Appellee, Williamson Printing Corporation, brought this action to collect a balance due it for services rendered and campaign materials produced in connection with appellant James M. Collins’ campaign for the United States Senate. The trial court submitted four special issues. In answer to those issues, which are unchallenged on this appeal, the jury found that Collins’ campaign committee was authorized by Collins to incur a debt to Williamson Printing, that there was a balance due Williamson Printing on the debt so incurred, that the amount of the balance due was $29,-526.68, and that Williamson Printing was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees of $5,500.00. Based on these findings, the trial court rendered judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of Williamson Printing. We have no statement of facts. In the absence of a statement of facts we find no merit in Collins’ points of error complaining of the admission of evidence and the sufficiency of the evidence. Moreover, we find no merit in Collins’ points of error regarding application of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Texas Election Code. It is only in an exceptional case that an appellant is entitled to reversal of the trial court’s judgment in the absence of a statement of facts. The case before us is not such an exceptional case.
Hyatt Corp. v. Trahan,
Before addressing the merits of Collins’ fifteen points of error, we first explain our observation that we have no statement of facts. The trial court signed the final judgment on December 16, 1986. Collins filed a timely motion for new trial on January 8,1987. Consequently, the last day to file the statement of facts was Thursday, March 26, 1987. TEX.R.APP.P. 54(a). The last day to file a motion to extend the time to file the statement of facts was Friday, April 10, 1987. TEX.R. APP.P. 54(c). On April 20, 1987, Collins tendered to the clerk his motion to extend the time to file the statement of facts. The clerk’s office erroneously placed an “April 20, 1987” file mark on that motion. By order dated May 11, 1987, another panel of this court, on its own motion, struck Collins’ motion to extend the time to file the statement of facts for want of jurisdiction, citing
Pierson v. Josef Manufacturing, Inc.,
In his third point of error, Collins complains of the admission of the testimony of Jerry Williamson. In his points of error four through eleven, Collins complains of the admission of Williamson Printing’s exhibits. Without a statement of facts, appellate courts are limited generally to complaints involving (1) errors of law; (2) erroneous pleadings or rulings thereon; (3) an erroneous charge; (4) irreconcilable conflicts of jury findings; (5) summary judgments; and/or (6) fundamental error.
American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Guerrero,
In his twelfth point of error, Collins complains that the trial court improperly overruled his motion for directed verdict and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We read Collins’ brief to argue that there was no evidence to support submission of the issues to the jury and to support the jury’s findings to those issues. We quote Collins’ prayer in his brief:
We submit that [Williamson Printing] failed to establish its burden of proof by competent evidence and that there is no evidence in this record to justify the Judgment as entered, and the cause should be reversed and rendered that Williamson [Printing] take nothing against Collins.
(Emphasis added). The burden rests upon appellant to timely secure and file in the appellate court a proper statement of facts, or show his inability through no fault of his own after the exercise of due diligence on his part.
Hyatt Corp. v. Trahan,
In his fourteenth point of error, Collins contends that there is no evidence to sup
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port the jury’s finding, in answer to special issue number one, that the Collins Campaign Committee had authority from Collins to incur the debt in question. Again, we are unable to determine this “no evidence” question for the simple reason that there is no statement of facts before us. In the absence of a statement of facts, we must presume that sufficient evidence was introduced in the trial court to support the findings of the jury in response to special issues submitted to them.
Hyatt Corp. v. Trahan,
In his fifteenth point of error, Collins contends that from the undisputed evidence the amount of the balance of the debt, found by the jury in answer to special issue number three, was excessive. An issue as to excessiveness of a verdict must be determined by the evidence in a particular case.
National Bonding Agency v. Demeson,
In his second point of error, Collins contends that Williamson Printing cannot recover because it failed to comply with certain provisions of Chapter 14 of the Texas Election Code. Collins argues that the Texas Election Code in 1982 required printers like Williamson Printing to reflect on orders taken for political advertising the name and address of the person responsible for placing the order. Political Funds Reporting and Disclosure Act, ch. 711 § 11, 1975 Tex.Gen.Laws, Local & Spec. 2257, 2268-69, amended by Act of June 15, 1977, ch. 657 § 1, 1977 Tex.Gen.Laws 1663 (now codified in substantially the same language at TEX.ELEC.CODE ANN. § 251.015(a) (Vernon 1986)). Collins argues that the Code also required printers to attach to the order an affidavit stating that the prices charged by the printer were comparable to those charged for non-political advertising. Although Collins states in his brief that he finds this requirement in section 14.10 of the Texas Election Code as it existed in 1982, which applies to campaign communications, we think Collins meant to refer to section 14.09 of the Code in 1982, which applies to political advertising (now codified in substantially the same language at TEX. ELEC.CODE ANN. § 251.015(b) (Vernon 1986)). We find no reference in either section 14.09 or 14.10 of the Code as it existed in 1982 to the requirement that an affidavit must be attached to the order by the printer. Nevertheless, Collins maintains that the Election Code required Williamson Printing to prove compliance with these purported requirements of the Election Code. Collins insists that Williamson Printing failed to prove compliance and, therefore, is barred from any recovery.
For the purposes of this opinion, we assume, but do not decide, that the Texas Election Code, as read by Collins, applies and has not been preempted by the Federal Election Campaign Act. 2 U.S.C.A. § 431 (West 1985). In this connection, we recognize that in the present case the Texas Election Code may stand preempted by the Act. The provisions of this Act, and of rules prescribed under this Act, supersede and preempt any provision of State law with respect to election to federal office. 2 U.S.C.A. § 453 (West 1985).
See also
Op. Tex.Att’y.Gen. Nos. H-433 (1974), H-588 (1975);
KVUE, Inc. v. Austin Broadcasting Corp.,
In his first point of error, Collins contends that the contract for printing services and campaign materials with Williamson Printing was unenforceable under section 2.201 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, requiring that a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more be in writing to be enforceable. TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 2.201(a) (Vernon 1968). In response, Williamson points to an exception to the requirement that a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more be in writing to be enforceable. Williamson Printing asserts that contracts which do not satisfy the “writing” requirement are enforceable “with respect to goods ... which have been received and accepted.” TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE § 2.201(c)(3) (Vernon 1968). In the present case, .a necessary fact to support the judgment was that Collins received and accepted the printing services and campaign materials. As a general rule, where no statement of facte is present in the record before the court of appeals, the court may conclude that every fact necessary to support the judgment, within limits of the pleadings, was proved at trial.
Jaramillo v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
In his thirteenth point of error, Collins contends that his appointment of a campaign committee insulated him from liability unless expressly assumed. In answer to special issue number one, the jury found that the Collins Campaign Committee had authority from Collins to incur the debt in question. We conclude, therefore, that we need not decide whether Collins can avoid liability to Williamson Printing by organizing a committee to direct the daily activities of his campaign. Furthermore, we conclude that we need not decide whether Collins expressly assumed the liability to Williamson Printing. We reach these two conclusions because the jury found that the campaign committee had authority from Collins to incur the debt in question. We reason that if Collins authorized the obligation, there can be no issue of insulation by the committee and there can be no issue of assumption of the debt. In the present case, therefore, a necessary fact to support the judgment was that the Collins Campaign Committee had authority from Collins to incur the debt in question. As a general rule, where no statement of facte is present in the record before the court of appeals, the court may conclude that every fact necessary to support the judgment, within the limits of the pleadings, was proved at trial.
Jaramillo v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,
Having overruled each of Collins’ fifteen points of error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.