321 Mass. 495 | Mass. | 1947
The plaintiff, a printer and distributor of books in Clinton, brings this bill in equity against certain individuals, who are officers and members either of a labor union known as the Clinton Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union, Local 265, or of a parent union known as the International Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America. By the bill, which alleges the existence of an unlawful strike, the plaintiff seeks an injunction against picketing and against interference with its business. The judge made “findings and rulings of law,” pursuant to which a final decree was entered enjoining the defendants, who appealed. The evidence is not reported.
The present purpose of the strike is to secure the retention in a contract, which is to be negotiated between the plaintiff and the local union, of a maintenance of union membership provision similar to that contained in their previous contract, which had been terminated. The most important part of this provision was that, subject to a fifteen day “escape period,” “All employees who, on February 14, 1945, are members of the union in good standing in accordance with its constitution and by-laws and all employees who become members after that date, shall as a condition of employment maintain their membership in good standing for the duration of the collective agreement in which this provision is incorporated, or until further order of the [national war labor] board.”
It is well settled in this Commonwealth, as the defendants concede, that a strike for a closed shop is a strike for an illegal purpose. Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294. Folsom v. Lewis, 208 Mass. 336. Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Hill, 231 Mass. 30. Folsom Engraving Co. v. McNeil, 235 Mass. 269. A. T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett, 260 Mass. 45, 60-61. Quinton’s Market, Inc. v. Patterson, 303 Mass. 315, 317. Fashioncraft, Inc. v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 388. It is also settled that in order to justify the infliction of intentional injury and to escape the liability which follows from the ordinarily tortious quality of such an act, the
The first question to be decided is whether a strike for a maintenance of union membership agreement falls within the unlawful category. This provision in union contracts originated with the national defense mediation board in 1941 and was subsequently adopted by the national war labor board. See Report on the work of the National Defense Mediation Board, Bulletin No. 714, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1942); 57 Harv. L. Rev. 183, 184, Manoff, The National War Labor Board and the Maintenance-of-Membership Clause; In re Caterpillar Tractor Co. 2 War Lab. Rep. 75, 78 (dissenting opinion). The first cases involving the subject before the national war labor board stress the fact that the unions had renounced the right to strike for the period of the war, and point out the fairness of allowing them in return a “union security plan.” In re Walker Turner Co. Inc. 1 War Lab. Rep. 101, 108, 109. In re International Harvester Co. 1 War Lab. Rep. 112, 120-121. The same underlying thought appears in later opinions of the board. See, for example, In re Ryan Aeronautical Co. 1 War Lab. Rep. 305, 318; In re Caterpillar Tractor Co. 2 War Lab. Rep. 75, 77; In re Monsanto Chemical Co. 2 War Lab. Rep. 479, 482; In re General Chemical Co. 3 War Lab. Rep. 387, 394-395. In re Harvill Aircraft Die Casting Corp. 6 War Lab. Rep. 334, 338, it was said, “The National War Labor
The provision is explained in decisions of the board. It requires only that an employee who is a member when the contract becomes effective and at the expiration of the escape period, or who thereafter voluntarily joins the union, shall remain a member in good standing. It does not create a closed shop, because it does not require that only union members be employed. It does not create a union shop, because it does not require the employees who have been hired, to join the union. It does not create a preferential union shop, because it does not require that preference in hiring be given to union members. No employee, old or new, is obliged to join the union to keep his job. If in the union, a member has the duration of the escape period to get out but still keep his job. If not in the union, the worker is free to stay out and keep his job. See In re Federal Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. 1 War Lab. Rep. 140, 142; In re Harvill Aircraft Die Casting Corp. 6 War Lab. Rep. 334, 338.
It is obvious that the provision for maintenance of union membership is in substance a means to provide union security. As such, it falls within the principles frequently enunciated with respect to the closed shop. A strike for its inclusion in an agreement with an employer is designed to afford augumented strength to the union in a potential future controversy. It cannot be upheld as a lawful strike objective under our decisions. The right of their own which the defendants claim to exercise bears merely a remote or secondary, and not a direct, relation to their own lawful advantage. The fact that union membership is not compulsory is only a difference in the degree of security.
The next question for our determination is whether, notwithstanding the unlawful purpose of the strike, the defendants may picket the plaintiff’s plant at the entrances and at the “railroad crossing,” under the guise of the right of free speech guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States. The judge found that the union placed a picket line around the plaintiff’s plant, and also at a rail
The facts which the judge found pursuant to G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 214, § 9A, as inserted by St. 1935, c. 407, § 4, are that by reason of the combination of persons, members of the union, intentionally endeavoring to injure the business of the plaintiff, there have been unlawful acts committed which will be continued unless restrained; that there has. been substantial and irreparable injury to the plaintiff’s business; that there has been injury to the plaintiff’s property which is greater than that to the defendants; that the denial of relief would inflict greater injury upon the plaintiff than granting it would on the defendants; that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law; that the public officers charged with the duty to protect the plaintiff’s property are unable to furnish adequate protection, in that the injury to the plaintiff’s property has been caused not by any acts of the defendants which are violations of the criminal law, but rather by acts which are unlawful from the point of view of the civil law of the Commonwealth; that the plaintiff has not failed to comply with any obligation imposed upon it by law; and that the plaintiff has made every reasonable effort to settle the dispute by negotiation and “with the aid of available governmental machinery.”
The defendants rely upon certain of the more recent eases in the Supreme Court of the United States. Senn v.
Decree affirmed with costs.
The remainder of the provision was as follows: “The union, its officers and members shall not intimidate or coerce employees into joining the union or continuing their membership therein. (2) If a dispute arises as to whether an employee (1) was a member of the union on the date specified above or (2) was intimidated or coerced during the fifteen day ‘escape period’ into joining the union or continuing his membership therein, such dispute may be submitted for determination by an arbitrator to be appointed by the regional war labor board, region I. The decision of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the parties. (3) If a dispute arises as to whether an employee (1) has failed to maintain his membership in the union in good standing after the aforesaid date, or (2) was intimidated or coerced into joining the union after the aforesaid date, such dispute may be submitted for determination by an arbitrator to be selected in the manner provided by the contract of the
The “escape period” is not set forth or described in the record. In other cases the board's order provided before its effective date for a fifteen day period, during which members might withdraw from the union. See, for example, In re Ryan Aeronautical Co. 1 War Lab. Rep. 305, 307; In re Caterpillar Tractor Co. 2 War Lab. Rep. 75, 77.