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Collier v. State
846 N.E.2d 340
Ind. Ct. App.
2006
Check Treatment

*1 (1) Company in the Columbus Wheel one City Addition to the

and M.T. Reeves'

Columbus"). evidence presented

Nava affirmative presumption

sufficient to rebut Kezy tax deed to

the issuance of the Porter, See, eg., 773 N.E.2d at

proper. pre (holding property that the owner evidence sufficient to

sented affirmative presumption

rebut the the issuance proper pur

the tax deed was because the provide

chaser failed to notice he had deeds). seeking tax petition

filed judgment that the trial court's

conclude

Kezy's clearly favor is erroneous. reasons, foregoing

For the we affirm the judgment

trial court's favor of on Swets claim,

Nava's cross reverse trial judgment Kezy,

court's favor of proceedings

remand for consistent with opinion.

this part, part,

Affirmed reversed

remanded.

RILEY, BARNES, J. and concur. J. COLLIER, Appellant,

Mark E.

Defendant, Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

STATE of

No. 76A04-0503-CR-142. of Appeals

Court of Indiana.

April27,2006. July

Transfer Denied *2 Defender Carpenter,

Susan K. Public Indiana, Freund, Deputy P. Public David Defender, Appellant. Indianapolis, Carter, Attorney General Steve Indiana, Deputy Ryan Johanningsmeier, General, Appel- Attorney Indianapolis, lee. night's night."

OPINION Id. at 172. As the two house, walked back to Collier's VAIDIK, Judge. again told going Cameron he was Summary Case kill his wife and himself. Onee back in appeals his conviction for Mark Collier *3 house, each of them drank a beer estranged murder of his eventually and off in Collier "dozed his con Specifically, argues wife. he that his "thought chair." Id. Cameron was over" constitute a duct did not substantial point and went back home. Id. At some murder, toward commission of the crime of during day, called Cameron Charter statute, attempt Indiana's required Beacon, Center, Northeastern and Col preparation. instead mere but was thought lier's ex-boss because he Collier agree, therefore we and reverse Collier's psychiatric help.2 needed conviction murder.1 History Facts and Procedural Collier to again went Cameron's house at p.m. 8:45 and told Cameron that he wife, May Naney, Collier married his on to talk to him. wanted The two walked Nancy separated from 1986. Collier back to Collier's house and each them out of their home on March moved 24, 2008, Nancy 20083. drank another beer. Collier took Camer- On March obtained an Ex Parte Order for Protection in which on him upstairs, showed where the cat stay away was ordered to from Collier were, litter boxes and cats and told him Nancy's place employment, Cameron that he could let the cats outside or take Hospital Angola, Nancy Indiana. filed them to a shelter. Collier then showed April for divorce on 2008. was, dog Cameron where the food asked him dog, gave spare to feed his him 24, 2003, April Naney working On was keys pickup. to his house and his Camer- p.m. hospital. the 2:80-10:30 shift at the says on that Collier then went into his day, That went to Collier the home of his know, prayin', you bedroom and Cameron, "started neighbor, approxi- Charles at Cameron, mately p.m. According 3:00 'God, forgive telling-saying, me for what upset thought gonna Collier was because "he I'm do."' Id. at 178. Collier gonna was lose his home him and because eryin'. kinda Then he ... start- "IsItarted gettin' his were T'r. 170. p. wife divorced." ed kinda chuckling." Id. He then came gonna told Cameron "he Collier room, Cameron, out of hugged his and told kill his wife and himself" and then went him, "Tonight's night. gonna I'm do thought home. Id. Cameron Collier "was it." Id. Collier collected ice a box just talking" because Collier had simi- said said, pair and a of binoculars and things lar actually before but "had never "I'm gonna stab her in the effin' heart anything." Id. at done gonna twice. I'm cut her effin' throat." approximately p.m., At 5:80 re Id. Collier also said he would ram Collier said, Nancy turned to Cameron's home and "To pickup. with his Id. at 174. Collier argument 1. We heard oral in this cause on 2. Charter Beacon Northeastern Center provide behavioral health 20, 2006, services in north- February Valparaiso University at http://www.ft- east Indiana. See School of Law. We thank counsel for their wayne.in.us/health_living/mental_health_sub- students, presentations faculty, able and the stance_abuse.html (last visited March hospitali- and staff of the law school their 2006) (last http://www.nec.org/ visited ty. 28, 2006). March approximately 9:00 A friend of called her at the pickup left in his Angola. hospital police and told her that the and headed towards were p.m. searching for Collier. That prompted left, after Collier Camer- A few minutes Naney police, phone who told her to During on himself left to drive to work. stay in until hospital she heard other drive, driving to- he saw Collier back approximately p.m., wise. At 10:40 Officer away Angola. house and from ward his Sandy and Officer Justice Robert Cun p.m., and 10:00 Sometime between 9:80 ningham Angola Department Police another of arrived at the house of dispatch received a radio says neighbors, Billy Fansler. Fansler thereafter, Shortly locate Collier. Officer going told her that "he was that Collier Cunningham Justice and Officer arrived at enough." Id. at 198. end it and he had had *4 hospital spotted the and Collier's pickup. Collier also told Fansler "to tell hus- [her] The was backed into a pickup parking you band thank and tell children God [her] of space parking the last row the lot Id. Collier was at them{[.]" bless When emergency across the street from the area house, "he looked kind of wob- Fansler's of hospital the so Collier would have feet," bly," quite steady wasn't on his "he emergency been able to see the room en little," speech] a and [his "he kinda slurred This door was the exit trance/exit. "[mlaybe and a little depressed he was leaving hospital available to those the after at angry[.]" Id. 201-08. p.m.3 10:00 left, Fansler called After Collier Camer- approached When the officers Collier's wife, had on's who told her that Cameron vehicle, they observed that the vehicle was planned speak police with the onee he off, off, lights were and was Collier Hamilton, Indiana, way reached on his inside out. The officers Indeed, already had work. Cameron of opened the doors the vehicle and told officer, spoken police and a stopped with It not until Collier to exit. was the offi- Jeremy Deputy Marshall Warner the doors that opened cers Collier awoke. Department. Police Hamilton Cameron vehicle, out of the Once Collier was says Deputy that he told Warner that Col- officers noticed that he was intoxicated him- planning Naney lier was to kill and custody. They him into then and took Warner, hand, Deputy on the other self. pickup searched the interior of the and says him only that Cameron told that Col- pair an a box found ice planning lier to kill himself. After was binoculars, open container of beer Cameron, speaking Deputy Warner partially full. The officers ex- County De- called Steuben Sheriffs they arresting plained to Collier were partment. Deputy and officers Warner privacy violating him for invasion of County Depart- from the Steuben Sheriff's protective terms of the order and also try ment then went to house to public intoxication. explained him. find Fansler went out and however, charged Eventually, to the officers that had been at her the State Collier Murder, a A just pickup Attempted had left in his and Collier with Class house but 27 felony.4 jury at his A trial was held October was not home. 35-41-5-1(a); 35- had been the case since before 4. Ind.Code Ind.Code This information, 42-1-1(1). original Collier, In the Nancy usually separated from when alleged State that Collier p.m. 11:00 worked until Nancy. Ap- "knowingly intentionally kill" pellant's App. p. day 8. On the first 344 beyond 28, 2004, preparation of which the overt act mere at the conclusion and in furtherance of intent to commit an February guilty. On

jury found Collier State, Asghar v. 698 offense. N.E.2d 28, 2005, Collier the trial court sentenced denied, (Ind.Ct.App.1998), reh'g 883 trans. thirty presumptive sentence denied. Whether a defendant has taken a years, of those years five suspended substantial toward the commission of twenty- prison term of for a total executed generally question a crime is of fact to be years of followed five years five to be by the of fact on all the decided trier based appeals. now probation. Collier case. particular circumstances and Decision Discussion State, Washington v. 517 N.E.2d 79 argues appeal, On (Ind.1987); Asghar, see also to support insufficient the evidence is State, 685 Williams "Upon murder. conviction for N.E.2d In (Ind.Ct.App.1997)). sufficiency of evidence to challenge to the determination, making this the focus is on conviction, reviewing court support a completed, what acts have been not what judge the evidence or reweigh does not remains to be done. Jackson v. witnesses, respects credibility of the (Ind.1997). complet province weigh con jury's exclusive *5 ed acts must be corroborative of State, McHenry flicting evidence." v. 820 the firmness of the defendant's criminal (Ind.2005) (internal 124, quota 126 N.E.2d Mitchem, intent. 685 N.E.2d at 676. omitted). must consider the tions We differently, liability the of the de Stated and reasonable infer probative evidence purpose fendant turns on his as manifested the verdict. Id. must supporting ences We State, through his conduct. v. Zickefoose if evidence and rea probative affirm the 618, 628, 507, 270 Ind. 388 N.E.2d 510 inferences drawn from the evi sonable (1979). has Supreme Our Court described have allowed a reasonable tri dence could step requirement the substantial as a guilty of fact to find the defendant er Cleave, "minimal v. 674 one." State Van beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. "To estab (Ind.1996). 1304 How con murder, attempted lish the State must simultaneously duct can be described as (1) prove beyond a reasonable doubt that and "minimal" is the both "substantial" specific the defendant acted with the intent grapple. dilemma with which we (2) kill; engaged the defendant jury acknowledges Collier could constituting step to substantial found each of the facts have reasonably ward commission of the crime" of murder. alleged charging in the amended informa- (Ind. State, v. 754 N.E.2d Osborne (1) tion, park- he was found wit: 2001) State, v. 685 N.E.2d Mitchem ing Naney's place employment, lot at (Ind.1997)); see also Ind.Code position from which he could see the 35-41-5-1; Ind.Code 35-42-1-1. Col Naney building; door would use to exit the day lier contends that his conduct on the (2) pos- when he was found he had his law, not, question did as a matter of consti cutter, pick, session an ice and binoe- tute "a substantial toward commission (@) ulars; before he was found he had agree. of the crime" of murder. We must going made a statement that he was that a We have said "substantial wait Naney to come out of work pickup, run her in step" purposes attempt statute is her over with stab "intentionally attempted trial, however, Collier had kill" the trial court allowed Nancy. Id. 46. say State to the information amend at involving the cases other Nor have heart, Appellant's throat. and cut her as close Nevertheless, argues presented questions crimes tempt he App. p. See, eg., Himes v. a matter of instant case. insufficient as as the evidence is (1980) State, step toward 403 N.E.2d 1377 273 Ind. to constitute substantial law murder; rape his conduct was conviction (affirming contends that decide, then, must at intended pointed gun preparation. mere where defendant tent, her, drove to victim, her into a told whether evidence directed want," with an ice Nancy's employment I threatened to place what know "You binoculars, parked ran, a box front of grabbed if shoot her she knew through her); which he outside the door struggled with pants, her exit, then fell Naney would (Ind. State, N.E.2d 1077 Hampton to have allowed a out is sufficient (see below); II, Ct.App.1984) section jury to find that Collier reasonable (Ind.Ct. Haskett the com- step toward taken a substantial robbery (affirming attempted App.1984) of murder. mission accomplice defendant's conviction where toy gun but then left went into store with not to be question to our The answer gun demanding mon pointing without to other Indiana cases by analogy found denied, trams. denied. ey), reh'g statute. This is be applying attempt in which the Indiana cases cause most go do from here? So where stat step prong substantial Supreme recog has The Indiana Court some at issue have involved ute has been "[dleciding constitutes nized that what direct, contact or at physical appreciable, always upon a burden attempt has been the defendant tempted contact between law, challenging common even In the alleged and the victim. *6 State, v. respected judges." Ward most context, involve in several cases murder (Ind.1988) 52, 58 Oliver 528 N.E.2d shot, victim was in which the stances Holmes, 68 The Common Law Wendell See, did not die. stabbed or beaten but (1881)). ap has principle the Court One (Ind. State, 112 425 N.E.2d e.g., Harris v. proved is as follows: 1981) (vietim head); Zickefoose, 270 in shot attempted the crime more serious [TJhe (victim 618, at 507 Ind. at 388 N.E.2d the menace to the social greater or the choked); beaten, stabbed, Cohen v. part efforts on the security from similar State, (Ind.Ct.App.1999) N.E.2d 1168 714 others, further of the defendant (victim head), In in trans. denied. shot to leading up of acts in the series back others, shot or stabbed at the defendant the crim- crime should consummated See, entirely. e.g., but missed victim the defendant holding inal law reach (Ind.2000) State, 1242 Bethel v. 730 N.E.2d guilty attempt. (defendant at intended victim but shot Sayre, Francis B. Crimi (quoting Id. at 54 State, missed); 1072 Evans v. 727 N.E.2d 821, 41 L.Rev. 846 Attempts, Harv. nal (Ind.2000) (defendant swung knife at vic (1928)). case, then, State, the seriousness missed); In this v. 711 tim Bartlett but in favor of weighs crime of murder (Ind.1999) (defendant at 497 shot N.E.2d Still, missed). conviction.5 affirming Collier's intended victim but "Tilt State, Hopkins special v. der treatment." note, however, of the strin- 5. We that because gent 633, and the penalties for (Ind.2001); murder see also 638 759 N.E.2d proof, ambiguity in its our Su- State, 1008, often involved 1010 704 N.E.2d Richeson "singled preme out mur- Court has 346 language much of the found our Su lay any general rule to down impossible

is acts are too remote Zicke preme to determine what Court's watershed decision attempt."6 constitute an Williams was borrowed from Model Penal foose 385, 391, Ind. 304 § thereto. Code 5.01 and the Comment (1973). Therefore, try we will 622-28, at Zickefoose, 270 Ind. Compare used to bright-line test formulate N.E.2d at 509-10 with Model Penal a defendant's conduct determine whether (Official § Draft and Revised Code 5.01 step" for pur constitutes a "substantial 1985), 297, 329, at Comment Comments attempt Rath poses of Indiana's statute. requirement that the Specifically, er, origins we will review Indiana's "strongly conduct be defendant's corrobo attempt compare statute and the instant pur of the defendant's criminal rative" from this Court case with another decision Zickefoose, see 270 Ind. at pose, provide some effort measure grounded N.E.2d at is Model Penal attempt law. clarity the area 5.01(2). requirement § It is to this Code "Strongly now turn our focus. I. is When Conduct of Intent? Corroborative" com require defendant's general attempt statute is Indiana's pleted "strongly acts be corroborative" of approach Penal

based on the Model Code a defendant's purpose his criminal because lability. Zickefoose, 270 Ind. is often more indicative of his at 509. The "substan- statements, "equiv intent than are his found in Indiana step" requirement tial 35-41-5-l(a) equivocal reflect an ocal acts well directly taken Code § LaFave, purpose."7 Wayne R. Substan- 5.01(1)(c), from Model Penal Code (”Attem n ted 5.01, (''The (Ind.1998) special is a Comment at 330 basic rationale murder treatment."). deserving special requirement that the actor's conduct purpose shall to com- corroborate M. Perkins & Ronald N. 6. See also Rollin is, course, same as that mit a crime (3d 1982) Boyce, Criminal Law 621 ed. view."); underlying loquitur ipsa the res see ("'The dichotomy prepatory-perpetrating (8th Dictionary also Black's Law discussing gen of a useful in situations rather ed.2004) (res ipsa loquitur is Latin for "the nature, dividing eral the actual line be itself"). *7 thing speaks for One commentator extreme."); shadowy tween the two is in the test, res.ipsa loquitur has described the Ghent, Annotation, Jeffrey What Constitutes F. "equivocality approach," way: this Murder, 612, Attempted 54 A.L.R.3d 617 ('The (1973) agree authorities it is im film, though cinematograph [It is as general possible to formulate a or defini rule depicted merely ac- which had so far (to attempt tion what constitutes mur of person's stating cused acts without what der), applied which as a test in all intention, suddenly been was his Miller, cases[.]") v. 2 Cal.2d California stopped, to and the audience were asked 527, (1935)); Sayre, 42 P.2d Francis B. 308 say to what end those acts were directed. 821, Attempts, 41 Harv. L.Rev. 846 Criminal If there is one reasonable answer to ("It (1928) manifestly impossible lay is [] question then the accused has done this down mechanical or hard and fast rule "attempt" what amounts to an to attain drawing prepara between for the of the line reasonably end. If there is more than one attempts; such efforts tion and indictable answer, possible then the accused has not unhesitatingly ... in this direction must be yet enough. done rejected."). Cambridge 5 Turner, Crimes, Commit Attempts 230, (as (1934) quoted J. 236 Indeed, "strongly corroborative" re- L. quirement is an extension of what the drafters Law LaFave, R. Substantive Criminal Wayne (2d ed.2003)). 11.4(d) § The Wisconsin Su of the Model Penal Code labeled as the "res "stop loquitur preme called this the the film ipsa test."" See Model Penal Code Court has

347 the intent of the defen- certainty what ed.2008) 11.4(d) (2d Law tive Criminal is. "LaFave"). dant of (hereinafter "Statements or a equivocal acts prior

intent made Martinez, 369, v. 88 Dakota S.D. South give subsequent thereto made confession (1974) 530, (quoting 220 531 Cali N.W.2d purpose of that firmness no assurance Miller, 308, 2 42 P.2d Cal.2d fornia dangerous actor's manifests the which Burton, (1985)); Michigan see also 310 "(alo differently, at Id. Stated ness." Mich App. NW a nature that is an act of such tempt is (2002). intent of the criminal evidence itself mind, A criminal bears it is done. this framework which With (quoting face." Id. upon criminal intent its now to determine whether Col proceed (7th Salmond, was sufficient to constitute Jurisprudence lier's conduct J. Wisconsin, ed.1924)); step toward the commission also Hamiel v. substantial see (1979) 639, 644 285 N.W.2d Wis.2d 5.01(2) in Penal murder. Model Code ("[In primarily it is that, attempt, the erime of list of conduct cludes an illustrative if provide which evi the acts of the accused crimi- strongly corroborative the actor's intent."). mental requisite of the dence shall not be held insufficient purpose, mal Therefore, necessarily evaluate we must as a matter to constitute substantial may have a defendant any statements pro Specifically, that subsection of law. order together made with his vides: he has done whether that which determine sufficiency of negativing the Without he said corroborates that which strongly conduct, if following, other Dakota Su he would do.8 As South pur- of the actor's eriminal corroborative has stated: preme Court held insufficient as pose, shall not be of a requiring evidence The reason matter of law: act, con- slight, toward direct however (a) wait, searching for or lying in crime, ... of the intended summation victim of following contemplated to that majority up in the of cases crime; defendant, con- the conduct of the

time has sisting merely preparation, of acts of (b) seeking to entice the enticing or and this is equivocal; ceased to be never go victim of the crime contemplated so, of his de- necessarily irrespective for the com- place contemplated quality being clared intent. It is crime; mission lacking that must be before equivocal (c) place con- reconnoitering may be said act becomes one which for the commission templated of the commis- to be a commencement crime; act, or an overt sion of *8 structure, (d) entry of a itself unlawful any fragment of the crime before in it is con- or enclosure which vehicle committed, this is so for has been com- that the crime will be templated that, long equivocal the reason so as remains, say mitted; no one can quality equivocality of a defen- emphasis on the Stewart, 28, 8. An 143 Wis.2d

test." Wisconsin especially important in (1988) dant's conduct will (concluding 420 N.W.2d one, attempted robbery cases, case where in test was met in which the unlike this those ''film", stopped, statements, shown the de- if would have made ei- defendant has not demanding money appearing fendant his conduct. ther before or after gun). for a reach beyond claim that he (e) be Collier's never moved of materials possession in the commission of the mere employed preparation. crime, specially designed that are for Second, undisputed there is evi use or that can serve no such unlawful dence that took an pick Collier ice and a purpose

lawful of the actor under the Nancy's place box cutter drove to of cireumstances; employment, where he in waited outside

(£) position from which he would possession, collection or fabrica- be able Nancy see But employed to be in exit. the corroborative tion of materials significance of a possession defendant's of commission of the at or near weapons he intends to use in commit for place contemplated its commis- ting a crime must be in sion, light evaluated of or possession, if such collection weapons types possesses. This purpose fabrication serves no lawful is because the level of threat or appar circumstances; the actor under danger posed by weapons inversely ent agent an innocent (¢) soliciting proportionate to the distance between the constituting in conduct an ele- engage alleged defendant and the victim. See ment of the crime. Richeson v. 5.01(2). Though not Model Penal Code (Ind.1998) ("[Wle think that the distance types an exhaustive list of the of conduct perpetrator in many between and victim step, that could constitute a substantial attempted murder poses special cases guides Model Penal Code formulation our "). problems of ambiguity." 'intent There resolution of this case. fore, we must consider the nature and falls into three of the seven Model Penal capability injury particular wait, categories, namely, lying Code in re- weapon weapons possessed by the de connoitering, possession of materials fendant. defendant's conduct must employed to be in the commission of the something prepara "be more than mere place contemplated crime at or near the tion, remote from place the time and Nevertheless, for its commission. can- 11.4(b) intended LaFave at n. erime[.]" say strongly that his conduct was cor- Dumas, Minnesota v. 118 Minn. roborative of his stated intent. (1912)). 186 N.W. First, Here, undisputed there is evidence that pickup Collier was found in his Collier, apprehended the officers when he with a box cutter and an given ice asleep. was either out or While we the distance between he and at the reject possibility lying do not arrest, time those items were virtu- reconnoitering may ally wait some cases useless to terms of an at- be deemed sufficient to tempted constitute a sub murder. Inasmuch a pickup, as step, stantial this is not such a pick potentially case. Sim and an ice are harmful, ply driving place contemplated necessary is nonetheless direct, allowing the commission of crime before make close contact with the intend- oneself to fall into unconsciousness cannot ed victim order to do harm. Compare be said to be corroborative of a this to the case of a defendant parks who firm purpose, require eriminal truck full explosives building. is the near a Zickefoose, Though ment Indiana. See 270 Ind. *9 the defendant be the same 510; 388 N.E.2d at see also physical Mit distance from his intended victim chem, Rather, 685 N.E.2d at 676. Nancy, such or victims as Collier was from equivocal evidence of supports explosives behavior defendant with a truck full of large a amount sig- armed. He was aware imminent a more certainly poses Likewise, a defendant of cash be taken the assistant would danger. nificant dangerous departed, more he and other objectively manager when gun a is with a away than in the restaurant. money hundred feet be left from a few would In police, or a vehicle with a knife If not for the arrival of the defendant sur- words, on all the depending have been able to rob Hampton other would cireumstances, it would seem anyone rounding manager the assistant else a come within who has that a defendant him. still with victim his intended feet of few hundred Hampton argued appeal, at 1081. On Id. taken a more substantial gun a has step" that he did not take a "substantial has come a defendant who step than has robbery commission of because toward the of his intended a hundred feet within few placed the Pizza Hut or he never entered pickup. a Under a knife or victim with Noting Hampton in Id. that anyone fear. say cannot cireumstances of this step" require- interpreted the "substantial pickup, a of his possession that Collier's that the facts narrowly, ment too we held strongly was pick and an ice Hampton took sub- demonstrated firm criminal intent. of a corroborative commission of rob- stantial toward undisputed facts demonstrate bery. Id. equiv ceased to be conduct never Collier's the facts of argues The State Martinez, at 531. 220 N.W.2d ocal. See for this case. Hampton are instructive employment Nancy's place He drove Supreme first note that the Indiana out. Fur asleep passed fell but then Hampton in has said that the facts Court thermore, weapons possessed while he attempt in are "much flimsier" than other in to use commission planned he Cleave, 674 robbery cases. Van ed enough to moved close he never Also, several distinctions N.E.2d at 1304. weapons dangerous, Nancy to make those more case even make the facts of Collier's is, present intent to demonstrate First, Hampton. flimsy than those against her. Because weapons use the intoxicated, somewhat Hampton, though corrobo conduct was him, apprehended police awake when was he never purpose, of a firm criminal rative was either while Collier step toward commission took a substantial arrest, Second, his Hampton, after out. of the erime of murder. a statement which gave a detective Hampton v. State? II. What About Pizza gone to the acknowledged he had this discuss in their briefs parties money. Both he needed Hut to rob because State, 468 Hampton police. Court's decision statement Collier made no such Hampton (Ind.Ct.App.1984). N.E.2d 1077 Third, actually left his ve Hampton while robbery based convicted of himself near and positioned hicle following facts: on the no evidence gun, there is building with prog physical made such the Pizza that Collier ever his car near Hampton parked arriving at the murder after ress toward busy highway, Hut to a which next Furthermore, holding easy escape hospital. provided an would have holding our consistent with Hampton and the He hid between bushes route. strongly cor Hampton's light to avoid from because building, attempting his stated intent. With he was roborated arrested passing cars. When vehicle, hand, ap mask, he exited his weapon could which wearing found ski restaurant, behind face, hid proached he was over his pulled down *10 stayed beyond a building, reasonable doubt that Collier bushes next these lay as he wait. Given committed the crimes of Invasion of Priva awake Supreme com- cy distinctions and our Court's a A or as Class misdemeanor Criminal B, C, Stalking felony.10 as a Class or D flimsy, facts therein were ments decision, though it affirmed Hampton Unfortunately for the Collier was conviction, reversing in favor of weighs a not tried for these crimes. differ Stated conviction. Collier's ently, we reverse Collier's conviction not crime, because he did not commit a Summary and Conclusion not because he did commit the crime with whole, the acts that Collier Taken as a prosecutor charged which the him. As the being apprehended did completed before Appeals rightfully New York of Court re step. a substantial constitute nearly eighty years marked ago: equivocal. to be Be- conduct never ceased may well "equivocal cause acts reflect police city The of New York did 11.4(d), § equivocal purpose," LaFave by preventing excellent work this case say cannot that Collier's conduct was of a commission serious crime. It is "strongly corroborative of the firmness of great a satisfaction to realize that we Mitchem, criminal intent." [his] See have such guardians wide-awake of our Furthermore, a compari- 676. peace. or not steps Whether which Hampton, son of this case with up had taken to the time defendant presenting substantially Indiana case facts his arrest amounted to the commis- similar to the instant reveals several law, by sion a our defined important weigh factual distinctions that is, however, another matter. reversing favor of Collier's conviction. Rizzo, New York v. 246 N.Y. N.E. may a have reached different result (1927) added). (emphasis alert, been awake and had he cognizant question We remain that the begun approach building, toward the whether defendant has taken a sub- foot, pickup either in his or on or even if step stantial toward the commission of a simply opened he had the door and taken a generally question crime is of fact to be step out. But those are not the facts Washing- decided the trier of fact. See still, before us. Even the State would ton, driving Here, however, have us find that Collier's act of 517 N.E.2d at 79. probative evidence and reasonable infer- hospital with a box cutter and an ice ences drawn from the evidence are insuffi- pick step. constituted a substantial cient, law, correct, as a State but it was not a matter to have allowed jury step beyond substantial toward murder. Collier to find a reasonable doubt proved concedes that the State's evidence Collier took a substantial toward felony, felony D but is elevated to Class C if § 9. Ind.Code 35-46-1-15.1. the defendant stalks the victim and makes an " § Ind.Code 'Stalk' means a 35-45-10-5. explicit implicit or an threat with the intent knowing or an intentional course of conduct place the victim in reasonable fear of sexual involving repeated continuing harassment battery, seriously bodily injury, or death or person of another cause a reason- would protective violates of certain orders. LC. terrorized, person frightened, able to feel in- 35-45-10-5(b). Stalking is elevated timidated, actually threatened felony Class B if "the act or acts were com- terrorized, fright, causes the victim to feel person mitted while the armed with ened, intimidated, Ind.Code or threatened." 35-45-10-5(c)(1). deadly weapon." 1C. Stalking generally § 35-45-10-1. a Class

351 criminal at an stop and courts to effort McHenry, 820 Nancy. See murdering stage, thereby minimizing earlier the risk at 126. harm im providing of substantive without Reversed. munity for the offender." v. Zickefoose State, 618, 622, 270 Ind. 388 N.E.2d J., CRONE, concurs. (1979). 509 BARNES, J., separate dissents step constitutes a substantial to What opinion. is, majority points murder as the wards BARNES, dissenting. Judge, out, usually a litigated attempt when direct majority In the I dissent. respectfully agree is made to take a life. We all could lucidly frames the opinion, Judge Vaidik miss, stabbing that a and a a or shot as, are faced with here question death, shooting does result that Collier drove to evidence "whether push attempt similar acts "needle" to with an ice Nancy's place employment of See, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. binoculars, parked a (Ind. State, e.9., Bethel v. 730 N.E.2d 1242 he knew through which outside the door State, 2000), v. 425 N.E.2d 112 Harris exit, then fell Naney would (Ind.1981). unique a presents This case to have allowed a out is sufficient any pattern reported fact unlike those that Collier had jury to find reasonable concerning attempted Indiana case mur toward the com- step a substantial taken der. sayI Op. pp. of murder." 344-45. mission majority recognizes and concedes The yes. severity gravity that the important put this I believe is most murder, "weighs in favor attempted here only of not the factu- in the context answer Op. affirming p. Collier's conviction." case, legal also its al of this but posture State, 528 N.E.2d Ward jury to a facts were tried posture,. These (Ind.1988)). affirm, They do not howev any evidentiary dispute. without serious doing for not so is er. Part of the reason "arm-wrestling" over the legal There is no recogni court's supreme because of our or the evi- given that were instructions instructions, tion, jury in the context of party Neither that was introduced. dence de "Attempted special murder is to us argued presentation in its oral Richeson v. serving special treatment." than, are these legal matter other serious (Ind.1998). State, 704 N.E.2d legally attempt- sustain an enough facts argument this is that at flip side of ed murder conviction? only felony in tempted murder is the punishment is less majority of the Indiana for which agree I with the vast com imposed be for the majority in the than what legal principles related § 85-41-5- pleted all of them crime. See Ind.Code repeat and need not opinion here, analysis l(a). except say that the person A convicted can be sen felony molesting A child empha erudite. I would Class thoughtful and years, twenty fifty that, impor the most tenced from my opinion, size is, completed convicted of person "The determi same as principle tant in this case felony molesting. A child See I.C. a substantial Class nation of what constitutes contrast, 35-50-2-1(a), By §§ jury." 85-50-24. province is left to the (Ind. of murder can be sen person convicted Newhoff sixty-five range forty-five in a law tenced Ct.App.1999). Our criminal years, person convicted by police action preventive allows "some Op. p. making do." 847. After this obser- sentenced the Class can murder *12 vation, however, twenty fifty years. majority to I that the range of submit felony A 35-50-2-8, it, Unlike especially §§ 35-50-2-4. to when it diseuss- See 1.C. fails follow I not extend our su majority, the would danger presented es the lack of immediate of at "special treatment" preme court's by pick of an ice and possession sufficiency to of the murder cases tempted mentioning box cutter without his stated to There is no reason questions.1 evidence to in the heart and intention stab convicted of treat a defendant strongly cut her throat. Our case law from a defendant con- differently. murder suggests that clear statements of intent felony attempt any other Class A viectedof convictions, support can eriminal ed crime. even where the conduct at issue is itself perfectly legal pose not an imme- and does the Model Penal guidance from

Some threat of harm to the intended vic- diate Code, attempt law is upon which Indiana's instructive, based, majority recog- the tim. majority's citation I with the agree nizes. in example, For Johnston 5.01(2) Code, which lists to section of the (Ind.1989), the was defendant that, if strong- of conduct examples several convicted of three counts of criminal ly of the actor's corroborative molesting. supporting child The evidence sufficient as a purpose, should be deemed that defendant the convictions was the law to constitute a substantial matter of parents told the of three children committing a crime. I also toward step them, and then wanted to molest went to majority the that Collier's con- agree with devices, parents' house with sexual the three of those duct falls within least give sedatives to lubricants, and in for the explicit examples: lying wait there no evidence the was children;

victim, Nancy; reconnoitering place the actually ever intended to allow the parents the contemplated for commission their children. defendant molest Our of ma- hospital; possession the and affirmed, finding court sufficient supreme employed in the terials to be commission of the defendant's intent to mo- evidence erime, cutter and an ice the three children and that he had lest place contemplated the for its at or near taken a substantial towards commit- commission, I hospital. disagree, observed, ting the crimes. The court course, majority's conclusion that with strongly factors are not corrobora- these Appellant clearly stated his intentions to purpose. tive of Collier's criminal fact parents the children. The states, approached parents it that he with a majority is correct when bag paraphernalia he stated he necessarily "we must evaluate state- which may togeth- intended to use in his molestation of the ments a defendant have made gave conduct in order determine children and the fact that he er with his parents specific he has done instructions as to how whether which prepared were to for the corroborates that which he said he would children degree Additionally, 35-38-1-7.1(a) to which a defen- something Section step" a "substantial toward dant has taken appellate courts take into consideration something committing attempted murder is determining "inap- whether sentence is may take that a trial court into consideration propriate" because it reflects the "nature of determining the sentence be- defendant's Appellate the offense" under Indiana Rule cause it reflects the "nature and circum- 7(B). Code stances of the crime" under Indiana open cardboard boxes supports that he intended which is evidence molestation especially This is true go fishing. ice jury. the verdict of did not of the evidence that Collier light court believed supreme Id. at 517. Our truck, items in his usually have these what to consider necessary proper placed them collected them specifically conjunction had done the defendant driving hospital. truck before performing prior intentions his stated that because Collier was disagree I also that the defendant's The fact those acts. arrived that police out when illegal by themselves were actions *13 passing conduct before out should to the his actual imminent threat posed no strongly corroborative of disqualified as enough for the defendant children was not dozing he until his criminal intent. Was liability criminal escape to get to off Nancy was scheduled he knew molesting. child ingestion Did his of aleohol overtake work? Likewise, that I conclude Collier's here legally any Does it make dif him ?2 his strongly corroborative of actions are warned, police, properly if ference? What in his statements to intent as revealed as he drove into interrupted Collier included, im- Those statements Cameron. more or parking lot? Would Collier be hospital, that mediately going to before can if he were awake? We culpable less Naney by "tonight" to kill going he was certainty, questions these with not answer cutting her in the heart and stabbing her but, me, they legally to are of little conse throat, instructions to Cameron giving and The law "focuses on the substan quence. family pets. care of the as to how to take completed, the defendant has tial that collecting included box Zickefoose, left undone." not on what was binoculars, cutter, pair and a pick, ice Also, N.E.2d at 510. 270 Ind. at in parking and driving hospital and necessary present that there be a "It is not exit where he could see an area ...." the crime Id. ability complete to hospital could use at persons leaving the complet could not have Obviously, Collier I to leave. expected time truck, asleep in his but ed the crime while possessing a box in isolation agree analyzing of no moment I submit that is pair of binoculars pick, ice step toward he took a substantial whether much of a "innocent" and not might appear murdering Naney. threat, with not combined Col- when majori persuaded Nancy by kill I also am not lier's stated intention or discredit distinguish ty's attempt hav- stabbing her and Collier's cutting and (Ind. from the hos- across the street ing parked 468 N.E.2d Hampton rob a case where a would-be Ct.App.1984), or- protective there was a pital exit while while outside a restaurant stay away ber waited requiring der effect a ski mask but never wearing armed and Additionally, although hospital from First, al actually entered the restaurant. legitimate cutters have picks ice later did de- supreme our court though under these weapons, than as uses other "flimsy," as it Hampton facts seribe the there is no indication cireumstances the case was way indicated pos- reason for no any legitimate Collier had instead cited incorrectly decided but ice such as sessing the box cutter and involuntarily (Ind.2001). argue claim he was 2. Collier does not He also does voluntarily intoxicated, to com- abandoned effort voluntary is no intoxication longer to a criminal a defense in Indiana See I.C. 35-41-3-10. mit a crime. State, 749 N.E.2d charge. See Sanchez case, apparent approval support as for af evidence. This is a my close firming the conviction before it. See State dissent should not be taken to mean that (Ind. Cleave, v. Van in another with different facts and issues, 1996). legal discussed, that I necessarily would vote Second, I I have be lieve the fact that Collier was an attempted sustain murder conviction. Third, significance. truck legal is of no I here. do so although post-arrest no Collier made con police, pre-

fession to the he did make clearly

arrest statements Cameron de

lineating Finally, his intent. the fact that physical progress

Collier made no toward arriving hospital

murder after at the is not

significant because it is reasonable to infer from parked posses where Collier and his Virgil CORNELIOUS, Appellant- *14 sion of binoculars he intended to wait Petitioner, hospital until left the before attack Therefore, ing strongly disagree her. I majority Hampton with the "weighs Indiana, Appellee STATE of of reversing favor Collier's conviction." -Respondent. Op. p. I opposite 350. believe the is true. No. 49A02-0507-PC-643. appreciate I the conduct charged, majority could have been as the Appeals Court of of Indiana. suggests, stalking or priva invasion of April 28,2006. However, cy. prosecutorial decision was to charge attempted murder July Transfer Denied try prove charge jury. to a That guilty decision resulted in a verdict.

Where a arguably defendant's conduct vio statute,

lates more than criminal one

prosecutor has the discretion to decide prosecute

whether to and under what stat

ute or charges. Lampitok statutes file (Ind.Ct.App.

2004), trans. denied.

Were I prosecutor in Steuben Coun-

ty, I might have my exercised discretion

differently charging when Collier. I am Additionally,

not. juror had I been a

this possible it is I could have been

persuaded to vote for acquittal

attempted murder. I was not. The bot-

tom jury, facts, line is that this on these guilty

returned a verdict. To conclude infringing

otherwise amounts to on this

prosecutor's charging discretion and this

jury's exclusive prerogative weigh

Case Details

Case Name: Collier v. State
Court Name: Indiana Court of Appeals
Date Published: Apr 27, 2006
Citation: 846 N.E.2d 340
Docket Number: 76A04-0503-CR-142
Court Abbreviation: Ind. Ct. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.