*1 COLLINS NATIONWIDE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY application July Docket No. 63577. On Decided plaintiff Court, appeal, Supreme leave lieu of granting appeal, judgment leave to reversed the Appeals and remanded the case the district court for further proceedings. brought Juliet M. Collins an action Nationwide Life Company indemnity provision Insurance under the double aof husband, group life and accident insurance on her Frank R. Collins. The insured died acute alcoholic intoxication. The Court, Ward, J., summary 39th District William B. rendered judgment ground for the defendant that the cause of death did not fall within the definition of accidental bodily injury. appeals, upon After intermediate remand from Court, Supreme Appeals, Riley D. C. and J. H. (M. Gillis, P.J., Cavanagh, dissenting), JJ. F. held that voluntary decedent’s act of intoxication which resulted in reasonably consequence foreseeable 78-5527). was not "accidental” (Docket plaintiff applies appeal. No. The for leave to per opinion signed Kavanagh, curiam Justices Wil- liams, Levin, Fitzgerald, Moody, Ryan, and Chief Justice Cole- dissenting, Supreme man Court held: many 1. A distinction has arisen states between the term "accident”, "accidental means” and the terms "accidental death”, bodily injuries”. and "accidental The more restrictive term happening "accidental means” refers to the occurrence or produces rather than the result. It is con- cerned with the cause of harm than rather the character of rely the harm. It involving was error to on cases requires only means” in this the decedent bodily injuries”. sustain here is not agency effecting whether the injury the death or can accidental, but whether the itself accidental. proper 2. The test of not "accidental” is the conse- [1] [2.3] [3.4] 44 Am Jur 44 Am Jur 44 Am Jur 2d, References 2d, 2d, Insurance Insurance §§ for Points in Headnotes §§ §§ 1219-1229. 1229-1231. 1289,1290. quences act decedent’s were foreseeable, not in fact fore- were improperly "reasonably foreseeable” test uses seen. *2 cases. order to set forth in tort definition of indemnity provision recovery involved double under the defeat expected or that have intended the insured must in this Negli- probability in his death. in all result his conduct would being prevent gence the death from an is not sufficient to alone meaning of This construction of within the accident insurer, by policy language, absent comports expects closely when he with what most unexpected. against the contracts to insure act, intentional as the result of an 3. Where an insured dies expect intoxication, voluntary or not intend but did such purposes of for the death is accidental death to policy In this such as the one in case. accidental death case, although the introduction of alcohol into his decedent’s intentional, he must determine whether factfinder addition, expected consequences. In have fatal intended jury suffered "inter- determine whether the deceased must autopsy”, exceptions injuries by of the one nal requirement injuries policy be evidenced from the body. of the or wound on the exterior visible contusion remanded to the district court. Reversed and credulity It strains to conclude Justice Coleman dissented. encompassed parties to the contract the intent overindulgence in alcohol. unintentional death
Opinion the Court Bodily Injuries. Policy — — Accident Accidental indemnity an accident in a claim for double under only requires that the insured sustain effecting bodily agency injuries” is not whether the accidental, but whether the death can be injury itself was accidental. Bodily Injuries — Policy — — 2. Insurance Accident Accidental Foreseeability. victim, voluntary but the act of the If death results from unforeseen, unanticipated, it is an unexpected, result meaning of an insurance accidental death within the resulting indemnity provides for death double bodily injuries; requirement foreseeable, a definition of the decedent’s act be not op cases, improper found in tort in an insur- accidental death ance case. Policy Bodily — — Injuries — 3. Insurance Accident Accidental Voluntary Intoxication. death A is accidental for the of an insurance insuring against from accidental where the insured dies as the of an intentional act such intoxication, expect did intend or death to result. Dissenting Opinion by Coleman, C.J. Policy Bodily — — Injuries —
4. Insurance Accident Accidental Voluntary Intoxication. credulity parties It strains to conclude that the intent of the policy providing indemnity an insurance double for death re- sulting bodily encompassed from accidental uninten- by overindulgence tional death in alcohol. Barge Dinning, P.C., Greve, La & Ronald H. *3 plaintiff. (Norman Zemke, Robert B. Tatham L. of coun- sel) for defendant. Per Curiam. Plaintiff’s husband died Decem- 29,1973, ber as a of acute alcoholic intoxica- autopsy An tion. disclosed that the deceased had a percent. Spitz, blood alcohol level of .37 Dr. who performed autopsy, deposition, by testified, high abnormally blood alcohol re- level lungs sulted fluid accumulation in decedent’s ultimately, and, which caused a strain on his heart his death. There no in- was evidence of external jury, superficial other than a abrasion which was unrelated to the of cause death. company paid plaintiff
Defendant $10,000, the face amount of an accidental death and dismemberment to issued decedent. pay Plaintiff suit filed when defendant to refused indemnity $10,000 an additional under the double 409 Mich coverage provides provision in the by which are evidenced on the exterior contusion wound visible inju drowning or internal (except in case of * * *”.1 autopsy) ries revealed of action in no cause court found The district cause of death defendant, holding favor definition of acci- policy’s fall did not within reversed, dental The circuit court bodily injury. ambiguous and constru- finding that from intoxication. include death alcoholic to the district Appeals agreed The Court court, failed to meet holding plaintiff had establishing a "visible requirement threshold of the body” on the exterior contusion wound Court reversed which caused the death. This order, stating that the medi- Appeals Court of Spitz "presented jury-sub- Dr. cal testimony the deceased suf- question as whether missible ”. autopsy’ 'internal fered Appeals Court of decide We remanded to the or death injury or intoxication can constitute (1978). remand, Court On death”. 403 Mich P.J., dissenting, answered of Appeals, Cavanagh, negative. Collins v Nationwide question 399; 282 NW2d 90 Mich resolution disagree We with the 1 pertinent part, policy provides: the insurance receipt proof employee, "Upon while insured for that an due policy, has benefits under the death and dismemberment *4 visible are evidenced sustained (except in the case exterior contusions or wounds autopsy) drowning injuries and that internal ninety days the date of their such occurrence have resulted within cause, contributing any of the losses other without living, below, pay employee, company to such if set forth will specified beneficiary, of insurance otherwise to the amount ** losses, following such loss in table exclusions, at here. none which is issue There are six 275 Life accordingly, and, of this issue remand to the dis- proceedings court for trict further consistent with opinion. important outset, theAt it is to note that a many has distinction arisen in states between the term "accidental means” terms "acci dent”, policy death”, and, used bodily injuries”.2 issue,
at This succinctly explained Couch, distinction in 10 (2d ed), pp § 41:28, 49-50: undesigned unintended and "[Accidental done, arising voluntarily from acts whereas death arising accidental means is a result from acts unin- tentionally done or undesignedly occurring. events term 'accidental means’ refers to the occurrence or happening result; produces rather than the is concerned with the cause of the harm (Footnotes rather omitted.) than the character of the harm.” upon by All of the cases relied the Court of Appeals majority poli- in the instant case involve containing language cies the more restrictive re-
quiring death from "accidental means”. Reliance 2See, e.g., (D Stuyvesant Co, Nev, Supp Minton v 373 33 F 1974); Co, 147; Catania v State Farm Life Ins 95 Nev 598 631 Adv P2d (1979); Co, 717; Pilcher v New York Life Ins 25 Cal 102 Cal Rptr (1967); (1972); Co, 107; 82 Beckham v Travelers Ins 225 Pa A2d 532 469; 2d, Insurance, 1083; 166 ALR 52 ALR2d 44 Am Jur 1221, 67; Couch, p Insurance, 41.28, p § § growing rejected A number of states have this distinction which Mr. Justice Cardozo in his now-famous dissent in Landress v Phoenix 491; (1934), 461; Mutual Life Ins 291 US 54 S Ed Ct L prophesied "plunge would this branch of the law into Serbonian See, Bog”. e.g., Co, supra; Catania v State Farm Ins Life and Beckham Co, supra, v Travelers Supreme Ins and the cited cases therein. Colorado, commenting stated, quotation, on this "Whatever bog Equitable kind of a Society is we concur.” Assurance Hemenover, 231, 235; unnecessary Colo P2d 80 It is Michigan recognizes us to determine this distinction because language we are us to |he concerned allows avoid Bog”. "Serbonian *5 409 271
276 Mich op the Court language error, in the cases was on these requires only us before bodily injuries”. Thus, the in- sustain "accidental effecting "agency quiry not whether is injury accidental”, 90 can be termed death or App Rather, is whether the Mich injury accidental. itself was disagree of
We also with of the term "accidental” which would definition require of decedent’s act reasonably foreseeable order must not be proper test for determin- "accidental”. The has or death whether an policy such an insurance occurred was stated Minton v the one before us (D Supp Stuyvesant Nev, 35 Ins 373 F Life 1974), involving also death caused acute a case ingestion. alcoholic courts, however, have
"The been concerned term "acci interpreting applying only with have, uniformity, reached the dent” substantial results from the act conclusion that victim, unexpected, unantici the result is unforeseen, pated it is an accidental death.”3 Appeals requirement con- Court
sequences of decedent’s act must not be improperly utilizes the foreseeable However, forth in set tort cases. foreseeability requisite tort neither the level liability nor for criminal recklessness sufficient mishap a "nonaccident” when conduct render the terms of an accidental measured Metropolitan policy. v Life death insurance Marsh 3See, also, America, Ashley Agricultural Ins Co of 241 Life (1928), 441; used in for a definition of "accidental” NW similar construing means” the context of v Nationwide Co, Inc, Ill 790; Ins NE2d (1979).4 question is not whether death was reasonably foreseeable, but death was in fact foreseen recovery the insured. In order to defeat *6 indemnity provision, under a double as herein, involved the insured must have intended expected probabil- that his conduct in all would ity Negligence result his death. alone in prevent being sufficient to the death from an meaning accident within the of the findWe this construction language, insurer, absent comports closely most with what insured ex- pects when he contracts to insure unexpected. purchases One who an accidental provide death intends to to benefits his beneficiary in the event he should suffer death opposed from accident to as death result- means, suicide, from other such as disease natural death. policies upon public "Insurance which the for relies
security in case accident should fine be free from distinctions few pointed can understand until out * * by lawyers judges Knight v Metropolitan 100, 104; 416, 103 Ariz 437 P2d conclusion, In we hold that an insured where also, See, Nash, 1957), (Fla, Gulf Life Ins Co v 97 So where the Court said: "It foreseeability seems to me that such doctrine of doctrine a totally unadaptable construing policies. unsuited in accident Moreover, only the rationale of these seems in cases to be founded not negligence the part intrinsically doctrine of but on the principle part of the insured. Were we this the law to make State, buying only of this accident majority it would not do violence to the reason for great preclude recovery it did not arising accidents, place of deaths almost it would liability.” insurmountable burden to enforce Dissenting Coleman, C.J. act, such as an intentional dies voluntary intoxication, or ex- but did not intend pect to is accidental such death of an accidental death although herein. In instant involved decedent’s introduction into his alcohol intentional, must the factfinder determine was whether he consequences. expected to fatal have
intended or jury addition, must determine In "internal the deceased suffered by autopsy” in our accordance with revealed previous in this case. order pursuant granting appeal, leave to lieu of 853.2(4), judgment GCR we reverse to the district court and remand opin- proceedings further consistent appellant. ion. Costs
Kavanagh, Williams, Levin, Fitzgerald, *7 JJ., Moody, Jr., and Blair concurred. Ryan, Coleman, C. J. I dissent. agree indemnity should that double
I cannot paid drinking It strains one’s self death. credulity parties to conclude that intent encompassed to the contract unintentional overindulgence in alcohol.