11485 | Conn. App. Ct. | Jun 29, 1993
The plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s judgment, challenging the granting of a motion in limine precluding him from offering any evidence regarding a prior accident that he claims was “substantially similar” to the accident that occurred in this case. The plaintiff claims that the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence was improper. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts are pertinent to this appeal. Deana Phelan was a customer at the defendant My Place Cafe.
The plaintiff brought a cause of action against the defendants in two counts. The first count was brought pursuant to General Statutes § 30-102,
On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion precluding the introduction of any evidence regarding the prior accident. We disagree.
“It is a well established principle of law that the trial court may exercise its discretion with regard to eviden-tiary rulings, and the trial court’s rulings will not be
In an offer of proof, the plaintiff attempted to show that the incident that occurred previously was substantially similar to Phelan’s actions in the present case. The court heard evidence that a patron of the bar, Michael Wagner, after ordering a drink, created a disturbance and was asked to leave. Wagner left the bar, got into his truck, and drove it into the front wall of the bar. Wagner did not drive all the way into the bar because the sidewalk curb stopped his vehicle. Mr. Wagner, however, could not account for how his truck was propelled into the bar. In the present case, Phelan, after initially getting caught on the curb, made a second attempt to drive into the bar, and was successful.
Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to exclude the prior accident evidence.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The other defendants are the named defendant and Peter Francis, the permittee of My Place Cafe.
General Statutes § 30-102 provides in pertinent part: “If any person, by himself or Ms agent, sells any alcoholic liquor to an intoxicated person, and such purchaser, in consequence of such intoxication, thereafter injures the person or property of another, such seller shall pay just damages to the person injured, up to the amount of twenty thousand dollars, or to persons injured in consequence of such intoxication up to an aggregate amount of fifty thousand dollars, to be recovered in an action under this section, provided the aggrieved person or persons shall give written notice to such seller within sixty days of the occurrence of such injury to person or property of his or their intention to bring an action under this section. . . .”
The trial court reduced the jury’s award to $20,000 in accordance with General Statutes § 30-102. See footnote 2, supra.