Collier v. CassadyCollier v. Cassady
— This is an appeal from an order enjoining among other things the removal of the county seat of Sumter сounty from the town of Sumterville, and overruling the demurrer to a bill filed to that end by certain resident tax payers in or near that town. The whole case depends upon the constitutionality of Chapter 6239
No objection is urged to the title to the Act, but it was successfully insisted before the Circuit Judge that the tenth section of the Act destroyed its dignity as a general law, within the inhibition of Art. VIII, section 4, forbidding the legislature to remove the county seat of any county, and commanding it “shall provide by general lаw for such removal.”
After general provision for change of the county seat in any county by a majority vote upon application to the county commissioners by a petition signed by one-third of the qualified electors, a radical departure was made from the old law in that provision is made where there is a failure of any place voted for receiving a majority over all other plaсes, the provision being that a second election be promptly held in which only the two places receiving the highest number of votes are placed upon the ballot.
Under the Act an election was held in Sumter county on September 1, 1911, at which election the vote was declared to be for Sumtеrville 68 votes, for Bushnell 282 votes, for Coleman 269 votes, for Webster 271 votes, for Wildwood 305 votes, and a second election was called for the 29th of that month at which the voters might choose between Wildwood and Bushnell.
The objectionable language in the tenth section of Chap
It is true that this court in County Commissioners of Lake county v. State,
It will be noted that the requirement of a general law for the removal of сounty seats is not included within the 20th section of the legislative Article, prohibiting local or special lаws on certain subjects, and as to which special subjects the succeeding sections requires “all laws shall be general and of uniform operation throughout the State,” but the inhibition is under the Article entitled “Countiеs and Cities” and after providing that the law for the removal of county seats be a general law, the сonstitution does not further emphasize the generality by saying it shall be of uniform operation throughout the State. The evil aimed at was the harm that might result and had theretofore resulted in this State by sudden changes wrought thrоugh local acts, passing the legislature hastily without full, if any, consideration, upon the request of the local members, and we can refuse to apply legislation for the removal of county seats, only
To bring the discussion to the concrete case, the legislature may provide that there bе no county seat removal until the courthouse already built at the couhty seat shall be twenty years old; every county in the State is brought potentially within the Act though it may be some time before a particular county may indulge in the excitement of a county seat fight, while others may do so immediately, but the legislaturе may surely safeguard the property rights of the tax payers as against the wishes of those who enjoy thе agitation of the political arena.
We think the language of the provisio means nothing' more оr less than to postpone all removal contests until the court house shall be twenty years old, and thаt the twenty years period is counted not from the passage of the act, but from the filing of the .petitiоn for the election.
The Circuit Judge states in his findings that the complainants abandoned the contention thаt thirty days notice of the second election was not given, and they will not be permitted to renew it herе.
The act is not beyond the legislative authority, the bill of complaint is Avithout equity and should be dismissed.
Order reversed.