787 N.Y.S.2d 305 | N.Y. App. Div. | 2005
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Paula J. Omansky, J-), entered September 12, 2003, which denied plaintiffs’ motion to strike the answer of defendant New York City School Construction Authority (SCA) or, in the alternative, to compel SCA to produce documents, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the disposition of the motion vacated, and the matter remanded to Supreme Court to review the requested documents in camera and redact confidential information and personal information not factually relevant to plaintiffs’ case.
This class action alleges that funds required to be segregated pursuant to the trust imposed by article 3-A of the Lien Law for the benefit of “subcontractors, materialmen and laborers” (see Tri-City Elec. Co. v People, 96 AD2d 146, 149 [1983], affd 63 NY2d 969 [1984]) were diverted by the SCA, York Hunter and certain of York Hunter’s employees and agents. The action was brought by Colgate Scaffolding on behalf of itself and all other potential beneficiaries of the statutory trust (see Canron Corp. v City of New York, 89 NY2d 147, 153 [1996], citing Caristo Constr. Corp. v Diners Fin. Corp., 21 NY2d 507, 512 [1968]).
Plaintiffs sought documents relating to several contracts for which York Hunter functioned as construction manager, includ
As noted in Cirale v 80 Pine St. Corp. (35 NY2d 113, 118 [1974]), “Public interest encompasses not only the needs of the government, but also the societal interests in redressing private wrongs and arriving at a just result in private litigation.” Therefore, to avoid abuse of the privilege, specific support is required to invoke it (id.; see also Matter of World Trade Ctr. Bombing Litig., 93 NY2d 1, 8 [1999]). Defendants’ broad, conclusory assertion that confidentiality is necessary to the pending investigation and vital to public safety because it encourages potential witnesses to provide information to the Inspector General is insufficient (see City of New York v Keene Corp., 304 AD2d 119, 122 [2003]). No potential harm is identified, such as a threat to public security or danger to a confidential informant (cf. World Trade Ctr., 93 NY2d at 6 [possible vulnerabilities of security systems]; Brady v Ottaway Newspapers, 97 AD2d 451, 452 [1983], affd 63 NY2d 1031 [1984] [disclosure “could subject sources to reprisals”]). Neither has the requested information been provided in alternate form (see Brathwaite v State of New York, 208 AD2d 231, 233 [1995]; Martin A. v Gross, 194 AD2d 195, 203 [1993]; One Beekman Place v City of New York, 169 AD2d 492, 494 [1991]).
As to the law enforcement privilege, defendants have merely alluded to the need “to prevent disclosure of law enforcement techniques and procedures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and otherwise to prevent interference with an investigation” (In re Department of Investigation of City of N.Y., 856 F2d 481, 484 [2d Cir 1988]). This privilege is qualified and must be balanced with the substantial need for the information sought (Borchers v Commercial Union Assur. Co., 874 F Supp 78, 80 [SD NY 1995]). While plaintiffs have demonstrated the need for disclosure, defendants have identified an interest in preserving