245 Conn. 710 | Conn. | 1998
Opinion
In Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, 219 Conn. 764, 594 A.2d 468 (1991), we held that under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2),
The material facts and procedural history are undisputed. At all times relevant to this appeal, the defendant, D. Eugene Bryant (Bryant), and his wife, Judith Bryant, owned three vehicles. Two of those vehicles were insured under a policy issued by Colonial Penn Insurance Company (Colonial Penn), and the third vehicle was insured under a policy issued by Royal Insurance Company (Royal). Bryant and his wife were the named insureds under each of the two policies. The Royal policy provided for $250,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. Prior to March, 1988, the Colonial Penn policy provided uninsured motorist coverage of $100,000 for each of the two vehicles covered under the policy.
Upon notification by Colonial Penn that its policy was due to expire, Bryant renewed the policy in March, 1988. Bryant also signed and forwarded to Colonial Penn a form requesting a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage from $100,000 per vehicle to $20,000 per vehicle.
Bryant thereafter was injured in an automobile accident on September 20, 1989. After exhausting the tort-feasor’s liability coverage of $25,000, Bryant sought to
Bryant claimed that because his wife had not signed the form requesting a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage under the Colonial Penn policy, his request was ineffective in light of our decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 764, and, consequently, he was eligible under that policy for uninsured motorist benefits in the total amount of $200,000 ($100,000 x 2 vehicles).
The case proceeded to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the Colonial Penn policy. The arbitration panel, with one of the three members dissenting, concluded that: (1) Bryant had sustained damages totaling $180,000; (2) because Bryant had received $25,000 from the tortfeasor, he was entitled to a balance of $155,000 under the uninsured motorist provisions of the applicable policy or policies; (3) in light of our decision in Pasión, Bryant’s request for a reduction in coverage under the Colonial Penn policy was ineffective because the signature of the second named insured, Judith Bryant, did not appear on the request form and, consequently, Bryant was entitled to $200,000 in uninsured
Colonial Penn appealed from the arbitration award to the trial court.
Royal petitioned for certification to appeal to this court. We granted Royal’s petition limited to the following issues: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that: (1) Under General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2), and Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, [supra] 219 Conn. 764, the signature of the defendant, D. Eugene Bryant, was sufficient to render the reduction
On appeal to this court, Royal
I
Before turning to the question of whether Pasión is applicable in the circumstances of this case, we first address the Appellate Court’s conclusion that P.A. 93-297, § l,
“Whether to apply a statute retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature in enacting the statute. See, e.g., State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 284, 528 A.2d 760 (1987). In order to determine the legislative intent, we utilize well established rules of statutory construction. ‘Our point of departure is General Statutes § 55-3, which states: “No provision of the general statutes, not previously contained in the statutes of the state, which imposes any new obligation on any person or corporation, shall be construed to have retrospective effect.” The “obligations” referred to in the statute are those of substantive law. . . . Thus, we have uniformly interpreted § 55-3 as a rule of presumed legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only.’ ”
Colonial Penn concedes, and the Appellate Court recognized,
The Appellate Court nevertheless concluded that, in light of the fact that the legislature’s decision to change the statutory language from “the insured” to “any named insured” was prompted by our decision in Pasión,
Colonial Penn contends that Reliance Ins. Co. v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pennsylvania, supra, 238 Conn. 285, supports its claim that P.A. 93-297, § 1, as it amended subsection (a) (2) of § 38-175c (hereinafter P.A. 93-297, § 1 [a] [2]), should be applied retroactively. In Reliance Ins. Co., we concluded that a different and unrelated part of P.A. 93-297, § 1, later codified at General Statutes § 38a-336 (f),
Furthermore, P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) provides that no request for a reduction in uninsured motorist benefits by “any named insured” shall be effective unless that insured has signed an informed consent form containing: (1) an explanation of uninsured and underin-sured motorist coverage; (2) a list of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage options available from the insurer; (3) the premium cost for each of those coverage options; and (4) a specific admonition, in twelve-point type, informing the insured of the consequences of choosing reduced coverage and advising the insured to seek assistance from a qualified advisor if he or she is uncertain about the effect of such an election. Neither Bryant nor Royal, however, claims that these requirements are also to be applied retroactively,
Finally, P.A. 93-297, entitled “An Act Concerning Automobile Insurance Reform,” made comprehensive changes to the law of uninsured motorist coverage.
II
We next turn to the question of whether our decision in Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion, supra, 219 Conn. 764, controls this case. We conclude that it does not.
In Pasion, we determined that, under § 38-175c (a) (2), a request for a reduction in uninsured motorist benefits by Carlos Londono, who, along with his wife, Alexis, was a named insured on an automobile liability policy issued to the Londonos by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, was not binding on a third party who was injured in an accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle covered under the policy. Id., 771. In so holding, we concluded, first, that the requirement that any reduction in uninsured motorist coverage be requested in writing by the “insured” was ambiguous because it was not clear, in the circumstances of that case, whether the term “insured” referred to any named insured or to all named insureds. Id., 769.
We then reviewed the pertinent legislative history,
Relying on our conclusion in Pasion that the legislative objective underlying the signature requirement of § 38-175c (a) (2) was to promote informed decision-making by purchasers of uninsured motorist coverage; id., 770-71; the Appellate Court reasoned that in view of the fact that Bryant himself had sought the reduction in coverage, his “election was not uninformed”; Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 45 Conn. App. 562; and, consequently, Bryant’s endorsement and submission of the reduction request form was sufficient to effect a reduction in coverage “[a]s to him.” Id. We agree with the conclusion of the Appellate Court. “It is not our practice to construe a statute in a way to thwart its purpose or lead to absurd results; Sutton v. Lopes, 201 Conn. 115, 121, 513 A.2d 139, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964, 107 S. Ct. 466, 93 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1986); or in a way ‘that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve.’ Fairfield Plumbing & Heating Supply Corp. v. Kosa, 220 Conn. 643, 651, 600 A.2d 1 (1991).” Doe v. Marselle, 236 Conn. 845, 859-60, 675 A.2d 835 (1996); see also Coley v. Camden Associates, Inc., supra, 243 Conn. 319-20. In light of the intent and purpose of the legislature in enacting § 38-175c (a) (2), we see no reason why a named insured who personally has elected a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage under that provision, and who has paid a premium commensurate with that choice, should not be bound by that decision.
This interpretation of § 38-175c (a) (2) is supported by the relevant scholarly commentary. For example, shortly after our decision in Pasión, and prior to the Appellate Court’s decision in this case, the authors of an authoritative work on Connecticut’s uninsured motorist law presaged the scenario presented by this case: “An immediate question posed by the holding of Pasión is
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2) provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, every [automobile liability insurance] policy issued or renewed on and after July 1, 1984, shall provide uninsured motorist coverage with limits for bodily injury and death equal to those purchased to protect against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law unless the insured requests in writing a lesser amount .... Such written request shall apply to all subsequent renewals of coverage and to all policies or endorsements which extend, change, supersede or replace an existing policy issued to the named insured, unless changed in writing by the insured.”
Throughout this opinion, the term uninsured motorist coverage encompasses underinsured motorist coverage as well. See Rydingsword v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 8, 14 n.11, 615 A.2d 1032 (1992).
The reduction request form filled out and signed by Bryant provided various uninsured motorist coverage options and set forth with specificity the cost of each option. Bryant chose the minimum uninsured motorist limits of $20,000/$40,000.
The accident occurred while Bryant was operating one of the two vehicles insured under the policy issued by Colonial Penn.
“Intrapolicy stacking is the aggregation of the limits of liability for under-insured motorist coverage of each automobile covered under one insurance policy.” Kent v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., 226 Conn. 427, 428 n.3, 627 A.2d 1319 (1993).
Royal also took this position.
On appeal to the trial court, Colonial Penn claimed that it was liable under the policy for a total of $15,000 ($40,000 of coverage less the $25,000 paid by the tortfeasor). In a separate appeal from the decision of the arbitration panel, Bryant claimed that if Colonial Penn prevailed on its appeal, then he was entitled to a judgment ordering Royal to pay him $140,000 under its policy ($140,000 from Royal, $25,000 from the tortfeasor, and $15,000 from Colonial Penn, for a total payment of $180,000). In a third appeal, Royal maintained that the arbitration panel properly concluded that Colonial Penn was liable to Bryant under its policy in the amount of $155,000 and, consequently, that Bryant was not entitled to any recovery under the Royal policy. The three appeals were consolidated by the trial court.
Colonial Penn and Bryant filed separate appeals to the Appellate Court, which consolidated the two cases.
The Appellate Court characterized our holding in Pasión as follows: “Pasión clearly holds that, coowners of a car who are named insureds on an automobile liability insurance policy must both sign the authorization
General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 38-175c (a) (2) was recodified at General Statutes § 38a-336 (a) (2) in the General Statutes as revised to 1991. Section 38a-336 (a) (2) was later amended by P.A. 93-297, § 1. See footnote 13. The legislature subsequently made a technical amendment to § 38a-336 (a) (2) in 1994; see Public Acts, Spec. Sess., May 25, 1994, No. 94-1, § 35; that is not relevant to this appeal.
Because § 38-175c (a) (2) is the provision relevant to this appeal, we hereinafter refer to P.A. 93-297, § 1, as an amendment to § 38-175e (a) (2), despite the intervening recodification of § 38-175c (a) (2) at § 38a-336 (a) (2).
Bryant also seeks reversal of the Appellate Court judgment for the reasons set forth by Royal.
Colonial Penn raises the doctrines of equitable estoppel and unjust enrichment as alternate grounds for affirmance. Because we agree with the Appellate Court that Colonial Penn is entitled to prevail as a matter of statutory interpretation, we do not reach Colonial Penn’s alternate equitable claims.
Public Act 93-297, § 1 provides in relevant part: “Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary, each automobile liability insurance policy issued or renewed on and after [July 1,1984] THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS ACT, shall provide uninsured AND UNDERINSURED motorist coverage with limits for bodily injury and death equal to those purchased to protect against loss resulting from the liability imposed by law unless [the] ANY NAMED insured requests in writing a lesser amount, but not less
The parties have not disputed that Colonial Penn’s substantive rights are affected by the amendatory language.
See Colonial Penn. Ins. Co. v. Bryant, supra, 45 Conn. App. 563 n.6.
The Appellate Court did not expressly explain its conclusion that the legislature had been prompted by our holding in Pasión to replace the term “the insured” with the term “any named insured” in § 38-175c (a) (2). We presume, however, that the Appellate Court’s determination was based on the temporal proximity of the release of our decision in Pasión in 1991 and the passage of the amendment effecting that linguistic change in 1993, as
General Statutes § 38a-336 (f) provides in relevant part: “[A]n employee of a named insured injured while occupying a covered motor vehicle in the course of employment shall be covered by such insured’s otherwise applicable uninsured and undeiinsured motorist coverage.” Section 38a-336 (f) was enacted in response to our decision in CNA Ins. Co. v. Colman, 222 Conn. 769, 610 A.2d 1257 (1992), in which we concluded that due to the exclusive remedy provision of our workers’ compensation law; see General Statutes § 31-284 (a); “an employee injured in an automobile accident during the course of his or her employment who had received workers’ compensation benefits was barred . . . from recovering against a commercial insur-
Indeed, even Colonial Penn does not claim that these four requirements should be applied retroactively. See Bayusik v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 233 Conn. 483 (unreasonable to conclude that legislature would have intended retrospective application of new statutory requirement in circumstances where party subject to mandate had no notice or opportunity to comply with requirement). Royal and Bryant do claim, however, that the four requirements should be given retrospective effect if, and only if, we conclude, contrary to the primary argument espoused by Royal and Bryant, that the “any named insured” language of P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2) is to be given retroactive effect. Royal and Bryant further argue that they would prevail under such a scenario because the reduction request form provided
Although the legislative history is silent on the issue, it is apparent that the legislature, when it replaced the term “the insured” with the term “any named insured” in P.A. 93-297, § 1 (a) (2), also sought to ensure that the decision by a named insured to seek a reduction in uninsured motorist coverage would be an informed one by requiring that any such election be made on an informed consent form provided to the insured by the insurer. See J. Berk & M. Jainchill, Connecticut Law of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage (1993) § 1.10.3, pp. 65-66.
Public Act 93-297 also made other significant changes in the law of automobile insurance, including the abolition of no-fault insurance coverage. See generally P.A. 93-297, §§ 10 through 15, 28.
In particular, we relied on the statements of Senator Wayne Baker, the cochairman of the Committee on Insurance and Real Estate in 1983, when the legislature passed Senate Bill 123, which added subdivision (2) to § 38-
See also 2 I. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance (3d Ed. 1995) § 36.04 [1], p. 36-8 (“There are a number of possible rejection results where there is more than one insured qualifying as ‘the named insured’: (1) A rejection by A may delete coverage for only A; (2) A rejection by A may delete coverage for both A and B; (3) A rejection by A, absent a rejection by B, has no rejection effect whatever. The mandate of these statutes is that [uninsured motorist] coverage shall be provided ‘for the protection of persons insured thereunder.’ Consistent with this, an appropriate interpretation of the wording, in light of the ambiguities invited by a multiple-named insured situation, is that a rejection by one named insured, unless he is authorized to act for others, applies only to himself and not the others." [Emphasis added.]).