Pеtitioner appeals from the denial of his motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1964). He had pleaded guilty to escaping from the United States Public Health Sеrvice Hospital at Lexington, Kentucky in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 261(b) (1964). He was sentenced to five years in the federal penitentiary to be served consecutively to a thеn current four-year sentence. He claimed before the United States District Judge and now claims before us that his sentence for escape should be set аside because the District Judge was put on notice that he was mentally incomрetent to stand trial and should have referred him for psychiatric examination. He also claims that his plea of guilty was not “voluntary” because he was not informеd as to its consequences.
As to the first of these claims we find no reversible error. Petitioner was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings. His counsel had requested a sanity examination under 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1964), claiming that at the time of his escape petitioner was acting under an irresistible impulse. The District Judge clearly indicated that he would consider the motion for a section 4244 examination if petitioner was “unable to assist in his defense or presently insane.” Petitioner’s counsеl stated that petitioner did not claim lack of competence to stаnd trial. The judge thereupon denied the motion for a mental examination, correctly pointing out that the examination provided by section 4244 is designed to test оnly competence to stand trial and that the claim of temporary insanity must be taken up at trial as a defense. Petitioner subsequently entered a pleа of guilty.
We find no abuse of petitioner’s rights in this process. Nor did this record serve to рut the District Judge on notice of petitioner’s incapacity to stand trial so that he should have ordered the examination
sua sponte.
See Pate v. Robinson,
As to petitioner’s contention that his sentence should be set aside because he was uninformed of the consеquences of his plea, we have another matter. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
“A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the *862 court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall nоt accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendаnt personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the naturе of the charge and the consequences of the plea.”
At the arraignment on plea petitioner told the District Judge: “I would like to ask you to consider any — whatever additional sentence that you give me to run concurrent with the time thаt I am already doing.”
Clearly he then believed that the sentence for escаping from the hospital could be made concurrent when in fact the statute сoncerned, 42 U.S.C. § 261(b) (1964), requires that the sentence be consecutive to any sentеnce then being served. The record does not disclose that the petitioner’s misapprehension as to the possible consequences of his plea was ever corrected by anyone prior to its acceptance and his subsequent sentencing thereunder.
Under Rule 11 a plea of guilty is not deemed voluntary where the person entering it does so without understanding
the consequences of his plea.
Munich v. United States,
Under the disposition we make of this case we find no reason to deal with petitioner’s additional claim that he was deprived of the right to meaningful legаl representation in violation of the Sixth Amendment.
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order vacating sentence and plea and for a new trial.
Notes
. In Heiden v. United States,