176 A.2d 3812 | Conn. Super. Ct. | 1961
Plaintiff, a restaurant corporation, brought this action for a declaratory judgment to determine whether or not a certain decision and order by the defendant state board of labor relations, entered on August 29, 1960, was lawful under the rules and regulations of said board and the General Statutes and whether plaintiff is bound thereby under the consent election agreement of June 3, 1960, to abide by such rules and regulations. The defendant union, a local union of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. and a "labor organization" within the meaning of §
It is alleged in the complaint that, pursuant to a consent election agreement between plaintiff and this defendant local, a secret ballot election was conducted by the defendant board, through its authorized agent, in which a majority of plaintiff's employees voted not to designate the defendant local as their collective bargaining representative; that six days after the delivery of the agent's report of this result to both parties, the defendant local filed with the defendant board a "Motion to Declare Void and Set Aside Election," which, over plaintiff's objection, the defendant board ruled that it would accept and consider, despite the fact that § 56-111 of the general rules and regulations of the board as well as the express terms of their agent's report of the election provided that any objections to the election or report must be filed within five days of the date of the issuance and service of such report on the parties.
In Connecticut Savings Bank v. First NationalBank,
"An action for a declaratory judgment is a special statutory proceeding, not one in equity. Silberman
v. McLaughlin,
The issue raised in this action is not concerned with the Labor Relations Act (General Statutes, c. 561) or claimed violations thereof, so as to be governed by its provisions, and plaintiff need not, *34
therefore look to that act for its basis for bringing this action. It specifically alleges, as a basis for its claim for the relief sought, that certain procedure followed by the defendant board, in failing to adhere to specific statutory procedures for promulgating administrative rules and regulations as set forth in §§ 4-45 and 4-48 of the General Statutes, and in failing to follow § 56-111 of its general rules and regulations as published, "was unlawful and constitutes an invasion of the legal rights of the Plaintiff in that it will be required to submit to further proceedings . . . and be bound by the ruling of the Defendant Board dated August 29, 1960, without the judicial review of said ruling at a later time." It alleges "an actual bona fide and substantial question and issue in dispute and a substantial uncertainty of legal relations requiring settlement," which, it claims, satisfies the conditions imposed by § 277 of the Practice Book for the court's assumption of jurisdiction under §
Our Supreme Court has frequently pointed out that the statutes and rules pertaining to declaratory judgments create an independent remedy and should be accorded a liberal construction. As stated inSigal v. Wise,
More specifically, the court has indicated that an action for a declaratory judgment is a proper method for determining rights in connection with a *36
regulation of an administrative agency. In Sage-AllenCo. v. Wheeler,
This language indicates that it would be proper for this court to take jurisdiction to determine the validity of the defendant board's ruling at just this point, where the board, an administrative agency, *37
intends to exercise the authority claimed by plaintiff to be invalid. On this point, the Supreme Court of the United States, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, has stated in Eccles v. Peoples Bank,
In the instant case, if the plea of the defendant local is sustained, plaintiff will be compelled to go through a lengthy and expensive administrative process when, prima facie, the board is acting contrary to its own regulations, which, if followed, would have terminated the entire matter by requiring the board to certify the results of the election and dismiss the union's petition. From an administrative point of view, at least, the board's "Decision and Order" is final and should be subject to judicial scrutiny quite apart from any right granted by the Labor Relations Act. This also answers defendant's claim that this action is premature, for this particular question has been decided and may not be open to question again before the board.
That this court has "independent" jurisdiction over this type of question, involving a claim of unlawful exercise of authority by an administrative agency, has been clearly pointed out in many decisions by our federal courts which, because of the close similarity of our state Labor Relations Act to the federal act, are pertinent. In Fay v. Rouds,
For another pertinent federal court decision invoking specifically a preliminary order of the national labor relations board, see Farmer v. UnitedElectrical Radio Machine Workers,
Many of the authorities cited by the defendant union in its brief are claimed to be pertinent on the apparent assumption that plaintiff is appealing at this time for a judicial review of the defendant board's action, but for the reasons stated above such is not the case, and Imperial Laundry v. LaborRelations Board,
Defendant's claim that the complaint "fails to establish any interest, legal or equitable, by reason of danger of loss or of uncertainty as to plaintiff's rights" really amounts to an assertion that plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action under § 277(a) of the Practice Book — in effect, a demurrer, and there is serious doubt as to whether such a pleading is a proper one in an action for a declaratory judgment;United National Indemnity Co. v. Zullo,
The plea in abatement of this defendant is overruled.