156 Ind. 64 | Ind. | 1901
Appellant was indicted, tried by a jury, and convicted of having committed the crime of robbery,,.and over bis motion for a new trial was,sentenced to be imprisoned for.an indeterminate, period of from two to fourteen years in the Indiana reformatory prison. Among the errors assigned are,the following: (3) “The court erred in overruling appellant’s, affidavit and motion for ,a continuance of said cause.” (4) “The court erred in overruling appellant’s motion for a new trial.” The first alleged, error argued by counsel for appellant relates to,the overruling, of the latter’s motion for a continuance or postponement of the trial on account of the absence, .of a witness named Samuel Moody. The record, discloses that.appellant applied for a continuance on account of. the absence of this witness. This motion, over his exception, the court denied, and this
The second cause enumerated in appellant’s motion for a new trial is: “The court erred in overruling the defendant’s motion for a continuance on the grounds of the absence of the defendant’s witnesses.” This assignment is too uncertain and indefinite to present any question for review by either the trial court or this court on appeal. It in no manner specifies or refers to the overruling of the motion for a continuance based upon the ground of the absence of. the witness Moody. It apparently refers only to some motion which was presented for a continuance on account of the absence of some indefinite and imcertain number of the defendant’s witnesses unnamed. The rule is well settled that each cause assigned in a motion for a new trial should be specified with reasonable certainty and in such a definite manner that the court will not be under the necessity of searching through the entire record in order to discover the alleged erroneous ruling'. Reese v. Caffee, 133 Ind. 14; Maier v. Board, etc., 151 Ind. 197; Ewbank’s Manual §51.
The only other question presented and argued by counsel for appellant relates to the refusal of the trial court to give certain special instructions to the jury. The Attorney-General in behalf of the State insists that the action of the court in refusing these instructions is justified, upep the