Collins v. StateCollins v. State
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Simmons
John Collins was tried in the county court of Gwinnett county upon an аccusation under section 4612(h) of the -code, charging him with сruelly beating, etc.; Robert Collins, his minor child. He was found guilty, and toоk the case by certiorari to the superior court; the certiorari was overruled, and he excepted. Thе main ground of exception is, that it did not appear frоm the evidence that the person alleged to havе been beaten was a child. The evidence in the reсord does not show directly the age of this person, but does show that he was of the size and strength of a man, that he was аlmost as large and strong as his *434father, who was only “a little the best man,” and that he had worked the ¡mblic roads for three years, which would make him nineteen years old if he commenced such work at the age when under the law he became subjеct to road duty.
Section 4612(h) of the code, upon which thе accusation was based, is taken from the third section оf the act of October 20th, 1879, entitled “an act for the prеvention of cruelty to children.” (Acts 1878--9, p. 162.) The first and second sеctions of the act (Code, §§4612(f), 4612(g)) have reference expressly to children under twelve years of age; the third and last section reads as follows: “Whoever shall torture, torment, deprive of necessary sustenance, mutilate, cruelly, unreasonably and maliciously beat or ill-treat, or cause to be tortured, tormented, deprived of necessary sustenance, mutilated, cruelly, unreasonably and maliciоusly beaten, any child, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor,” etc. Cоnstruing together all the provisions of the act, and giving the word “child” its ordinary and popular meaning, the section above quoted is clearly inapplicable to the case at bar. Except where used as a term of relationshiр — which is not the case here, for the language is, “whoever” shall torture, etc., “any” child, — m> one in the ordinary use of the tеrm would apply it to a person who had attained the рhysical strength and stature of manhood, or even to a рerson who had entered the period of youth; and therе is nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the legislature intended to use the term in a broader sense than that in which it is ordinarily employed. There is no reason to suppose that it was intended to include youths who are in laAV old enough to perform road duty and military service. Indeed it is manifest that the statute was intended for the protection only оf those of’ tender years, who by reason of their physical immaturity are unable to protect themselves and are helpless against the cruelty of older persons. Blaсk’s Law Dictionary, in. *435defining the term “child,” says that in laws for the protection of children it means generally the young under the age of puberty. See also Allen v. The State, 7 Tex. App. As used in thе present instance, we think it means children of the periоd between early infancy and youth. At any rate we are quite clear that it does not apply to a person of the age, size and strength of the person alleged to have been béaten by the accused in this case.
Judgment reversed.