OPINION
T1 Color Country Management and Mid Century Insurance Company (collectively Color Country) petition for review of the action of the Labor Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-801(8) (1997), 63-46b-16 (1997), 1 and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 2
BACKGROUND
12 Because Color Country does not challenge the Appeals Board's findings of fact, we recite the relevant facts from the Board's order on Color Country's motion for review. See Osman Home Imp. v. Indus. Comm'n,
T3 Nellie Thomas was employed by Color Country at its Sizzler restaurant where she worked preparing salads and maintaining the salad bar. On October 15, 1994, Thomas,
T4 On May 15, 1997, Thomas filed an application for a hearing regarding her workers' compensation claim. An administrative law judge (ALJ) held an evidentiary hеaring on January 6, 1998. On January 8, 1998, the ALJ awarded Thomas temporary total disability benefits of $140 per week and specifically reserved ruling on permanent partial and permanent total disability.
15 On June 23, 1998, the same ALJ issued a supplemental order, citing a January 20, 1998 report 3 by Dr. Seott Smith in which Dr. Smith gave Thomas a twenty percent whole person impairment rating based on the problems she had with her left arm, shoulder, and her neck. The ALJ awarded Thomas permanent partial disability benefits based on the twenty percent whole person impairment, with a credit for amounts already paid by Color Country, and reserved ruling on permanent total disability.
T6 On August 11, 1998, the same ALJ issued a third order finding that because Thomas had reached medical stability, the issue of permanent total disability was now "ripe for determination," and concluded Thomas was "tentatively permanently totally disabled." He ordered Color Country to pay subsistence benefits of $140 per week, suspended permanent partial payments, and informed the parties that Color Country could submit a reemployment plan and request a hearing on the plan.
T 7 In September 1998, Color Country submitted a reemployment plan and requested a hearing. In the meantime, the first ALJ retired and a second ALJ held a hearing March 8, 2000, regarding the reemployment plan submitted by Color Country. On May 18, 2000, he issued an abstract based on the August 11, 1998 award. On June 14, 2000, the second ALJ issued an order in which he reaffirmed the earlier orders, rejected the reemployment plan, and entered a final award of permanent total disability.
T8 Color Country subsequently filed two motions for review: one filed June 16, 2000, to have the Appeals Board review the propriety of the abstract, and one filed July 14, 2000, to have the Appeals Board review the compensation award.
T9 In its October 31, 2000 order addressing the compensation award, the Board found that by January 20, 1998, Thomas had reached medical stability with permanent impairments to her left shoulder consisting of limitations to her range of motion, "joint crepitation, and distal clavicle resection." The Board determined that Thomas had a twenty-nine percent impairment of the left shoulder, which it equated as a seventeen percent whole person impairment. The Board described the neck impairment as "critical signs of impairment without radieu-lopathy or loss of motion, but with some evidence of arthritis for [a] 5% whole person impairment." The Board determined that these impairments, when combined, produced a twenty percent whole person impairment.
T10 The Board agreed with the earlier findings by the ALJ that Thomas could not perform other work reasonably available when taking into consideration her "age, education, past work experience, medical capacity and residual functional capacity." The Board noted that Thomas had over thirty years experience as a certified nursing assistant, but that she could not resume those duties due to her impairment. The Board found that she could not return to her job at
{11 The Board then examined the reem-ploymnet plan that Color Country submitted. The Board noted that the plan did not provide for "education, training, accommodation of physical problems or payment of continuing disability compensation to provide for ... subsistence during the period of rehabilitation and reemployment."
112 Based on its findings, the Board concluded that Thomas had carried hеr burden of proving permanent total disability and that she was entitled to an award of $131 per week, reduced from the $140 per week awarded by the ALJ. 4
113 After the Board's October 31, 2000 decision affirming the ALJ's rejection of the reemployment plan and the award of permanent total disability, Color Country filed a petition for judicial review in this court pursuant to section 34A-2-801(8), section 63-46b-16, and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1 14 On January 22, 2001, the Commission denied the motion for review of the abstract by stating that the Appeals Board would not take any action on the motion for review of the abstract because "it appears your motion for review is moot" due to a stay granted by the district court.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1 15 On аppeal, Color Country argues that (1) the Commission misinterpreted Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994); 5 (2) its due process rights were violated by the Commission, and if the Commission interpreted and applied section 35-1-67 correctly, then seetion 85-1-67 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied; and (8) the abstract was improperly issued because there was no final order at the time it was issued.
116 "Judicial review of final agency actions is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act." Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm'n,
117 Whether the statute itself is unconstitutional, and whether the agency interpretation of the statute is unconstitutional or incorrect, are questions of law that are reviewed under a correction of error standard. See Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n,
ANALYSIS
118 We first address Color Country's claim that the Commission interpreted seetion 35-1-67 incorrectly by requiring Commission approval of a reemployment plan. Color Country also argues the Commission erred by concluding that the reemployment plan must include subsistence payments and that the plan was unreasonable.
1 19 According to Color Country, the hearing called for in section 35-1-67 is merely to determine whether the reemployment plan is
120 Section 85-1-67 allows an employer to submit a reemployment plan for an employee whо is seeking permanent total disability benefits:
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, until;
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(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the commission a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment or the employer or its insurance carrier provides the commission notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the commission, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise stipulated, to consider evidence regarding rehabilitation and to review any reemployment plаn submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
Utah Code Ann. § 385-1-67 (1994) (emphasis added). When interpreting statutory provisions, we are guided by our primary purpose of giving effect to the legislative intent, and we first turn to the plain language of the statute to divine this intent. See Regal Ins. Co. v. Bott,
121 The verb "review" is defined as: "to go over or examine critically or deliberately"; "to go over with critical examination in order to discover excellences or defects"; and "to make a formal or official examination of the state of" something. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1944 (1986). This meaning, taken together with the requirement that the employer "submit" the plan, that the commission "consider" evidenсe, and that the plan be "reasonably designed to return the employee to gainful employment" convinces us that the plain meaning that the Legislature intended by its use of the word "review" in section 85-1-67(6) was to have the Commission independently evaluate and approve the employer's reemployment plan. We think it is clear that to require an entity to submit something to an agency charged with implementation of a remedial act and ask the agency to review it for reasonableness requires an evaluation and the agency's approval. The alternative construction urged by Color Country, if carried to its logical extreme, would give employers who sought to avoid paying comрensation the ability to draft a plan that an employee had no chance of fulfilling and then deny benefits because the employee was not cooperating with reemployment - efforts. This would be in direct contravention to the larger purpose and spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. See Wilstead v. Indus. Comm'n,
122 We also reject Color Country's argument that the Commission erred in ruling that the statute requires that the reemployment plan provide for the payment of subsistence _ benefits. Section _ 35-1-67(6)(c)(ii) plainly states that a plan "shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67(6)(c)(ii) (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, not only was the Commission's decision that the subsistence benefits must be included in the plan correct, it was also correct to rule the plan was defective for failing to do so. Moreover, the second ALJ pointed to an additional shortcoming of the plan when he rejected it. According to the June 14, 2000 order, the plan was defective because the physical work re
128 Color Country next argues that its due process rights were violated by the Commission and that section 35-1-67 is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clauses of the Federal and Utah Constitutions. Color Country cites to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution in making this argument, but it does not articulate any basis for interpreting the two provisions differently or suggest that Article 1, Section 7 entitles it to greater protection than that afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, we analyze this claim only under the due process clause of the Fourteеnth Amendment and we undertake no independent analysis of Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. See State v. Kohl,
¶ 24 Notwithstanding that the general poli-cles and provisions of workers' compensation acts are not unconstitutional, 6 particular provisions of these acts may yet run afoul of the Constitution, and so we now turn to consider the specific due process challenges raised by Color Country.
125 Color Country's due process argument has several components. First, it argues that its due process rights were violated because the issues of permanent partial and permanent total disability were not ripe for consideration at the time of the first hearing before the ALJ on January 6, 1998. The basis for this argument is that Thomas had not reached medical stability by the time of the first hearing, and she had not received any permanent work restrictions. Color Country argues that the permanent partial and permanent total disability claims should have been dismissed at the first hearing, and because these issues were not dismissed, the Commission "exceeded its adjudicative authority and denied [Color Country's] due process rights to a meaningful hearing." We reject this argument.
126 The ALJ's January 8, 1998 order awarded only temporary total disability benefits and expressly reserved ruling on the permanent partial and permanent total disability issues because Thomas had not reached medical stability. Workers' compensation claims are best viewed as a process, rather than as a discrete event, and the Commission had continuing jurisdiction over
27 The second due process argument focuses on the procedures used by the Commission. Colоr Country claims that the Commission deprived it of a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the manner in which the evidence was considered. Color Country claims it did not have adequate notice that the Commission would consider the permanent partial and permanent total disability issues without an additional hearing or post-hearing opportunities to submit additional evidence by both parties. In addition, Color Country complains that the Commission violated its due process rights when the first ALJ allowed Thomas to submit "post-hearing evidence regarding her impairment rating and work restrictions." Color Country also complains that the second ALJ violated its due process rights by failing to consider certain evidence submitted by it and by failing to appoint a medical panel.
¶28 Under Utah Code Ann. § 85-1-88 (1994),
7
the Commission is not bound by the usual rules of evidence or any formal rules of procedure. Although proceedings for workers' compensation claims are very informal and of their own kind or class, the proceedings still must satisfy basic notions of fairness. See Utah Fuel Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
{29 In addition, the second ALJ, in his June 14, 2000 order, reviewed all the evidence, including the functional capacity evaluation (FCE) by Michael Meek and the independent medical examination (IME) by Dr. Root.
8
Thus, even if, as Color Country argues, the first ALJ failed to consider evidence submitted by Color Country, there were two more independent analyses of all the evidence submitted in this case: one by the second ALJ after the March 8, 2000 hearing and again by the Board on Color Country's motion for review, and we fail to see how Color Country was denied due process of law here. See Vali Convalescent & Care Inst. v. Indus. Comm'n,
130 We also reject Color Country's claim that it was denied due process because there was no medical panel appointed. The appointment of a medical panel is discretionary and is called for when there are significant medical issues in dispute. See Willardson v. Indus. Comm'n,
31 Moreover, as the Board noted in its October 2000 order, in Dr. Root's 1998 IME, his ultimate conclusion on Thomas's employa-bility was: "I think her chances of being gainfully employed with all of these problems would be difficult." In the IME, Dr. Root also stated that "Ms. Thomas's complaints about neck and shoulder discomfort are directly related to the initial injury in October of 1994." Thus, Dr. Root's conclusions were not in conflict with the conclusions of Dr. Smith on these issues. Considering all of the аbove, we cannot say the Commission abused its discretion by not appointing a medical panel.
1 32 Color Country also argues that if the Commission's interpretation and application of section 35-1-67 is correct, then section 35-1-67 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied for additional reasons. Color Country argues that section 85-1-67 violates the due process clause because it does not provide time frames for the second hearing or any opportunity for corrective action following a second hearing. Color Country also argues that the Act is unconstitutional because there is no provision for recoupment of monies paid as subsistence benefits to an еmployee pursuant to an interim order if it later turns out that the finding of permanent total disability was erroneous. Color Country argues that it can be years before such an order is judicially reviewed, and because the employee does not have to hold the money in trust, there is "little or no chance of any recovery."
133 It is clear that Color Country has a property interest in the monies it pays for compensation benefits and/or insurance premiums. - It is equally clear that, for purposes of our due process analysis, there has been state action here. This isgue turns, then, on whether Color Country received all the process it was due before the Commission deprived it of its property intеrest.
34 In Mathews v. Eldridge,
11 35 In addressing each of these factors in the context of the SSDI benefits at issue in Mathews, the Court noted that due process is not a "'technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and cireum-stances." Id. at 334,
136 We adopted the reasoning and the factors from Mathews in Lander v. Industrial Commission,
137 The second Mathews factor, however, weighs in favor of the Commission. In addition to multiple hearings on the issue of disability under the Act, the Commission also has the ability to reconsider prior rulings due to its continuing jurisdiction over claims. See Spencer v. Indus. Comm'n,
1138 The Mathews Court pointed out that "the decision whether to [award] disability benefits will turn, in most cases, upon 'routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports by physician specialists'" Mathews,
€ 39 The reasoning of the Mathews Court applies equally here. +The procedures under UAPA outlined above, the nature of the evi-dentiary determination to be made, the fact that there were multiple hearings, continuing jurisdiction to cure defects, and the fact that the claimant bears the ultimate burden, all persuade us that the risk of erroneous deprivation under existing procedures is low, and that there is little, if any, probable value in the additional procedures suggested by Color Country.
T 40 The final Mathews factor requires an examination of the governmental interest at stake, including the burdens of added procedures. As the Mathews Court noted:
At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual affected by the administrative action and to society in terms of increased assurance that the action is just, may be outweighed by the cost. Significantly, the cost of protecting those whom the preliminary administrative process has identified as likely to be found undeserving may in the end come out of the pockets of the deserving since resources available for any particular program of social welfare are not unlimited.
Id. at 348,
T41 Thus, we do not agree with Color Country that section 85-1-67 is constitutionally deficient for failure to mandate additional hearings or require that specific time lines
42 We also reject Color Country's argument that the statute is unconstitutional because there is no provision for recoupment of money paid under an interim order that is later reversed. In Kerans v. Industrial Commission,
€ 43 On balance, we conclude that the risk of erroneous deprivation of Color Country's property interest under the procedures of section 35-1-67 and UAPA is so minimal that the benefits of any additional procedures are outweighed by their administrative costs. In addition to the fiscal and administrative costs imposed by additional procedures, the delay and potential deprivation of benefits to claimants who have already met their initial burden of proving a compensable claim weighs heavily against Color Country, where the very purpose of the Act challenged is to do away with expense and delay and afford injured workers speedy, certain, and just compensation. Any claimed harm to employers and insurers in Color Country's position is also mitigated by the ability to spread the costs associated with the Act over an entire industry and then on to society as a whole by adjusting the appropriate rates of insurance premiums and charges. The procedures used by the Commissiоn under section 35-1-67 and UAPA provided all the process that was constitutionally due before Color Country was deprived of its property interest.
10
All things considered,, Color Country's arguments are best directed to the Legislature. See Rekward v. Indus. Comm'n,
144 Color Country's final argument is that the abstract should not have been issued by the second ALJ because there was no final order at the time. The Commission concedes this point in its brief, although Thomas does not.
145 The abstract was issued under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-212 (1997), which states that an abstract "of any final order providing an awаrd" can be filed under the Act with the clerk of the district court. At the time the abstract was issued, in May of 2000, the second ALJ's findings, conclusions, and order based on the March 2000 hearing had not yet issued, and there was no oral ruling from the bench at that hearing. Thus, the only order the abstract could have been based on was
T46 The August 1998 order by the first ALJ made only a "tentative" award. Under Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission,
CONCLUSION
T 47 We reject Color Country's interpretation of section 85-1-67 and affirm the Commission's determination that the reemployment plan was not reasonable. We reject Color Country's claim that the Commission and the statute deprived it of due process of law. We also conclude that the abstract was improperly issued. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the order issuing the abstract, and otherwise affirm.
148 WE CONCUR: NORMAN H. JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge, and WILLIAM A. THORNE, Jr., Judge.
Notes
. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) applies to all administrative proceedings commenced on or after January 1, 1988. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22(1) (1997); South Davis Cmty. Hosp. v. Dep't of Health,
. Color Country refers to the Commission in its motion for review and throughout its brief although the decision under review was issued by the Appeals Board. A decision of the Appeals Board is treated as a final order of the Commission unless set aside by this court. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-303(2)(c)(ii) (1997).
. Although the impairment rating was done January 20, 1998, it was not received by the Commission until June 22, 1998.
. The reduction of benefits is not an issue on appeal.
. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 (1994) was the applicable statute for awarding permanent total disability benefits at the time Thomas sustained her workplace injury. See Abel v. Indus. Comm'n,
. According to Professor Larson, the American system of workers' compensation that evolved near the turn of the twentieth century differed from the German system, which incorporated contributions from the workers for insurance, in that it imposed "unilateral liability without fault upon the employer," and made the employer "bear the entire burden of any insurance against that liability." 1 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation Law § 2.06, at 2-11 (2001). Nevertheless, it is well-settled that workers' compensation acts in gеneral, and the Utah Act specifically, do not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because they impose liability upon industry without regard to fault or because they have abrogated defenses available to employers at common law. See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
Over the years, the Utah Supreme Court has rejected several due process challenges to the Workers' Compensation Act brought by employers, beginning as eаrly as 1918. See, e.g., Scranton Leasing Co. v. Indus. Comm'n,
. - Currently codified at Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-802 (1997).
. In fact, the second ALJ had to independently review the evidence and make his own findings on the issue of permanent total disability compensation because the first ALJ had mistakenly relied on Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413 (1997) instead of section 35-1-67. The second ALJ addressed Thomas's claim and re-analyzed the findings made by the first ALJ under section 35-1-67, applying the statutory factors and those in the pertinent sections of the Administrative Code, and he reached the same conclusion as the first ALJ: that Thomas was entitled to permanent total disability compensation.
. Except as limited by section 63-46b-1(2)(i).
. Because we reject Color Country's "as applied" challenge, its facial challenge must necessarily fail. See United States v. Salerno,
. - Color Country also argues that it is entitled to the costs and fees that arose from defending against the abstract, but because Color Country has failed to cite to authority of any kind in support of this argument, we decline to address it. See Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(9); State v. Thomas,