45 Ga. App. 380 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1932
By an act of the General Assembly, approved July 30, 1927 (Ga. L. 1927, p. 888), the City of Barnesville was authorized to pave its streets. Having passed the required enabling ordinances, the city council, upon the petition of property owners, proceeded to pave Thomaston street, and to that end passed certain ordinances and resolutions. These ordinances and resolutions were adopted in violation of a former ordinance requiring all ordinances to be introduced at a regular meeting or adjournment thereof, and to be acted upon at the next regular meeting, or adjournment thereof,
The writ of error was brought to the Supreme Court, but the case was transferred to this court for the reason, that the only ground of defense set up in the affidavit of illegality, an adverse ruling upon which would confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court, had been abandoned by the defendant in the court below; and that, therefore, the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to pass upon the writ of error.
1. The first ground of the affidavit of illegality,—that the city-did not acquire jurisdiction to pave Thomaston street, for the reason that no preliminary resolution declaring such paving necessary was adopted and published as required by the law (section 3 of the act of July 30, 1927), and that the property owners did not petition the mayor and council for the improvement as required by that section,—is not insisted upon in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error, doubtless for the reason that the record discloses that the proceedings looking to the paving of the street in question were in fact initiated by such a petition as was required by the act of the General Assembly referred to.
2. The second ground avers that the ordinance adopted by the mayor and council in relation to the paving was not in accordance with the prayer of the petition and the resolution adopted in conformity therewith, In connection with this ground it was urged
3. The third ground avers that the resolution or ordinance purporting to authorize the paving in question was introduced and adopted and approved at one and the same meeting of the city council, in violation of an existing ordinance requiring all new ordinances to be introduced at a regular meeting or at one adjourned therefrom, and acted upon at the next regular meeting or at one adjourned therefrom, unless action thereon is postponed by the council, and that, therefore, the resolution or ordinance referred to is invalid. 'It seems to be conceded in the brief for the plaintiff in error that the Supreme Court refused to sustain a similar contention in the case of South Georgia Power Co. v. Baumann, 169 Ga. 649 (supra). It is quite clear to us that the decision in that case is controlling in this instance.
The fourth and fifth grounds are in effect the same as the third, in no wise differing with respect to the legal question raised, but differing only with respect to the particular ordinance or resolution to which these grounds refer. Of course, under the ruling in the Baumann case, supra, neither of these grounds can be sustained,
We perceive no error in the judgment of the trial court that the affidavit of illegality, be overruled and that the execution proceed to final collection.
Judgment affirmed.