Case Information
*2 M cKAY , Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Colorado Judicial Department (“CJD”) appeals the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) reversing the bankruptcy court for the District of Colorado and concluding that restitution ordered pursuant to juvenile delinquency proceedings is dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3). CJD argues that an adjudication of guilt resulting from juvenile delinquency laws is equivalent to a conviction of crime, and, therefore, that restitution— whether ordered against a juvenile or an adult— is nondischargeable because it is “included in a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime” under § 1328(a)(3).
B ACKGROUND [1]
Defendant–Appellee Shea Thomas Sweeney was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent at the age of tw elve for having committed second degree arson. A s part of his sentence, M r. Sw eeney was ordered to pay $89,202.10 in restitution.
Approximately eleven years later and having well surpassed the age of adulthood, M r. Sweeney filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy. He listed the roughly $85,000 outstanding restitution balance as a potentially dischargeable debt. CJD filed an adversary proceeding challenging the inclusion of the restitution award in *3 the Chapter 13 petition. The parties conceded that trial was not necessary and filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court awarded CJD summary judgment after concluding that the restitution award was not dischargeable under Colorado state law because restitution for juveniles was governed by Colorado’s Criminal Code, not its separate Children’s Code. M r. Sweeney appealed and the BAP reversed.
The BAP, applying federal law, determined that juvenile delinquency is an adjudication of status, not guilt, and therefore could not be considered a “conviction of a crime” under § 1328(a)(3). CJD appealed, and we now address this issue of first impression.
A NALYSIS
As an initial matter, we observe that we properly maintain jurisdiction over
this appeal despite the BAP’s remand order. W hile a remand order requiring the
bankruptcy court to engage in “significant further proceedings” would not be a
final, appealable order,
Homa Ltd. v. Stone (In re Commercial Contractors, Inc.)
,
Section 1328(a)(3) excepts from discharge “restitution . . . included in a *4 sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a crime.” W hether this subsection includes restitution ordered pursuant to an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See Troff v. Utah (In re Troff) , --- F.3d ----, 2007 W L 1314489, at *1 (10th Cir. M ar. 15, 2007). Nondischargeability is a matter of federal law. See Grogan v. Garner , 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991).
Under federal law, juvenile delinquency is defined as “the violation of a
law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday
which would have been a crime if committed by an adult.” 18 U.S.C. § 5031.
W e previously have stated that this definition means that juvenile delinquency is
“an adjudication of status— not a criminal conviction.”
United States v. Brian N.
,
Section 1328(a)(3) of the bankruptcy code precludes dischargeability of
restitution that was “included in a sentence on the debtor’s conviction of a
crime.” CJD argues that dictionary definitions of the word “conviction” illustrate
a uniform understanding of “crime” such that M r. Sw eeney “was found guilty of”
and “w as sentenced for committing the crime of second degree arson.” (A plt.’s
*5
Opening Br. at 12.) This contention fundamentally mischaracterizes juvenile
delinquency law. As noted above, an adjudication of juvenile delinquency is not
equivalent to a conviction precisely because § 5031 punishes “violation[s]” of the
law that “
w ould have been a crime
if committed by an adult,” 18 U.S.C. § 5031
(emphasis added), with a classification of “status” as opposed to “criminal
conviction.”
Brian N.
,
W e observe that the same holds true under Colorado law, which likew ise
separates juvenile delinquency from criminal conviction. Under the Colorado
Children’s Code, a juvenile delinquent is one who has been adjudicated such after
having been found “guilty of a delinquent act.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-103(71)
(2006);
id.
§ 19-1-103(2);
see C.B. v. People
,
CJD and the amicus curiae also make lengthy public policy arguments. The *6 crux of these arguments is that permitting juvenile delinquents to escape restitution simply by filing for bankruptcy undercuts not only the rehabilitory and anti-recidivist purposes behind juvenile delinquency laws, but also the compensatory purpose of restitution. However, the public policy effects are not ours to resolve in the face of unambiguous statutory language. As CJD points out, Congress enacted § 1328(a)(3) “to eliminate a loophole.” (Aplt.’s Opening Br. at 24.) W hether due to a lack of foresight or an intentional limitation, the provision as written does not encompass juvenile-delinquency-related restitution, and therefore it is not the province of this court to close that loophole.
W e are not convinced that Congress’ failure to paint in broad strokes violates the principle of comity or infringes states’ rights. As M r. Sweeney notes, “[t]his argument makes little sense when you consider that prior to enactment of § 1328(a)(3) in 1990 all state restitution orders were dischargeable in a Chapter 13 proceeding[].” (Aple.’s Br. at 10 (citing Pa. Dep’t of Welfare v. Davenport , 495 U.S. 552, 563 (1990)).) Nor is this limited avenue for restitution avoidance likely to result in a deluge of juvenile delinquents rushing into bankruptcy once reaching the age of adulthood. M r. Sw eeney did not immediately file for bankruptcy upon turning eighteen, and the probation office had long before determined M r. Sweeney’s inability to pay.
Thus, the decision of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel is AFFIRM ED .
Notes
[1] The parties do not dispute the material facts of the case.