Shannon Colt, Appellant, v Nathan Littauer Hospital, Respondent.
CV-24-0183
Appellate Division, Third Department
March 20, 2025
2025 NY Slip Op 01690
This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
Decided and Entered: March 20, 2025
Calendar Date: January 13, 2025
Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Reynolds Fitzgerald, Fisher and Mackey, JJ.
Theresa M. Suozzi, Saratoga Springs, for appellant.
Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC, Albany (Sanjeeve K. DeSoyza of counsel), for respondent.
Opinion
Mackey, J.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Martin Auffredou, J.), entered December 28, 2023 in Fulton County, which granted defendant‘s motion to dismiss the complaint.
Plaintiff was formerly employed as a pediatrician for defendant and, as a part of her employment agreement, was required to “[c]omply with [defendant]‘s governing policies.” In 2021, following the promulgation of the mandate requiring certain hospital personnel to receive a COVID-19 vaccine, defendant implemented a policy that required plaintiff to obtain a first dose of a COVID-19 vaccine by September 27, 2021 (see
“When presented with a motion to dismiss under
Plaintiff contends that Supreme Court improperly granted defendant‘s motion to dismiss because she “clearly allege[d] a cause of action for breach of contract” by referring multiple times to the employment agreement and by alleging that she was “unlawfully fired” in breach of the agreement. Plaintiff also argues that neither the Commissioner of Health nor defendant possessed the authority to require that plaintiff receive a COVID-19 vaccine. Plaintiff further asserts that she should have received a religious exemption from the vaccine requirement and that the Department of Health‘s policy had no rational basis. Plaintiff also asserts that she should be awarded punitive damages.
“[T]o recover for a breach of contract, a party must establish the existence of a contract, the party‘s own performance under the contract, the other party‘s breach of its contractual obligations, and damages resulting from the breach” (Collyer v LaVigne, 202 AD3d 1335, 1339-1340 (3d Dept 2022) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed 39 NY3d 925 [2022]; see New York Mun. Power Agency v Town of Massena, 188 AD3d 1517, 1519 (3d Dept 2020); Vestal v Pontillo, 158 AD3d 1036, 1041 (3d Dept 2018)). “When a written agreement is complete, clear and unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be found within the four corners of the contract, giving a practical interpretation to the language employed and reading the contract as a whole” (Modern Mktg. Concepts, Inc. v GAF Materials LLC, 195 AD3d 1204, 1205 (3d Dept 2021) [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]). “In order to adequately plead a cause of action for breach of contract, . . . the complaint must allege the provisions of the contract that were allegedly breached” (Woodhill Elec. v Jeffrey Beamish, Inc., 73 AD3d 1421, 1422 (3d Dept 2010) [citations omitted]; see Sutton v Hafner Valuation Group, Inc., 115 AD3d 1039, 1042 (3d Dept 2014)). This Court‘s “role is not to interpret the contract, but to determine whether defendant[ ] met [its] burden of proffering documentary evidence conclusively refuting plaintiff‘s allegations” (Shephard v Friedlander, 195 AD3d at 1194; accord Boland‘s Excavating & Topsoil, Inc. v Bradford Cent. Sch. Dist., 231 AD3d 1523, 1523 (4th Dept 2024)). Additionally, “a demand for punitive damages does not amount to a separate cause of action for pleading purposes” (Park v YMCA of Greater N.Y. Flushing, 17 AD3d 333, 334 (2d Dept 2005); see Rocanova v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 NY2d 603, 613 1994; Doller v Prescott, 167 AD3d 1298, 1301 (3d Dept 2018)).
In support of its motion to dismiss, defendant pointed to plaintiff‘s employment agreement, which was first executed in 2010 when plaintiff was initially hired. Plaintiff was reappointed in 2015 and her appointment was then extended through 2023. In the employment agreement, plaintiff agreed to “[c]omply with [defendant]‘s governing policies[,] e.g., the bylaws of [defendant], the bylaws of [defendant‘s] medical staff, and all policies, rules and regulations established from time to time by [defendant‘s] Board of Directors.” The termination clause of the employment agreement states that if plaintiff “materially breaches any one or more of the provisions of this [a]greement and fails to cure such breach within thirty (30) days after [defendant] delivers written notice to [plaintiff], stating the alleged breach,” then defendant could terminate the contract. The agreement also states that defendant could terminate it if plaintiff engaged “in any unprofessional conduct that interferes with or impairs the treatment, care or safety of patients.” Defendant also submitted its COVID-19 vaccine policy and its written denial of plaintiff‘s request for a religious exemption.
Preliminarily, Supreme Court properly dismissed plaintiff‘s second cause of action seeking punitive damages. While defendant contends that plaintiff failed to challenge the dismissal of this claim on appeal, she briefly renewed her request for punitive damages in her brief (compare Matter of RT 13 Rocks LLC v Town of Cortlandville, 229 AD3d 1018, 1020 [3d Dept 2024]; Wheat v Town of Forestburgh, 223 AD3d 1134, 1135 n 2 [3d Dept 2024]; Matter of Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v Assessor of Town of Catskill, 263 AD2d 558, 560 [3d Dept 1999]). In any event, it has long been established that “New York does not recognize an independent cause of action for punitive damages” (Gershman v Ahmad, 156 AD3d 868, 868 [2d Dept 2017] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]) and ” ‘[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for an ordinary breach of contract as their purpose is not to remedy private wrongs but to vindicate public rights’ ” (Calabrese Bakeries, Inc. v Rockland Bakery, Inc., 102 AD3d 1033, 1037 [3d Dept 2013], quoting Rocanova v Equitable Life Assur. Socy. of U.S., 83 NY2d at 613). Thus, the court properly dismissed plaintiff‘s second cause of action for punitive damages (see Doller v Prescott, 167 AD3d at 1301; Yong Wen Mo v Gee Ming Chan, 17 AD3d 356, 359 [2d Dept 2005]).
Supreme Court also properly granted defendant‘s motion to dismiss plaintiff‘s claim for breach of contract. Although plaintiff alleged that defendant breached her employment agreement, she failed to address which section of the contract defendant allegedly breached or how. Regardless of the adequacy of plaintiff‘s pleadings, under the employment agreement, which qualifies as documentary evidence for the purposes of
Egan Jr., J.P., Clark, Reynolds Fitzgerald and Fisher, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.