207 Mich. 627 | Mich. | 1919
On December 10, 1918, Deputy Commissioner Ora E. Reaves, acting as a committee of arbitration, other arbitrators being waived, heard the testimony offered by the parties upon applicant’s claim. He did not at this time announce or make his finding or award or fix a definite date when he would do so. On December 12th he made an award in favor of applicant. It is a well known and established custom of the board, and a commendable one, to promptly send to the parties, to the insurance company carrying the risk, and to the attorneys for the parties, true copies of the award. In this case through some oversight no copy of the award was sent to defendants’ attorneys and they did not learn of the award until January 8, 1919. They then promptly filed "a petition for an extension of the time in which to appeal the case. The board declined to exercise its discretion in the matter. It is somewhat doubtful from the findings filed whether this result was reached upon the theory that the board had no power or upon the theory that no facts were stated upon which the board could act. In its ultimate findings the board found:
“(a) That under the conditions of this case it has no power to grant an extension of time to the respondents during which they might appeal.
“(b) That if the industrial accident board had the power in this case it would exercise its discretion to grant an extension of time, and if it believed it had the power to grant an extension of time it would do so.”
In its opinion, however, there is some language indicative of the view that no facts had been presented
Section 8, part 3, of the act (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5461), provides:
“The committee of arbitration shall make such inquiries and investigations as it shall deem necessary.. The hearings of the committee shall be held at the locality where the injury occurred, and the decision of the committee shall be filed with the industrial accident board. Unless a claim for a review is filed by either party within seven days, the decision shall stand as the decision of the industrial accident board: Provided, That said industrial accident board may, for sufficient cause shown, grant further time in which to claim such review.”
This court had this provision of the act before it in Brunette v. Mining Co., 197 Mich. 301, and Kalucki v. Foundry Co., 200 Mich. 604. In both cases this court held that the board had the power, the discretion, to grant an extension of time. In the Brunette Case, we held that the discretion of the board had not been abused, while in the Kalucki Case we pointed out that the provision did not give the board the arbitrary power to extend the time fixed by the statute.
We think the facts set up in the petition are sufficient to authorize the board to exercise its discretion. What that action should be, we do not intimate. Parties, insurance companies, and attorneys having business before the board are familiar with the practices and customs of the board. The universal custom of