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Collins v. State
977 P.2d 741
Alaska Ct. App.
1999
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*1 and, employer; the control of their normal or under thing as the usual and same not the teacher typical through arguably Kokhanok school sanc that a while route LPSD — Jones — and from expected to take to school, would be their visit to the their losses tioned school. traveling while to the school under occurred going covered by the and com circumstances language special- history and rule, ing by special-hazard rather than suggest that it is intended exception hazard sys- compensation exception. the workers’ to draw into closely to the work- are tied tem risks that Although eagerness to visit the Malones’ repeatedly confronted. Historical- place and certainly their new school was understanda- Larson, factories ly, according to Professor purpose in to deciding and their make the ble railroads, only so that the were situated near commendable, undeniably the set- visit way “pick,

way get to one’s to work was of the Alaska Com- tled standards Workers’ tracks, sidings, and even switching through permit pensation do not the conclusion Act compensation deny To main lines. workers’ their arose “out of and in the losses necessity injured employees because employment.”27 course running most daily gauntlet such struck concept as out of tune with broad courts IY. CONCLUSION Accordingly, courts of work-connection.”25 special-hazard exception. developed reasons, For these we AFFIRM the compensation. denying Board’s decision yet begun had not teach The Malones and had no or normal route Kokhanok usual They expected to move to work. teaching their

village of Kokhanok once they began began. Obviously, once

duties jobs, their normal route to work would

their flying. The true of other not involve same is COLLINS, Appellant, Artie R. teachers, routinely are ex- Kokhanok pected village to live the school

year. newly-hired teachers —or Nor would Alaska, Appellee. STATE of that mat- employees, other LPSD No. A-6724. expected fly normally be or ter — from pre- Anchorage to for a Kokhanok Appeals of Alaska. Court contrary, undisput- To school-year visit. April ed that LPSD went out evidence establishes way discourage by summer visits of its teachers; arriving

new and for most teachers year, LPSD beginning the school transportation

arranged to Kokhanok directly from its head-

commercial carrier King may

quarters in That Salmon. LPSD acquiesced in the decision to

have Malones’ visit did not

come to Kokhanok for a school “only, ‍​​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍flight Anchorage their

make their

normal, expected [work.]”26 route to

Accordingly, totality of evi even when favorable light

dence is viewed most

Ann, her LPSD it could not sustain claims. travel to the require

did not the Malones to supply transportation; their them

school performed at the direction

activities were not Sokolowski, Larson, Compensa- at 292. 26. See P.2d Arthur Larsons Workers' 25.1 4-38, (em- (1998) 15.13(b), § 4-39 Law tion 23.30.395(17). added). phasis

743 *3 Bair, Dan Rex Rex Lamont Butler and S. Associates, Anchorage, Lamont Butler and Appellant. McDannel, Attorney Assistant Marcelle K. General, Special and Prosecutions Office Botelho, Anchorage, Bruce Appeals, and M. General, Juneau, Appellee. Attorney COATS, Judge, and Before Chief STEWART, Judges. and MANNHEIMER OPINION STEWART, Judge. R. was tried

Artie fourth-degree mis- counts convicted two substance,1 involving controlled conduct (a)(5). tl.71.040(a)(3)(A)and second-degree interviewed, count in- eyeglasses. one misconduct wоre When volving weapons,2 and one count of third- guns admitted that the were his that he weapons.3 degree involving misconduct On bought them the on street No $50. superior appeal, he maintains court fingerprints gun. on usable were found either granted judg- should have his motions for Evidence was trial acquittal ment count. He also purpose removing usual a serial number erroneously that evidence was admit- gun from a is to that gun render untraceable. causing ted two areas reversible error. bedroom, In the closet in the southwest below, uphold For reasons discussed we day pack containing seized a black possession Collins’s convictions for of cocaine scales, scissors, pipe, plastic a crack bag- possession of an firearm and altered gies, piece plastic wrap, bag. *4 maintaining reverse for his convictions a small, precise, scales were and electronic possession crack house and of a firearm dur- commonly weighing used for cocaine. The ing the a felony drug commission of offense. scales had traces of cocaine on them. From room, they papers, day also seized a proceedings Facts and planner, phones pagers. two cellular and two 3, 1997, January Anchorage On Police day planner paper contained a Department anonymous tip received an police drug-sale described as a record. The occurring apartment sales at # 10 planner “Stoney was identified with the name Eagle’s up Nest Hotel. Police set Mac,” answered, a name to which and Collins shortly surveillance thereafter and observed (Collins),” the name of “Odessa Watson people apartment five or six enter within planner as was listed “mother.” The con- period a ten-minute and leave' after brief entry propose marriage tained an to “Kim- police visits. The obtained a search warrant berly” fingerprints on Christmas. Packer’s apartment # (but Collins’s) planner. were found p.m., police After 11:00 returned Page Records from the Personal showed that apartment # 10 to execute search war- pager belonging a to Collins had received Washington opened rant. David the door 1,000 more than calls one month. Police apartment and the officers entered. The seized from Collins. $197 bedrooms, room, living consisted of two items, police also seized various in- kitchen and a bathroom. Collins was found straw, cluding piece coat hanger, Kimberly the southwest bedroom. Packer knife, and a M & M with container a white Marilyn apart- and Medina were also in the living residue from the room area. The appeared ment. Packer to be either under yielded north gar- bedroom scale inside a the influence cocaine or in cocaine with- bage bag. copper pipe Police also found a drawal. piece Boy, with a of Chore a test tube with During pursuant search to the war- piece Boy, another of Chore and two small rant, police handguns seized two from containers in the north bedroom. A broken under the same side of the mattress pipe” “crack was found in the kitchen. Col- bedroom, southwest оne the foot of the police lins told he in apartment resided bed, the head. other The serial num- #10. handgun ber on one had been filed off. The trial, Collins, Medina, Packer, At handgun, caliber, ‍​​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍altered an Acutec .380 was Washington testify. did objected loaded with two live rounds. The other purported admission of two “drug handgun, a 9-millimeter Inter Arms Fires- ledgers,” tar, day planner, one found in the was loaded three live rounds. A the other found elsewhere in the box .380 southwest caliber bullets with two rounds objected bedroom. He Judge removed was also also Sout- found the southwest green bag permit police bedroom in a er’s decision to that also contained certain officers eyeglass testify experts. ease cards that had as Souter over- alias, pager Stoney. objections. number his ruled those At the end 11.61.200(a)(6). 2. AS 11.61.195. going to I’m ob- acquit- DEFENSE COUNSEL: judgment moved for discovery. ject his as to denied every count.

tal on Object discovery? motions. as THE COURT: Yes, sir. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Discussion I didn’t hear where that THE COURT: any discovery. The ob- called for sort experts as Testimony of'police officers jection is overruled. maintains that appeal, Collins On again, the issue nor did Collins did not raise erroneously ad- was officers of relief. ask form objection. mitted over appeal, that Detec On awhy Pam Nelson was asked Officer similarity Bryant’s testimony about tive fire removed from a number would be serial Eagle’s Nest of other crack houses objected that the answer called arm. testimony apartment expert that was objection was speculation. After that discovery notice without overruled, num that a serial Nelson testified Criminal Rule 16. He asserts that Alaska from a firearm might be removed ber 16(b)(1)(B) Procedure re Rule Criminal renews it untraceable. Collins render testimony.5 quired discovery But it is of this testimony speculative. argument that *5 16(b)(1)(B) Rule not clear to us Criminal that not that Souter did abuse conclude We officers, applies Bryant, like to permitted he that testi discretion when testify to observations and their on-the-scene objection.4 Nel mony Officer over training expe conclusions based on their and testimony experience on and based her son’s so, to rience. Collins did not articulate Even training handguns speculative. discovery purported the the trial court how that Officer Nelson now maintains Collins defense.6 did he prejudiced violation Nor proper expert testimony without offered speсific object any ask for relief other than testify to an qualification by the court as put Bryant. to ing question to the not make expert witness. But Collins did implicitly argues that denied testimony objection to Officer Nelson’s that relief, including request for a continu all Therefore, he did not in the trial court. ance, objection the as when overruled preserve appeal. that issue for discovery. disagree. We objected questions also to certain If defense claims a mid-trial the put Bryant Bruce on basis to Detective the violation, discovery pres defendant must the foundation, would lack that his answers of plausible with a claim ent the trial court irrelevant, for hear- call speculative, would If appropriate relief. prejudice request and objected to the say. also State’s purport requested for a a continuance is posed Bryant regard- question Detective violation, ordinarily discovery ed waives he noted between this ing what consistencies a continuance should have any claim that other “crack houses” he seen case and any request did not granted.7 Collins past. been the State, 1349, (Alas- proposed Hawley description the of substance v. 614 P.2d 1361 See expert’s opinion, 1980). testimony expert, the ka opinion. underlying Fail- basis of that timely provide disclosure under this rule ure to 16(b)(1)(B)provides: Rule 5. Criminal a continuance. If the defendant shall entitle (B) Expert Witnesses. Unless different is not an finds that a continuance the court court, by the as known and date is set as soon remedy adequate under the circumstances trial, days priоr prose- 45 no later than may impose other sanc- the tions, the court of the names shall inform defendant cutor prohibiting prosecutor including expert perform- witnesses and addresses declaring calling expert at trial or ing connection with case or whom work in mistrial. likely prosecutor is at to call trial. State, 344, (Alas- v. 805 P.2d 348-49 6. See Bostic prosecutor available for in- shall also make State, 1991); P.2d 916-17 Jurco v. any reports ka spection copying and written (Alaska App.1992). experts. respect With statements of these prosecution likely expert whom the trial, prosecutor 561 P.2d 7. See Scharver v. call shall also furnish to a curriculum vitae and written the defendant specific purported Arteaga recognized relief address the dis- forms. The court that covery violаtion. We conclude that this issue ruling hearsay objections that eliminated the was waived. recognized that the forms at issue that Arteaga’s case that were found home were drug day ledg- Admission planner charged circumstantial crimi- ers nal conduct.10 argues next docu that certain Although argues the docu- trial, day planner ments admitted ments were for the question admitted paper two sheets described as asserted, truth of the matter that was not ledgers, erroneously admitted over his ruling. Judge Souter’s announced The docu- hearsay objection. He claims the of in question ments here as were admitted fered the exhibits for the truth the matter circumstantial evidence of cocaine transac- asserted. The two sheets were described premises. on tions names, the court as “a list of numbers and Many courts have allowed introduction reasonably the jury from that can draw “drug ledgers” not for the truth of inference that it’s list customers[.]” papers Collins also claims ledgers, were ad entries on the but as circumstantial foundation, is, mitted without sufficient drug-related evidence that activities were oc inadequate proof there was curring premises on the where records authored the He documents. also Wilson, were found. In United States that the documents were not admissible un court ruled that certain records that were exception der the business record to hears premises prosecution found where the ay.8 Judge Souter admitted the documents alleged drug trafficking occurring asserted, not for the truth of the matter but were admissible as circumstantial evidencе *6 drug as relevant circumstantial evidence of trafficking drug occurring on the occurring premises. transactions on the In evidence, premises.11 however, “The did words, other the documents were circum apartment being tend to show stantial evidence that controlled substances Also, drug trafficking.”12 used for in United Eagle’s apart were distributed in the Nest court, Jaramillo-Suarez,13 v. States fol ment. Wilson, lowing approved the introduction of Arteaga,9 relies United States v. “pay/owe” sheets as circumstantial evidence support as argument. Aiteaga, for his In drug apartment trafficking in the where “to-send-money” the trial court admitted they were found: “to-receive-money” forms from Western Un- pay/owe in present sheet case was a money-laundering ion in scheme where specific pur- admitted for the and limited proceeds of cocaine sales in Alaska were pose showing the character use of wired to California. The district court first apartment.... pay/ [] Because the admitted forms under Federal Rule of probative owe sheet’s value for the limited Evidence 803 as business records later purpose for which it was admitted was stated that the forms were admissible independent contents, of the truth of its hearsay exception the catch-all because the against hearsay implicat- the rule was not guarantees forms had circumstantial of trust- ed[J14 objections worthiness. In the face of Similarly, in Enriquez-Est United States v. the defendants in the the district court rada,15 ultimately approved ruled that the forms were admit- court the introduction ted truth drug ledger of the matters on to show the nature of the 803(6). 8. Alaska Rule of Evidence 12. Id. — (9th Cir.), denied,

9. 117 F.3d 388 cert. U.S. (9th 1991). 13. 950 F.2d 1378 Cir. —, (1997). 118 S.Ct. 390 139 L.Ed.2d 10. See id. 397-98. Id. at 1383. Wilson, (8th

11. See 532 F.2d 645-46 Cir. (9th Cir.1993). F.2d object to he did not argument. Because ledger was tor’s where of the residence use of the evidence People Harvey,17 the claimed misuse in And found.16 non-hearsay drug argument, preserved use of issue he has upheld the court claimed Finally, in connected Collins has not appeal. found homes ledgers evidence co prosecutor’s argument as circumstantial final created defendants conspiracy.18 a cocaine caine sales and plain error. that it was not abuse conclude We Sufficiency the evidence to admit Souter

discretion as circumstantial evi- contested documents claims that activity the issue of drug because dence judg his motiоn for erred when he denied mate- substances is a trafficking controlled acquittal on count. When ment of to count II. rial issue for insufficien attacks a conviction defendant evidence, view the evi cy of the we must relating issue raises another presented, and reasonable inferences dence question. He to the documents evidence, light favorable from the in the most prosecutor’s argument, final during the Viewing jury’s upholding verdict.22 drug information prosecutor used we must perspective, from this the evidence of the matter asserted. ledgers for the truth juror exercis whether a fair-minded decide prosecutor purportedly used Because judgment could conclude that ing reasonable matter for the truth of the that information proving guilt met its burden of the State it admitted for thе when was not asserted beyond a reasonable doubt.23 contents, argues that his truth of its He relies on should be reversed. conviction Possession cocaine Lai.19 United States v. co stipulated that there was Lai, drug court admitted the In the trial apart in the residue on various items caine of Lai’s

records as circumstantial scales, ment, including on the on various Lai, activity. drug But alleged criminal paraphernalia pipes, on other crack that the documents government conceded described found in his residence. prove particular transac- used paraphernalia found the various items conspiracy elements of the tions that were typically apartment that were around the charged. The Lai court con- that was count *7 co hearsay mаrketing and crack used for cocaine the records were cluded that addition, present prosecution re- proper for the records were In the foundations caine. through quired.20 pager district court had not had Because the that ed evidence Collins for admission of the foundation received Page addressed on which he had Personal hearsay, the court did not the records as pages in a month. more than a thousand conviction, remanded the but jury reverse Lai’s the cards prosecution The showed hearing for court on case to the district to Collins pager number issued that had the proper basis whether there was ‍​​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍alias, two Stoney Mac. The along with of admission those records.21 (that admitted were handguns loaded his) under the mattress of were found nor has the State has not claimed was found in the room where Collins bed that the use of documents conceded prosecution police entered. when question for truth asserted the docu- testimony it was consistent presented that necessary to establish element ments was cocaine to have with the retail distribution charged counts. And Collins of one of the readily firearms. portion proseeu- available objected never id. 21. See 16. See id. 1360. 1206, Cal.Rptr. Cal.App.3d 158

17. 233 285 State, Simpson P.2d 1320 22. See (1991). App. 18. See id. 167-68. (Alas- 622 P.2d Dorman v. See Cir.1991). (9th 944 F.2d 1434 omitted). 1981) (citations ka id. at 1445. 20. See pre-

While most of the evidence was with that number the intent to render the firearm relating and, sented to this count was untraeeable, second, circumstan- that acted tial, jury entitled make was reasonable “knowingly”24 respect to this circum- inferences from that evidence and conclude stance. possessed cocaine. While it was record, our From review we con- possible jury also for the to infer that other jurors agree clude that reasonable could occupants apartment were the ones prosecution proven beyond had this count cocaine, Collins, possessed and not purchased a reasonable doubt. Collins both reject jury permitted those con- handguns, including handgun, the altered on agree prosecution clusions and that the had the street from a he did not know proven beyond count reasonable doubt. The jury was entitled to infer that he $50. handgun loaded altered and hid it under Keeping maintaining a “crack house” jury the mattress in the bedroom. Thе also possession during commis- firearm testimony purpose that a for the felony drug sion offense obliteration or of a removal serial number on We conclude that Collins’s conviction on a firearm is to render the firearm untracea- these must counts be reversed for the rea- ble and could infer from the circumstances of expressed sons Mannheimer’s con- purchase possession opinion. curring handgun that he knew the serial number had been removed from the firearm in order Possession an altered firearm render it untraeeable. Finally, Collins maintains there was insufficient evidence to show that he Conclusion handgun knew that the with the serial num ber removed had been altered with intent to here, explained For the reasons we AF- above, render it untraeeable. As we nоted FIRM possession Collins’s convictions for handguns admitted possession cocaine and of an altered firearm. purchased his. also He said that he both We REVERSE his conviction for maintain- handguns “on the street” for al $50. ing a crack house REMAND entry handgun tered was admitted into evidence judgment acquittal on that count. We allowed examine where REVERSE possession Collins’s conviction of the serial number had been obliterated. The of a firearm the commission of a prosecution also evidence from two felony drug offense and REMAND for a new officers removal of serial trial count. weapon number from a exhibited an intent to render that firearm untraeeable. MANNHEIMER, Judge, concurring. maintains that the State was re- Two of Collins’s convictions must re- quired present possessed evidenсe that he *8 versed: conviction under AS handgun specific with the intent that the 11.71.040(a)(5) maintaining for a structure weapon disagree. be untraeeable. We Alas- storing used distributing for or controlled 11.61.200(a)(6) provides ka Statute a (the statute), substances “crack house” third-degree weapons commits mis- 11.61.195(a)(1) his conviction under AS person: conduct when the possessing a firearm the commission possesses a firearm which the manufac- felony of a drug offense. removed, turer’s serial number has been

covered, altered, destroyed, knowing or maintaining Collins’s conviction for a crack removed, that the serial number been has house must be reversed because the State covered, altered, destroyed or with in- present failed sup- to sufficient to evidence rendering tent of the firearm untrаcea- port finding a that Collins controlled the ble[J motel drugs suite where he were statute, prove, Under this found. for possessing State must Collins’s conviction a first, that had someone removed the serial firearm during felony a commission of 11.81.900(a)(2). 24. See AS any to that Collins or other evidence show be reversed because must drug offense (and (or housemates, no three any thus made of the other instructed

jury was not matter) element concerning an essential finding) legal or actual au- had either a nexus requirement of offense: thority premises authority control — possession of the the defendant’s between reside there and control decide who would commission and the defendant’s firearm premises. on the what occurred felony. judgement for a Collins moved When charge, Judge recog- acquittal on this Souter building maintaining a The conviction for Ad- in the State’s evidence. nized this flaw distributing storing or used for prosecutor, Judge said: dressing the Souter controlled substances “keep- question got I’ve here is [T]he statute, AS The crack house ing maintaining” [element of- 11.71.040(a)(5), the defen requires fense]_ prove that [ele- order to [I]n type of some “struc kept or maintained dant ment], ... has to show that the the State storing distributing controlled or ture” for right or had the defendant controlled per that a The statute declares substances. And, premises. than his other control if he or she: commits the offense son there, he what else lived [statement] store, knowingly keeps or maintains there, Prosecutor]? [Mr. warehouse, building, vehi- shop, dwelling, boat, aircraft, cle, or or other structure pros- resрonse judge’s question, to the In keeping or distribut- place that is used arguments. two ecutor of a violation ing controlled substances argued that the State prosecutor The first [AS 11.71] under or AS felony offense prove that Collins had sole not have did 17.30[.] suite; it be suffi- of the motel would control charged him against The indictment joint control with one or cient if he exercised building”. maintaining “dwelling or may This housemates. be cor- more of his kept theory The State’s rect, help position it does not the State’s but (really, a motel motel room maintained the present failed to the State because suite) housemates where and his three premises. anyone’s control drugs found. living where the were if prosecutor argued next even The suite was both “dwell This motel prove who controlled the State failed “building” as these terms are ing” and suite, evidence did tend motel State’s 11.81.900(b). in AS Under AS defined and distrib- drugs had been stored show that 11.81.900(b)(20),“dwelling” particu means suite, the bedroom of the uted in the south building building that is de kind of lar —“a slept. prosecu- where Collins bedroom person’s per signed for use or is used as go that the State’s case could tor contended place of temporary home or manent theory that Collins under the And, definition of lodging”. the south bedroom. “controlled” 11.81.900(b)(3), “building” contained argu- in a mul- separate apartment accepted or office second “building”. is considered ti-unit structure ment: Well, really ... was ... the hotel room by Collins and suite shared motel suite, just a room.... [T]he apartment hotel separate was a

housemates Thus, there were testimony [shows that] if the- State multi-unit structure. *9 living that motеl area. it’s hotel proved Collins controlled and a So that bedrooms suite, [living] been sufficient people this would have four suite. And there were “building” kept ..., or maintained and three others. defendant there the “dwelling”. and a testimony only that ties the defen- And the testimony of [premises] is the to the dant prove The failed to this. But the State ... in the was found police that he the in that lived showed State’s bedroom, of his a number south where that it also showed motel suite —but the ... found. belongings [also] personal the The people lived in suite. three other lease, he lived there. that And his statement produce receipts, a rent did not State got apartments all “buildings” I’ve to draw reasonable infer- and suites motel are purposes “dwellings” ences in of the of Title 11. [G]iven favor State.... separate apart- personal belong- the that he But the bedrooms within fact had his there, ings guns ments and motel suites are not.1 including some mattress, pretty appar- were under the it’s granted Souter should have Col- controlling ent that he was the bedroom. judgement lins’s acquittal. motion In- mean,-... there, I stuff stead, charge presented he allowed this guns [That two under the mattress.... argued jury improper to the jury evidence from which the is] could legal theory. reasonably infer that he was in control of appeal, pursues On the a dif State deny going the room.... I’m [S]o the justify theory ferent Collins’s conviction. judgement acquittal[.] motion for State Collins “controlled” ruling This was error. motel suite because he was dealer difficulty first “bed- State’s addicts, living among drug and because he theory physical room” that Collins’s is occu- only рossessed was the resident who fire pancy of the south bedroom does not amount this, arms. From concludes that legal control the crack socially among Collins was dominant the four leasing house statute. Whoever rent- or manipulate residents of the suite: he could ing normally the motel suite would “control” by cutting supply the others their off (in all rooms and areas within the suite cocaine, and he could exercise “brute authori having legal authority sense to decide ty to have the final word in discussion there). who lived there and what went on with [his] unarmed [housemates]”. presented ‍​​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍The State no evidence as to the Whether Collins “controlled” his house- identity persons of the or who leased mates in this fashion is irrelevant. The or By rented the motel suite. the same requires proof crack house statute that Col- token, the State no evidence that kept lins or maintained premises —the subleasing agreement Collins had a with the motel suite. As we held in Dawson v. unidentified lease-holder suite. The requires proof this statute that the defendant mere fact that Collins lived in the south authority “controlled] ha[d] or to control the place bedroom did not him in “control” of occupancy or use of the structure”.2 that bedroom. speculate One can in a Collins was Equally important, even if position physical psychological exercise or State’s evidence had established that Collins housemates, control over his three legal exercised control over the bed south point they acquiesce where would in whatev- room, prove would be sufficient to еr he chose to do in his But this bedroom. violation of the crack house statute. The only speculation, would be for the State rais- requires proof statute the defendant es this factual issue for the first time on kept or maintained a “structure” —in Col appeal. The argue State did not its case “dwelling” trial, lins’s “building” or cited way jury was not asked to above, explained Moreover, the indictment. As convict theory. Collins under this conceivably argue 1. One person keeps building, could because AS A or maintains a 11.71.040(a)(5) speaks “any I) ... structure or dwelling!,] place or other structure or if: may place”, the statute have been intended to person knowingly uses or allows another apply apartments to individual rooms within or building, dwellingf] use the or other structure However, given motel suites. list struc- operation involving keeping for a business places 11.71.040(a)(5), tures and included in AS distributing or of one or more controlled sub- appear likely this does not be a construction of stance[s]; 2) keeping distributing the statute. substance(s) felony controlled a in violation statutory interpretation This issue need not 11.71; 3) person, of AS either alone or First, be addressed reasons. the State others, right controls has the to control Second, argument appeal. does raise this building, dwellingL] or other structure^] instructions in Collins's case did not *10 jury theory allow to convict him (Alaska App.1995). 2. 894 P.2d 676 kept "place” opposed that he or maintained a as 16(a) jury: to a "structure”. Instruction told the

751 required proof some connection of physical psy- statute had if exercised even Collins drug the firearm and the offensе. three between over the other chological dominance suite, not this does of the motel residents (a) Proper characterization Collins’s “ke[pt] or maintain[ed]” of establish motion proof of premises element —the house statute. by the crack important that It is to note actually judge “motion was not a for motion reasons, that Col- we conclude For these acquittal” though Judge Sout of ment violating the crack house for lins’s conviction —even by it parties referred to this and both er must reversed. statute court, though and even both label in the trial a possessing way The conviction to it this parties continue to refer firearm drug a during the commission contention was—-and appeal. Collins’s basic of felony possessing the offense of a firearm is—that felony drug during a of the commission of violating charged AS was requires of one additional ele fense 11.61.195(a)(1), prohibits a which weapon and the ment: a nexus between the during the commis- “possessing] a firearm drug alleged element was not offense. This 11.71.010— of an offense under AS sion indictment, jury instructions that The 11.71.040”. it; thus, jury never made no mention of and that Collins possessed cocaine of the offense. this asserted element decided his mat- hidden under had two firearms a vio- seemingly established tress —facts that correct, entitled to If then he is lation of the statute. trial, a new of the indictment and dismissal judgement to a he would be entitled but jury indeed instructed this The was because, acquittal. This is true had of itself, evidence, by sufficient to establish was motion, this would granted Collins’s Jury of the statute. Instruction a violation legal grounds a dismissal on havе been that, of jury prove a violation told the —that is, ground requiring a factu dismissal on 11.61.195(a)(1), State had to establish AS of the elements al resolution following only two elements: not amount offense. Such dismissal “does First, question the event oc- acquittal, regardless of its judgment Anchorage and on or at or near curred timing attached thereto.” State or the label 3,1997; January about v. Martushev.3 Second, knowingly R. Collins that Artie during State4, commission possessed firearm a defen example, For Steve charged in felony drug offense as judgement post-trial “motion for filed dant I II the indictment. Counts and he convicted of sec acquittal” after was (having abuse of a minor ond-degree sexual I felony drug offenses named Counts age of (1) with a child under the sexual relations possessing II the indictment were: trial, affirma hаd asserted the (2) At Steve cocaine, maintaining a keeping or he of reasonable mistake: tive defense storing or dwelling building distribut- reasonably he believed sexu jury instruc- claimed ing controlled substances. jury explanation 16. The partner older than no further al tions contained felony In his “during rejected the commission affirmative defense. phrase motion, drug post-trial offense”. Steve asserted process because the denied due been jury convicted Collins After the statute) (in re accord with instructions crime, what he called a motion filed pre prove this defense quired him to argued acquittal”. Collins “judgement of claimed of the evidence. Steve ponderance possession of a firearm that mere law, it a matter of constitutional as felony was not suffi- of a commission disprove as government’s burden to violation cient to establish doubt.5 11.61.195(a)(1). beyond a reasonable Rather, defense argued, the serted App.1993). 5.See id. 114-15. 3. 846 P.2d (Alaska App.1994). P.2d 110 *11 (1) that, attacking supplemental meaning We held because Steve was file briefs on of the (2) legal ground on did conviction not the statute and how the State’s evidence require of of resolution the facts of the at Collins’s trial either established or failed pleading was not a “motion for of to establish violation the statute. judgement acquittal”, granting and the brief, supplemental In its con- the State preclude his motion would not the State Judge ceded that Collins and Souter re-trying him: right: simply required the statute more than appellate the an [I]f defendant convinces proof possessed that a coсaine adopted court that the trial court an erro- simultaneously owned firearm. State neous definition the offense or misallo- 11.61.195(a)(1) required admitted that AS proof, cated the burden this conclusion proof of some nexus between the firearm and necessarily assumption undermines However, drug relying offense. on fed- government day fair its cases, argued eral the State that the statute court. can not know We what evidence necessarily require proof did presented might the State [the have at defendant used the fire- threatened use if it had defendant’s] trial known true [the Rather, arm offense. or that] elements of the offense the State argued, the offense could be estab- proof [disputed] bore burden on the proof that, lished because a firearm was issue[.] аvailable, nearby and “em- defendant was Steve, Thus, 875 P.2d at 115. if the defen- felony drug boldened” to commit the offense. motion, prevails on dant such a the defendant argued viewing The State further trial, outright is “entitled to a new light trial evidence Collins’s in the most acquittal”.6 State, required favorable to the this nexus holdings ap- Martushev and Steve proved in Collins’s case—because the ply Collins’s judgement “motion for suggested drugs evidence that Collins dealt acquittal”. argument concerned the in the bedroom where the firearms were offense; essence, legal definition found. claimed that the failed allege indictment arguments Based on the in the element essential of the crime and that brief, supplemental Judge State’s de- Souter jury was not asked to decide each essen- judgement nied Collins’s motion for of ac- Thus, if prevailed tial element. in his quittal. motion, the State would be able to re-indict Judge ruling SouteFs re-try Collins, is trouble attempting to establish supplemental some. In the State’s brief to this additional element of the crime. Souter, the State conceded that (b) Proper resolution Collins’s claim crime of an additional ele proof of a nexus between the firearm When Collins’s motion ment — was first ar felony drug and the assuming offense. Even gued, Judge expressed preliminary presented enough that the State agreement with Collins’s construction of the prove Collins’s trial this additional ele judge statute. The declared that he did not ment, the fact remains that indictment legislature sepa think the intended to inflict element, allege jury did not felony punishment rate people pos on who elеment, (for on drugs never instructed sessed used at one location cabin) jury example, finding regard made no it. a restaurant or at Be this, happened possess cause of a firearm at home. Collins’s conviction was flawed.7 Nevertheless, Judge Although judge Souter took the matter Collins was not entitled to a under parties acquittal, advisement. He invited the to ment of ruling Souter’s nee- 6. Id. jury fail to inform the all essential ele offense, ments of an unless the record as whole judge duty 7. A trial to instruct the incomplete jury establishes that the instructions on all essential elements of the offense. See significant jury's had no influence deci State, 528, (Alaska Thomas v. 522 P.2d 531 n. 11 State, sion. See S.R.D. v. 820 P.2d 1095- 1974); (Alas- Sears v. 713 P.2d App. App.1986). plain ka It is error when instructions *12 need not define the felony drug offense. We was entitled essarily mеant that Collins nexus at this new trial. contours of this the indictment exact dismissal appeal, it is suffi- To Collins’s time. resolve Now, appears it that the State appeal, the indictment returned cient note problem. In its brief to recognized has this allege against Collins did not this element court, construc- the State disavows this and the at Collins’s trial offense prose- adopted by the trial the statute tion of finding respect to element. made no with this Souter. State cutor pos- conviction for indictment and proved be between that no nexus must claims instead, sessing during a firearm the commission of a drug felony; the firearm is committed argues that the offense be reversed. drug felony must therefore State simultaneously commits someone whenever possesses exercises con- felony and firearm located

trol over a firearm —even State, place. According in another required by is the statute only nexus

“[t]he possession firearm] [of

one time: [of] with the point some time

must coincide at felony drug

commission aof offense.” JOUBERT, Appellant, Hurist agreement with find ourselves We prosecutor on this and the trial Judge Souter v. felony drug is Possession cocaine issue. Alaska, Appellee. STATE of felony, carrying a maxi- offense —a class C imprisonment.8 years’ penalty mum of 5 No. A-6540. the commis- firearm Possession Appeals of Alaska. Court felony drug a more offense is seri- sion of crime; felony, carrying B it is a class ous April 1999. imprison- penalty years’ of 10 maximum though wording- of AS Even ment.9

11.61.195(a)(1) interpreted could ‍​​​​‌​​​‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​​‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌​‍be appeal, it urged by the

fashion legislature in- unlikely quite

seems or, if receives to double the defendant

tended sentences, penalty triple the even

consecutive whenever a cocaine possession of cocaine happens gun owner.

user also statutes, interpreting it is

When interpretations that lead duty to shun

court’s agree results.10

to absurd We 11.61.195(a)(1) in unless AS nexus between the

terpreted require some the commission

possession of the firearm and offense, felony drug the statute leads penalties for run-of- inexplicably draconian drug possession

the-mill offenses. reasons, we conclude

For these 11.61.195(a)(1) a nexus requires

AS fire possession defendant’s

between a and the defendant’s commission

arm 11.71.040(d), 11.71.040(a)(3)(A), 841 P.2d AS See Millman AS AS 12.55.125(e). 11.71.150(c), pp.1 AS A 11.61.195(b), 11.61.195(a)(1), AS

9. AS 12.55.125(d).

Case Details

Case Name: Collins v. State
Court Name: Court of Appeals of Alaska
Date Published: Apr 9, 1999
Citation: 977 P.2d 741
Docket Number: A-6724
Court Abbreviation: Alaska Ct. App.
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