233 Pa. 350 | Pa. | 1912
Opinion by
The rights of the defendant company in this case are based upon the language of a conveyance executed by Albert F. Dible to J. N. Pew on July 24, 1883. In consideration of the sum of $600, and one-eighth of all oil produced, the grantor conveyed unto the grantee the right to the oil and gas underlying a tract of land consisting of about thirty-five acres. He also conveyed the right to lay down and maintain upon and across said land, pipe lines, conduits and other means of conveyance for oil and gas, and gave the right to transport oil or gas by any means whatever over said tract. In addition, the right was also given to place, erect and maintain
That the language of the grant is indistinct and open to more than one interpretation, can hardly be doubted. That being the case, the trial judge felt that the interpretation placed on the contract at the time, by the parties to it, was of binding force. He says: “Whatever we might think about the proper construction of the instrument made in 1883, if we were called upon to construe that without anything more, we think the action of the interested parties in construing it themselves, is binding, not only upon the parties who construed it, but upon their successors in title.” It appears from the evidence that in the year 1895, a small portion of the tract, containing a little less than half an acre, was fenced off, and within this inclosure was erected a boiler house, a pump house with two gas pumps or compressors therein, a- large water tank, and a storehouse; the whole plant being designed and used for the compression of gas, and for pumping it through a large pipe line. All this seems to have been done by the defendant under claim of right and without objection from Albert F. Dible, who had exe
We agree with the trial judge that the facts of this case properly called for the application of -the principles set forth in Gillespie v. Iseman, 210 Pa. 1, and in McMillin v. Titus, 222 Pa. 500. Not only was he justified in the conclusion which he reached, by the principle that in case of ambiguity, the contemporaneous construction placed upon the instrument by the acts of the parties is to prevail, but he is also sustained by another well-known principle, which is, that in .such' a case the construction to be adopted is that which-is most strongly against the grantor and in favor of the. grantee. “The words of a document will, in cases of doubt, be construed most strongly against the party using'them, or, as it is sometimes expressed, fortius contra proferentem. This principle has frequently been applied in the case of deeds, including those by way of lease or by way of mortgage:” 17 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d ed.), 14. In the present case the conveyance of the right to erect machinery would naturally involve the right to protect it by means of a suitable cover or building. As to whether the machinery which was installed by the defendant was such, only as was contemplated in the grant, might very well have been a question of fact for the jury; but that matter is not raised by the assignments of error, and both sides seem to have agreed that the matter was one of con-