The outcome of this appeal depends on our interpretation of G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A) (1984 ed.), a statute mandating the forfeiture of retirement benefits by public employees who have been convicted of certain offenses. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment in the Superior Court. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff. The *685 defendants appealed. We transferred the appeal to this court on our own motion.
The defendants argue that the language of the statute is to be construed broadly, so that conviction of a Federal offense will result in forfeiture of benefits. The plaintiff argues that the statute may be applied only to those persons convicted of the specific offenses designated by the Legislature. We agree with the latter contention, and affirm.
The plaintiff, George N. Collates (Collates), was an employee of the Boston Redevelopment Authority who submitted his resignation on March 2, 1982, to be effective on March 15, 1982. Two days after the effective date of his resignation, Collates pleaded guilty and was convicted in the United States District Court of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982). 2 Nevertheless, the Boston retirement board (Board) approved Collates’s superannuation retirement application on July 22, 1982, and he began receiving his retirement benefits as of the effective date of his resignation. On January 4, 1983, G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A), became effective. 3 On August 29, 1983, the Board notified Collates that his retirement benefits were terminated by a vote of the Board as of August 22, 1983. 4 The Board’s decision followed an opinion of the corporation counsel of the city of Boston (city) that G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A), required termination of benefits.
*686 Collates filed a complaint against the Board seeking a declaration that the Board’s action was unlawful. The city was allowed to intervene. The parties then filed a statement of agreed facts. The trial judge granted Collates’s motion for summary judgment.
It is “[wjell established . . . that ‘[t]he duty of statutory interpretation is for the courts. ’
Cleary
v.
Cardullo’s Inc.,
A statute designed to enforce the law by punishing offenders, rather than simply by enforcing restitution to those damaged, is in the nature of a penal statute. See 3 C. Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 59.01 (4th ed. 1974). Cf.
Brown
v.
Taunton, 16
Mass. App. Ct. 614, 618-619 (1983) (construing the forfeiture provisions of G. L. c. 268A, § 25). Forfeiture of property, though it may also have the purpose of preventing further illicit activity involving the property, is punitive.
Commonwealth
v.
One 1972 Chevrolet Van,
It is an ancient rule, to which we have long adhered, that “[pjenal statutes must be construed strictly ‘and not extended by equity, or by the probable or supposed intention of the legislature as derived from doubtful words; but that in order to charge a party with a penalty, he must be brought within its operation, as manifested by express words or necessary impli
*687
cation.’ ”
Libby
v.
New York, N.H. & H. R.R.,
The statute operates “after final conviction of an offense set forth in section two of chapter two hundred and sixty-eight A or section twenty-five of chapter two hundred and sixty-five pertaining to police or licensing duties.” G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A). The Legislature has chosen two crimes that are to be enforced by the additional mechanism of § 15 (3A), and it has precisely denoted them. Not only is the statute specific in enumerating the particular statutory violations triggering its operation, but it specifies that only a portion of one of the two enumerated sections is involved. The Legislature recognized the exactitude required in a penal statute, and the language of the statute demonstrates the necessary particularity. Thus, it is appropriate to follow the maxim that the statutory expression of one thing is an implied exclusion of other things omitted from the statute.
County of Middlesex
v.
Newton,
The Legislature, specifying the crimes to which the statute would apply, used the term “set forth,” which, as two Federal courts have said in unrelated circumstances, is a precise term meaning “disclose in full, clear, concise and exact terms,”
Union Carbide Corp.
v.
Borg-Warner Corp.,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
“Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (a) (1982). This section is popularly known as the “Hobbs Act.”
“In no event shall any member after final conviction of an offense set forth in section two of chapter two hundred and sixty-eight A or section twenty-five of chapter two hundred and sixty-five pertaining to police or licensing duties be entitled to receive a retirement allowance or a return of his accumulated total deductions under the provisions of sections one to twenty-eight, inclusive, nor shall any beneficiary be entitled to receive any benefits under such provisions on account of such member.” G. L. c. 32, § 15 (3A) (1984 ed.), inserted by St. 1982, c. 630, § 20.
The parties addressed the question of the retroactive application of the statute, but we find it unnecessary to reach that question.