On April 7, 1994, after the trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress tangible evidence, appellant entered a plea of guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance, in violation of D.C.Code § 33-541(d) (1993 Repl.). 1 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the police did not have probable cause to arrest him and conduct a search incident to arrest. However, because appellant failed to enter a conditional plea pursuant to Super.Ct.Crim.R. 11(a)(2), he has waived his right to appeal pre-judgment motions and thus his claim fails.
A defendant who enters a guilty plea ordinarily waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings below on appeal.
United States v. Gines,
The record does not reflect that the plea agreement was conditional, nor does appellant allege that it was, and we therefore will presume that the plea was unconditional. There was no written agreement preserving the denial of the motion to suppress for appellate review. Moreover, there was no “indicia of a plea conditioned on a right to appeal pretrial matters” whether written or oral.
See United States v. Bell,
*1243
Because appellant entered an unconditional plea of guilty to one count of possession of cocaine, he has waived all pre-judgment issues on appeal. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 11(a)(2);
United States v. Frye,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant was sentenced to six months imprisonment, but the court suspended all but two months of the sentence. The government subsequently dropped the other count of possession of a controlled substance.
. Moreover, it appears that appellant profited from the unconditional plea agreement when, as stated, the government dropped the second count of possession of a controlled substance, thus re-during his possible sentence. See
supra,
note 1;
Bell, supra,
