trial issue before is whether the court in excluding prejudgment erred Justice opinion ENOCH delivered the damages cap. from the Court, HECHT, in which Justice OWEN, damages cap, The K found JEFFERSON, Justice Justice 11.02(a) 4590i, at article of the Re- and Justice joined, RODRIGUEZ and in Statutes, vised joined provides: which Civil only. Justice O’Neill Part III In an action on a health care prejudg this case we decide whether claim where final is rendered ment interest assessed under against physician pro- or health care of the Liability Medical and Insurance Im vider, limit of civil for dam- (“the Act”) provement subject Act1 is ages physician of the or health care damages cap.2 provider shall be limited to an amount Following our recent decision Hori $500,000.5 not to exceed Auld,3 Corporation Healthcare zon/CMS adjusted we hold that P’s to account for inflation interest damages applied,6 disputes are to the statu when and neither party 4590i, 11.02(a). §§ 16.01-16.02. Stat. art. Tex.Rev.Civ. Tex.Rev.Civ. Stat. §§ 2. See id. 11.01-11.05. Seeid.% (Tex.2000).
3. 34 S.W.3d 897-901
4. 43 S.W.3d
cable,
capped damages
amount. We
adjusted and
properly
disagree.
$1,305,691
awarded
applied to reach
court here.
the trial
II
centerpiece of the
Subchapter K was a
strikingly
simi-
recently addressed
*3
We
Liability and Insurance
original Medical
in
Healthcare
question
lar
Horizon/CMS
in
passed
Act
1977
order
Improvement
In Auld we were
Corporation v. Auld.12
frequency
damages cap
excessive
and severi-
Act’s
to “reduce
to reconcile the
asked
in-
general prejudgment
the former
with
liability
care
claims.”7
ty of health
“judgments in
directing that
terest statute
1995,
the
death,
injury,
proper-
or
wrongful
personal
Act,
particular
for a
providing
to the
prejudg-
include
ty damage cases must
[ijnterest”
[pjrejudgment
“[c]omputation
16.02(b),
section
interest.”13 Like
rele-
care
claims.8 The
health
like sub-
mandatory;
was
provision
this
provision,
vant
of this
portion
reference
the statute did not
chapter
16.02(b),
“the
dictates that in such claims
But we held
damages cap.
Act’s
prejudgment inter-
judgment must include
required
that
Auld
by
trier of
past damages found
est on
subject to the
by
general statute was
fact,
shall not include
damages cap.14
K
Act’s
by
found
on future
analysis was
At the heart of our
Subchapter
explicitly
fact.”9
trier of
interest was
that
recognition
“[njot-
computation applies
that
states
damages that
a form of
withstanding”
general prejudgment
cap.15
in the Act’s
We
intended to include
statute,10
mention of
but makes no
terest
designed “to
that the Act was
emphasized
cap.
K’s
limit,
provider’s
a health-care
expand,
not
and includ-
damages,”16
for
civil
argue, and the court
The Moores
in the
ing
held,11
Legislature’s addi-
appeals
that the
ex-
Legislature’s
with the
consistent
inter-
P’s
tion of
decreasing the cost
purposes of
pressed
an
to the Act evidenced
provisions
est
ensuring the avail-
and
health care claims
intent
to exclude
insur-
reasonably affordable
ability of
by
damages cap prescribed
sub-
from the
the statu-
further noted
ance.17 We
16.02(b)’s
K,
man-
chapter
and that section
harmonized
could be
tory provisions
effect
datory language
given
must be
the extent
up to
interest,
appli- would be recovered
adding prejudgment
1997,
24,
Leg.,
75th
May
1.02(b)(1).
pealed
Act of
§
7.
Id.
R.S.,
6(a),
Gen. Laws
§
Tex.
1997
ch.
(section heading).
§
Id.
16.02
(now
at Tex. Fin.Code
codified
304.102).
§
16.02(b).
§
Id.
S.W.3d at 901.
14. See
§
Id.
at 897-99.
15. See id.
11.
12.
First,
the addition of subchapter P to
Report
House Committee
for the bill con-
the Act did nothing
change
to
the nature
P
taining subchapter
described “[pjrejudg-
of
awarded.
accruing
interest on costs
after the
Prejudgment
was,
and continues
be,
judgement
background
date
as a
[sic]”
“compensation allowed by law as
bill,
problem justifying the
additional
which “reforms
damages for lost use of the mon-
ey
due as
limits on health care
during
lapse
claims.”28
time between the
P
subchapter
accrual of the claim and Thus
was enacted for the
judgment.”23
date of
These additional
same
as
K and
the Act
Auld,
See,
18. See
34 S.W.3d
e.g.,
Comm,
Practices,
House
on Civil
971,
Leg.,
Tex. H.B.
R.S.
74th
Analysis,
Bill
Galveston,
(citing
City
19. See id.
Lufkin
(1995);
Comm,
Development,
Sen.
on Economic
437,
(1885)).
63 Tex.
439
971,
Leg.,
Tex. H.B.
74th
R.S.
Analysis,
Bill
(1995).
(citing
See
chapter P and the Act a whole. also as concluded that P’s struc- ture did not “suggests Third, explained as we uncap capped pre- intend to previously cap is irreconcilable with nothing interest.”34 Because statutory prejudgment require- indicates Here, ment.30 describes uncap damages ture intended to that this how interest must be com- Court held under capped has puted judg- in health claim care K, control, must and subchapter Auld P’s ment; subchapter K dictates when that *5 damages prejudgment remain judgment, computa- with atténdant capped. tions, capped.32 must be We should not to find the K surprised subchapter IV damages in cap some tension with the larger statutory and compen- common-law sum, In prejudgment structure, satory designed for it is to P subchapter awarded under remains damages applicable override otherwise damages compensatory capped form of the computation But this K, standards. does by subchapter capping prejudg and cap damages make the irreconcilable with goals. ment interest advances subchapter K requirements; allocation Further, subchapter P does not exclude merely an qualification adds implicit cap designed from a prejudgment interest applicable they standards: otherwise damages applicable to override otherwise subject cap. now to the apply P nothing and in computations, legislative uncap pre
indicates a
intent
Ill
damages. For
rea
viously capped
these
Auld n
sons,
hold that
Finally,
prece-
we consider
we
P of Medi
this Court has al
awarded under
dential effect. Because
Improvement
ready
Legislature
Liability
meant
cal
Insurance
decided
subject
Act is
to the Act’s
to include
interest awarded
cap.
in
Subchapter
under
statute
from
past damages
on
excluded
question
today
K’s
us
turns
before
il.02(b)
by
fully
avail-
Legislature
intended sub-
on whether the
See,
e.g.,
on Civil
judgment interest is a of common law inconsistent with intent.” Id. part legislative Because Id. 900-01. the health-care damages. P, predated subchapter claim the Court however, recognized, The Court reserved expressly the issue before us to- subsequent its Legislature’s codification of day cap also limits an award —whether own interest statute created of interest under potential cap a conflict with the on medical self-contained, prejudgment malpractice prejudg- because the provision. Id. at 900 n. 13. statute award mandated the Relying on the Court now holds cap pre- of interest while cap pre- also limits recovery eases. Com- vented some judgment Using interest. But Auld’s 5069-1.05, Stat. Ann. art. pare Tex.Rev.Civ. statutory yields rule construction differ- (“A 6(a) death, § judgment wrongful in a compared result when is cap ent injury, or personal property damages case self-contained, prejudgment Act’s interest.”) must include with provision. No are we longer comparing 11.02(a) 4590i, § (directing id. art. that a malpractice pre- medical with a civil defendant’s for judgment generally appli- interest statute statutorily-determined limited Here, subchapter cable to tort damages. amount). The con- Court reconciled the specific provision is the more because it cap, relying flict favor of the on a maxim recovery expressly pre- mandates construction, statutory and the interest in successful health-care perceived capping ture’s cases, explicit an intent evidencing liability damages. Applying health-care to exclude interest from the statutory principle construction general application cap. of the more specific over the the more statute controls 4590i, § Stat. Ann. 16.02 Tex.Rev.Civ. general, the Court wrote: Yet (Supp.2002). statutory another rule regard With in article provides construction that when two stat- prejudg- 11.02 and conflict, provision utes the later-enacted ment-interest statute in article 5069- controls. See Tex. Gov’t Code 1.05, specific the former the more supports recovery This rule likewise *7 only in that it applies statute to health- this case because claims, liability care while the latter is only specific is not the more applies it more because also provision, but the later enacted one. claims, including categories broader of Auld, years ago Two the Court de- personal injury, property all types Thus, the Act as struc- scribed a “self-contained and damage, wrongful death. provid- ture for a health-care determining prevails article 4590i over Auld, liability damages.” er’s general prejudgment-interest statute. Today, at 901. the Court inter- S.W.3d at Regarding 34 S.W.3d Act not rules prets the well-settled by purpose, explained legislation’s the Court construction, statutory deference to Legislature intended the Act to Act’s “overarching goal” limiting determining a “self-contained structure for care liability. health S.W.3d dam- provider’s liability a health-care however, limit, Legislature, was not moti- ages” whose was “to The health solely by a to limit care expand” liability permitting such and that vated desire liability for its own statutory prejudgment to exceed sake. affordability of liability cap “a result a crisis in the produce perceived would insurance, professional medical which DEPARTMENT TEXAS OF inevitably impact
would availability TRANSPORTATION, medical care. See at S.W.3d Petitioner, To the “availability increase of medical Texans,” care for Legislature sought make health care
predictable professional so medical JONES DIRT & BROTHERS PAVING surance would be available affordable CONTRACTORS, INC., rates. Id. Respondent.
Mandating the award of No. 00-1067. interest on past damages, as the Supreme Court of Texas. ture has done under subchapter does goal. not undermine that Prejudgment Argued on Jan. calculation, to precise and thus the maximum amount of addition- Decided June exposure may al readily be anticipated
insurance carriers. See 34 S.W.3d (Hankinson,
at 909 J. concurring and dis-
senting).
Had the intended to limit award of interest under it would have referred
to that subchapter it subchap- Furthermore,
ter P in 1995. Leg- had the
islature intended for
to be awarded in some health-care others,
cases but not it would not have
chosen the mandatory language did for
subchapter P. Given the self-contained Act,
structure of the it seems extremely
unlikely to me that the Legislature would ignored
have both and used
mandatory language P had
it not intended exempt prejudgment past
interest on from the
cap. Because the Court concludes other-
wise, I dissent.