Colquitt appeals the grant of summary judgment on his counterclaim for interference with contract rights, costs and attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14, and abusive litigation under
Yost v. Torok,
Network Rental, Colquitt’s former employer, sued in August 1986 to enjoin him and another former manager from working as managers for a competitor in the “rent-to-own” industry. The suits were premised on a non-competition clause contained in the two men’s contracts with Network. The court hearing Colquitt’s suit ruled the clause enforceable while the court in the second suit held it was not.
Colquitt began work for Network in October 1985 and signed the employment contract with this following covenant: “Employee agrees that he will not, in any way, directly or indirectly, . . . within three *245 (3) years after the termination of his employment . . . either as an individual on his own account or as a partner, employee, officer, director, stockholder, or agent of or for any person, firm, association, or corporation, engage, within [fourteen named Georgia counties] in either the performance of any duties which are the same or similar to those duties performed by Employee while employed by Network Rental for, or the management of, any business establishment renting televisions, stereos, furniture, and appliances which are the same or similar to those rented by Network Rental within the territory described above.....” A clause provided that employee agreed that Network would be entitled to injunctive relief upon proof of a violation of the covenant. Colquitt had no experience in the rent-to-own industry and was given classroom and on-the-job managerial training. He became a manager of a Gwinnett County Network store before leaving Network voluntarily. He then began work for a direct competitor, managing its Gwinnett County store approximately a mile from Network’s.
Both cases were appealed to the Supreme Court, which found the clause unenforceable in a non-unanimous decision reversing the 9-month-old injunction against Colquitt.
Colquitt v. Network Rental,
Summary judgment was granted to Network on three causes of action in the amended counterclaim, i.e., intentional interference with contract claim; Yost; and attorney fees and costs pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14.
1. We first consider the scope of the review. Appellant filed a supplemental enumeration of errors on November 14, 1989 and a supporting brief on December 27. The case had been docketed on August 10 and appellant was required to file any enumeration of error within 20 days thereafter. “An enumeration of error may not be amended after the original filing time has expired. [Cits.]”
Parham v. State,
2. The trial court held that the fact that the restrictive covenant was eventually declared invalid did not mean the suit at its inception was “bereft of any justiciable issue” and that the action did not lack
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substantial justification, due to the court’s original grant of summary judgment to Network, citing
Biosphere Indus. v. Oxford Chemicals,
While Georgia does regard as void those contracts which lessen competition and restrain trade against public policy, a contract containing such type clause may be upheld “if the restraint is reasonable and the contract is valid in other respects. [Cit.]”
Shanco Intl. v. Digital Controls,
Colquitt’s contention below was that his clause was premised on an “anomaly” of Georgia law,
Pierce v. Indus. Boiler Co.,
(a) Because the area of non-compete clauses is one in which similar clauses beget dissimilar results and each case must be considered on its own particular facts, see
Fuller v. Kolb,
Colquitt contends the trial court’s reliance on its original summary judgment order as establishing “substantial justification,” which it labels probable cause, was erroneous. It was not.
Bulldog Trucking v. Adams,
(b) Likewise, the denial of OCGA § 9-15-14 attorney fees and costs of litigation was not an abuse of discretion under these circumstances. Bulldog, supra; Bouchard, supra; Biosphere, supra.
(c) The court granted summary judgment on the count for intentional interference with contract on the theory that, since the
Yost
and OCGA § 9-15-14 claims failed, there was no basis for that claim as a counterclaim for abusive litigation. This procedural rationale is relevant only to claims for attorney fees and costs under OCGA § 13-6-11, which is not present. However, a decision right for any reason
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will be affirmed.
Dorminy v. Dorminy,
The issue is whether a former employer tortiously interferes with the contract rights of its former employee by obtaining from a court an injunction against that former employee’s working for a competitor.
Network notified the competitor that Colquitt was working in violation of a non-compete clause, by copy of its attorney’s letter to Colquitt asking him to cease and desist. But the competitor took no steps to relieve Colquitt of his managerial duties. When Colquitt was advised of the order enjoining his working for a competitor, he quit.
An employee has a property right in his contract of employment with which another may not unlawfully interfere. OCGA § 51-9-1;
Ott v. Gandy,
Judgment affirmed.