163 F.2d 908 | D.C. Cir. | 1947
In August, 1941, appellee filed a complaint against the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia and his surety. Trial resulted in a verdict that was set aside and is not here on appeal. In 1944 the marshal died and his executors were substituted as defendants. In 1945 the issues for retrial were limited to an alleged forcible and unlawful entry and “any consequent damage that may have resulted therefrom.” The amended complaint alleges that in January, 1940, the marshal’s deputies forced their way into appellee’s home, and beat and arrested him, in attempting to serve civil process on a lodger.
It appeared at the new trial that the deputies had a warrant for the arrest and commitment of appellee’s -brother-in-law, a lodger in appellee’s home, who had been adjudged in contempt for failing to comply with an order requiring him to pay alimony for the support of-his wife and children. There was evidence that the deputies forced an entrance late at night, by pushing an unlocked door hard enough to overcome appel-lee’s resistance, and afterwards struck and arrested appellee. The court instructed the
Forcible entry of a dwelling in order to execute civil process is an actionable wrong.
An Act of Congress provides that “on the death of any person in whose favor or against whom a right of action may have accrued for any cause except an injury to the person or to the reputation, said right of action shall survive in favor of or against the legal representatives of the deceased; but no right of action for an injury to the person * * * or to the reputation, shall so survive
It is clear that appellee’s right of action for wrongful entry survived and may be enforced against the marshal’s executors and surety. When a wrongful entry leads to
further conduct on the premises which is harmful to the occupant, his right of action for the wrongful entry carries with. it a right to recover damages for such conduct. “Whatever is done after the breaking and entry is but aggravation of damages.”
Considerations of policy confirm our conclusion. Lawless invasion of homes is the more menacing to a democratic society when it is committed by public officers. The forcible entry of appellee’s home by the deputies would be a grave wrong, and one for which appellants would be answerable, even if it had not led to the infliction of personal injuries. There would be neither logic nor policy in denying appellee redress for the injuries which actually resulted from the wrong.
It is immaterial that the statutory period of limitations
Affirmed.
Palmer v. King, 41 App.D.C. 419, L.R.A. 1916D, 278, Ann.Cas. 1915C, 1139; 47 Am.Jur. 863.
27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 259, p. 1037. Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L.Ed. 797, 34 L.R.A.,N.S., 874; Barrett v. Barrett, 287 Ky. 216, 152 S.W.2d 610; Sells v. Sells, 193 Okl. 27, 140 P.2d 1022.
Palmer v. King, supra Note 1.
D.C.Code 1940, § 12—101. Italics added.
D.C.Code 1940, § 20—501.
Adams v. Blodgett, 47 N.H. 219, 90 Am.Dec. 569, 570.
Ilsley v. Nichols, 12 Pick., Mass., 270, 22 Am.Dec. 425.
State ex rel. McPheron v. Beekner, 132 Ind. 371, 31 N.E. 950, 32 Am.St. Rep. 257.
Meagher v. Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281, 96 Am.Dec. 759.
Donohue v. Dyer, 23 Ind. 521.
Gorman v. Marsteller, 2 Cranch C.C. 311, Fed.Cas.No.5629.
McAfee v. Crofford, 13 How., U.S., 447, 14 L.Ed. 217, illustrates several aspects of this familiar principle.
The intervening act may eren be that of the plaintiff himself. Wagner v. International R. Co., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437, 19 A.L.R. 1.
D.C.Code 1940, § 12—201.