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Colfax Envelope Corporation v. Local No. 458-3m, Chicago Graphic Communications International Union, Afl-Cio
20 F.3d 750
7th Cir.
1994
Check Treatment

*1 750 addition, in uncertainty;

genuine CORPORATION, Har ENVELOPE COLFAX be reasonable. reading must sured’s Plaintiff-Appellant, Co., 927 F.2d Ins. Harbor Corp. v. nischfeger denied, - Cir.1991), (7th certiorari 974, 976 v. 189, 160. L.Ed.2d 116 -, S.Ct. 112 U.S. 458-3M, GRAPH CHICAGO NO. LOCAL here. present condition such Neither INTERNA COMMUNICATIONS IC language construing similar courts Other AFL-CIO, UNION, Defendant- TIONAL See, e.g., Velez Todd. with are in accord Appellee. (1st 471, 476 Co., 599 F.2d Ins. Crown Life 93-3010. No. Pru Elsey v. Cir.1979) (alternative holding); 432, America, F.2d 262 Ins. Co. dential Appeals, Court States United Metropolitan Cir.1958); Biggs v. (10th 434 Circuit. Seventh (unpublished), Co., 573 F.2d 977 Ins. Life 25, 1992); (4th 14, Sept. Argued Cir. Feb. 1992 WL Co., 11 Wis.2d Ins. v. Travelers Rabinovitz 1, 1994. April Decided (1960); 807, Carnes 545, 105 N.W.2d Co., 746 S.W.2d Accident Woodmen Life v. Conti Credeur (Mo.Ct.App.1988); 105, 107 214, Co., 502 So.2d Assurance

nental v. Hick Co. Ins.

(La.Ct.App.1987); Gulf Life (Fla.Ct.App.1985), cit 762, 763

ey, 476 So.2d Services, Prudential Ins. Inc. v.

ing Starlite (Fla.Ct. 305, America, 418 So.2d Co. of Co., Ins. v. Travelers App.1982); Smillie (Mich. N.W.2d Mich.App.

Ct.App.1980). contrary, we would be held If we up setting in effect

rewriting plan Quad Graph

new insurance imper That would Great-West.

ics and Ins. v. Guardian

missible. Burnham Life (1st Cir. America, F.2d Co. of plaintiff,

1989). we Although sympathetic contract. As insurance redraft cannot analogous situa it in an put Circuit

the First to redraft no warrant

tion, “Courts palliate the effects contracts

insurance hard language on occasional

considered at 491.

case.” Id. is reversed di- judgment below this action. to dismiss

rections eligibility period. day work, the last Edwards was actually being geste, Mr. lay a coma on "actively when he at work" *2 envelopes. manufacturer It does some printing of envelopes, its seventeen employees who do printing -the repre- are by sented the defendant union. Colfax has printing presses. two One prints 78-inch- wide sheets four colors. prints The other colors, 78-inch-wide sheets five but most prints Colfax only four-color .time sheets on it. Colfax has so printing employees few it does not participate bother to in the collec- tive bargaining negotiations between the un- ion and Chicago Lithographers Associa- tion, an association for bargaining collective Chicago other printing companies whose employees represented by this Instead, union. whenever the union and the sign CLA a new collective bargaining agree- ment, the union sends Colfax a summary of changes the new made in the old If one. Colfax is content with changes, the union it copy sends complete agreement, new which Colfax signs and returns. If Colfax doesn’t like the negotiated terns by CLA, it is free to do its bargaining own with the union. The agreements spec- ify minimum for each type press used printers. Dean A. (argued), Dickie Michael I. Roth- agreement in force between 1987 and 1991 Pope, Cahill n & stein, Klaus, Kathleen H. fixed those minima as three men for four- Devine, IL, Chicago, plaintiff-appellant. presses color printing sheets 45 to 50 inches Eugene Cotton, Allison, Thomas D. Robert wide and four men for presses four-color H. (argued), Nichols Green, Jr., James W. printing sheets wider than 50 inches. Five- Cotton, Watt, King, Jones & Chicago, IL, for presses color printing sheets more than 55 defendant-appellee. inches wide five only unless men four printed, colors were in which event POSNER, CUDAHY, Before Judge, Chief required. four men were upshot Judge, McDADE, Circuit District that, agreements, under thése all of which Judge.* signed, Colfax had Colfax to man each of POSNER, Judge. Chief (which presses its presses) 78-inch except four men on the rare occasions when appeal This in a suit over collective bar- printed five-color on sheets its second gaining agreement presents a fundamental press, and then it had to a man. add law, issue drawing that of the line ambiguous contract, requiring In 1991 negotiated the union a new interpretation, that, and a contract because ment with the CLA and a summary sent represent cannot said to to Colfax. The enclosing letter all, the parties at interpreted, cannot be can the asked Colfax to indicate wheth- only be rescinded and left agreed er it to the terms in,the summary. Colfax, ways. (This their own plaintiff, may is a departure have been a past * Billy Joe Hon. McDade of the Central District of Illinois. the issue way to describe One complete signed the Colfax in which

practice, they disagree is that divides summary, than rather “4C 60" meaning of the about it.) In a anything of makes neither so that, believes Men.” Press —3 sum- manning requirements, section printing sheets four-color means and “5C Men” Press —3 “4C mary lists *3 that over, believes union while the and inches (in part be- Believing Men.” Press —4 and 60 inches presses four-color means fa- to be claimed who members union cause inches). that (down Remember to 45 under Col- had told new the miliar with use the had allowed previous the changes really like the that Colfax fax presses be on four-color crews of three-man operat- presses all it) that this meant inter The union inches. 50 45 and tween require now presses would four-color ed as upper extending the change as prets the them, presi- man Colfax’s to men three inches. range to 60 the three-man of bound shareholder, Pat- Charles majority and dent aof the Ordinarily dispute over a letter, indicating ac- union’s ten, signed the is, contains if the contract contractual summary. La- in the terms ceptance clause, to the for arbitrator arbitration an arrived, actual copy of the ter a be difference the But sometimes decide. sup- typo, which crucial a it contained but deep that goes so tween sum- understanding of the Patten’s ported agreed— they say ever impossible to agree- copy of the corrected mary. When a that a court they have contract even manning require- arrived, the finally famous interpret. In the might ment arbitrator from what different possibly it were misunderstood though enigmatic and stated ments Wichelhaus, summary. 2 H. & C. from of case had understood Patten Raffles (Ex. 1864), Eng.Rep. inches 46 and 60 presses Four-color ship delivery of a for the made men, four-color all three Bombay England on from ment cotton The men. required four inches over 60 to either ship Unbeknownst Peerless. all, and at Colfax benefited changes had not name ships of that were two party, there pressure, competitive under because was dates. One Bombay different sailing negotiate better terms. liked would have to one referred thought the contract agreement but the sign the refused Patten The to the other. ships, the other and was that Colfax position took the union contract; there was no that there court held summary. acceptance of to it its bound the minds.” See had been no Simpson, “Contracts section Brian under A.W. brought generally this suit Colfax of the Two Case § for The Cotton to Arrive: Act, for Tafl>-Hartley U.S.C. Peerless,” L.Rev. Ships Cardozo bar- no it has declaration (1989). because the union gaining contract term— essential agreed on an parties never “meeting of the premise print- Colfax’s for binding contract— required for a minds” for union counterclaimed ing presses. The Farns 2 E. obviously Allan strained. position union’s order arbitrate. 7.9, p. worth, § accepted new had was that Colfax par disputes arise because Most of all dis- arbitration ment, requires which some provide for foresee and did ties not inter- application or “arising putes out materialized —so contingency that now The district pretation contract.” of this on matter meeting minds was no judgment for granted judge as are treated yet disputes such at issue — union, reference concluding meaning, that the as not contractual disputes over for four-color and thus rescinding new grounds they where press back 60-inch putting meeting unambigu- signed it. a literal accepted they referred So before applica- required for an enforceable had no not minds is ously presses and to 60-inch fortunate, courts are contract, since which as such Colfax’s any presses, tion to other set us mind readers. Let as renowned appealed. presses. Colfax has 78-inch side, concept therefore, fact, to one meeting ask of the minds. Young, Cf. (else) explain how supra, Wichelhaus at 646. Intersubjectivity is not the Raffles and cases like it. It seems to us as it has to test of an enforceable contract. ought other courts that a contract to be liability terminable without The clearest cases for rescission on thus allowed to ways their own when ground that there was “no there is “no sensible basis for choosing be (or, better, that there awas “latent conflicting tween understandings” of con ambiguity” in the sense that neither party language, tractual as the court said in an knew that the contract ambiguous) case, Allen, American like Oswald v. Raffles ones in garbled which an offer is in transmis (2d Cir.1969), 417 F.2d quoting Wil sion. The cases we have cited are all of that Jr., Young, liam F. “Equivocation *4 character, if “transmission” broadly con Making Agreements,” 64 Colum.L.Rev. Ritchie, Vickery strued. 247, 202 Mass. (1964). 619, 647 In Oswald the misunder (1909), N.E. provides a further illustra standing arose parties because the did tion. A landowner and a signed contractor speak the language (literally). same In Bal they what duplicate believed to be copies of a istreri v. Nevada Livestock Production Cred contract for the construction of a Turkish Association, it Cal.App.3d 262 Cal. bath house. Because of a fraud the archi Rptr. (1989), parents the of an aspiring tect for which neither the contractor nor the thought they farmer pledged had property blamed, landowner could be copy signed the they Sebastopol owned in to secure a loan to by the price $23,000 landowner stated the as son, their and indeed the lender’s cover letter signed and the copy by the contractor stated property described the “your as Sebastopol $34,000. it as Through own, no fault of their residence.” But actual deed of trust signed had different contracts. parents’ listed the in home Petaluma as Or consider Konic Corp. International collateral. The court held that there had Spokane Services, Inc., Computer supra. been no of the minds. The seller quoted price “fifty-six twen and Oswald were in cases ty,” Raffles buyer which thought meant $56.20. party

which neither was blameable for the In $5,620. fact the seller had meant In both mistake; Balistreri case in which both cases permitted, was rescission the first be blameable, equally were parents for hav ing a in party fault, case which neither was at ing trust, failed read the deed of in second one which equally both were having lender for misleading drafted a cover fault, being careless in their utterance and (Sec letter. It is all the same. Restatement interpretation, respectively, ambiguous of an ond) (b) 20(l)(a), §§ If oral formula. neither can assigned greater be superficially Our case is similar. The actu- blame for the misunderstanding, no al terms of the 1991 nonarbitrary were mud- deciding party’s basis for which in died that understanding enforce, gave the union so the Colfax signed, and that Colfax making allowed to abandon the contract without lia possible bility. that the had 61, 127 Neel v. different under- Lang, 236 Mass. N.E. standings. (1920); The difference Konic between this case International Corp. v. and Spokane Computer Services, Inc., Colfax, the others is that unlike the 109 Idaho 527, 529, hapless promisors cited, 708 P.2d the cases have (App.1985). we h should These are not have realized that party’s cases whic one contract was understanding buyer unclear. thought more reasonable Konic than the —real- Restatement, Compare ly thought other’s. being he supra, quoted price was 20(2)(b). § $56.20, If permitted rescission and no doubt fell off stool when his case, that kind of every the enforcement of he price discovered a hundred mercy greater would be at the jury, thought. of a times than he But the ex- might which persuaded be pression that one Press” does not on “4C its face genuinely had idiosyncratic held an speak to minimum idea meaning, been, of its so that there had for a 4C 78" interpreta- Press. The union’s where the ship Peerless that of the cases like merely extended the.phrase

tion, that buried, possibility of ambiguity is three-man range for the old upper bound misunder grounds of mutual rescission inches, may 50 to from four-color latent ambi or, prefer, we standing, the term fact that correct. be may not person in A Col reasonable guity, arises. interpreta- clarified union restated realized its position would fax’s that it sent corrected tion Press —3 “4C 60" of the term interpretation question, be- on the not decisive Colfax might not- coincide Men” than the summary rather cause to which tribunal other party.or that is the contract full corrected would meaning of the term dispute over Colfax, if reason- But parties. these lost, dice, and threw the It be submitted. reading doubted able, not have could case. It cannot end of the that is the .and of the kind interpretations summary that and, if interpretation gamble on a favorable judge later the district union that the fails, with no repudiate the. entirely plausible. upon placed v. Miller Ins. Co. liability. Prudential Cf. interpreta- hope that its right had a (7th Co., Cir. 789 F.2d Brewing right prevail tion would 1986). by the constituted the offer accept case have a different We would interpretation its that either premise on the *5 whether the had ambiguity were 'over away from the walk it could or was correct duty disputes. their lose,” agreed to arbitrate win, you is I tails “Heads contract. contractual, interpre to arbitrate principle that that animates the spirit not the duty is that creates the the contract tation of rescission of ground a for ambiguity is latent Technologies, Inc. AT T v. the court. & for a contract. America, 475 Workers Communications contracting parties to for common It 1415, U.S. 643, L.Ed.2d 648 89 106 S.Ct. a is, signify to agree —to (1986). party a not But courts will allow a different party attaches each term which by clause arbitration a contractual unravel just gamble on a favorable a meaning. It is part of a contract that the clause arguing tribunal by the authorized interpretation voidable, fraudulent perhaps because that is prefer often Parties dispute arise. should v. Corp. Paint Flood & ly Prima induced. to take the way rather than this gamble in Co., 406, 395, 87 S.Ct. Mfg. 388 U.S. Conklin possible all their out try to iron time to (1967); 1801, 1807, Matter 1270 L.Ed.2d may never of which most disagreements, (7th horn, Corp., 763 F.2d v. NCR Inc. gambled consequence. Colfax on any have Cir.1985). must show reference that the an arbitrator persuading itself, say is to which clause arbitration four-color 60-inch summary to the any disputes arbitrate parties’ .to it means. Colfax believes what press, meant arise, might is vitiated over the contract that adopt- on the arbitrator’s gambled The union assent, fraud, or lack of consideration later made the union ing the Municipal Valleys Water Dis as in Three repeat, if agreement but, to full clear in — Co., 925 F.2d E.F. Hutton & trict v. (the agree) a contract there is (9th Cir.1991); that in short light of the collective summary, read disputes. agreed their to arbitrate never being agreement that was modi- bargaining Green, Securities, Wheat, Inc. First v. these.par- fied, (11th Cir.1993). Colfax and 818-19 F.2d ties. dealing long course the union had patently ambigu- always agreed to a to submit their contractual parties agree When arbitration, any dispute question term, so the they disputes to have submit ous was a dispute That is in this case by interpretation. their whether resolved over it meaning of dispute in con- their contract. are over what arbitrators courts for arbitrated, was, for that questions It to be interpretive so tract resolve cases—to resolving parties’ parties was chosen method It is when ambiguity. founded or not Colfax would disagreements, reasonably appear to whether agree terms that agreement had it not, signed on to the have unequivocal but them to each be agreement actually realized what the meant create an enforceable contract to submit the interpreted or could be to mean. Matter issue arbitration.

horn, Corp., supra, Inc. NCR 763 F.2d at Affirmed. CUDAHY, Judge, Circuit concurring: if, contrary We further: Even to our accept I without Judge reservation Pos- analysis, earlier nowas lucid explanation ner’s and admirable (in the artificial in which sense gradations various and nuances of the term term) of contracts uses the on the man- law “meeting of the minds” widely and the mis- ning requirements in agreement, the 1991 Wichelhaus, understood case of Raffles there was a of the minds on the (Ex. 1864). H. & Eng.Rep. C. arbitrating mode of disputes between the As notes, Professor Farnsworth our under- parties arising any standing of these issues “would improved be (including summary if [the] metaphor much-abused ‘meeting [of contract) previous signed. that Colfax Un- minds’] abandoned.” 1 E. Allan Supreme der Court’s decision in Prima Farnsworth, 3.5, § at 168 2n. Paint, dispute is arbitrable even if party argues one that the contract should be Nonetheless, this seems to inme some express rescinded because it does ways a much easier case than my either of actual parties, example colleagues’ opinions would Interpret- let on. because was induced by fraud. All that is ing the contract is the responsi- arbitrator’s important is that agreed bility. Only questions of contract formation adjudication that arbitration rather than are for the By framing court. question resolving the mode of their dis- minds,” as one of a “meeting of the *6 putes. A different many view in cases tries to turn ordinary question an of inter- deprive the arbitrator of important con- pretation formation, into one of thereby and remedy tract point This im- has —rescission. get out from under the arbitration clause. plications for scope of the arbitrator’s Judge opinion correctly Posner’s dismisses responsibilities, presently. of which more attempt. this here, however, I am inclined to affirm

We thus affirm judge’s the district deci- judgment of the sion, district court on its own point but out that her conclusion that terms and on the supplied by rationale disputed unequivocally bears the summary court. The settlement document to (which meaning assigned that she to it inci- which Patten assented purported to be a dentally is not identical to the union’s inter- manning of changes in pri- pretation, thought point she it a —60-inch (1987-1991) agreement or par- made presses, period thought union it a —while of negotiations. ties course the current range down) presses and does not —60-inch changes These are all on their face addressed bind the arbitrator. responsibility, His to requirements specific presses subject to the excruciatingly right limited specific having specific sizes and color capa- judicial decisions, review of arbitral to inter- following bilities. Thus relevant entries pret agreement. It will therefore be appear: open argue to to to the arbitrator 60" 4C Press —3 men: that, proper under a interpretation' of the Pressman, 1st 2nd Pressman and contract, really there no meeting of the Feeder manning requirements minds over the and 5C 78" Press —4 men: therefore that the contract should be rescind- Pressman, Pressman, 1st 2nd 1st Feed- after ed all. The point at essential this er, through 2nd Feeder or attrition 65% stage litigation of the is that whether or not Helper (as believe, there was we without to arbitrator) minds, bind the such meeting of entry There was no for the 4-color 78" there was sufficient understanding press mutual in which Colfax was interested. The meaning of the con- and that the tion manning for clause is that the inference inescapable therefore be submitted terms should tract changed. been had not press arbitration. have made arguing the issue caused case has difficulty this Whatever presses of “ranges”, e.g., points about

various “doctrine” of the fact comes from more. and 60" presses or less 60" seen two minds” can be figured various apparently “Ranges” it as way is see ways. The first different past and parties in agreements typi- We formation. of contract an element nothing in the there present; where formed say cally “ranges.” suggests document settlement acceptance. But where is an offer there indicated, to refers, as I have document This thing, the offeree offers one the offeror specific say that no another, sometimes accepts we These were characteristics. specific having there is formed because has been respect to which only presses with agreement on the ad idem —no consensus changed the view, a “meet- thing. this without On same manning requirements. minds,” “simply no ing of the “ranges” be about If deductions could be bound.” to which ment (and I specific see from these drawn Chirelstein, Concepts and Case A. Marvin this), they might valid to do no reason Analysis in the Law of Thus, if direction. in a size-downward drawn to me seems Judge concurrence McDade’s crew, would a 3-man press a 60" (“There .was either this view embrace a smaller 40" infer that seem reasonable formed, and a ‘meeting minds’ than a require more 3-man not press would minds’ and ‘meeting of the not a or there was as a suggested this Union crew. parties.”). no contract therefore hand Colfax On the other inference. valid alternatively be under- could The doctrine press change the 60" suggests .that is the metaphor. This simply as a stood upward should extend to take. Judge Posner I understand position This larger press. inference to include court de- understanding, where On support from common gain could minds, there is no clares that larger requiring larger presses sense is no con- saying that there really it is not crews. parties, but relation between tractual *7 event, took a clear district court any the In a non- declaring that it cannot discern simply in this matter: position interpretation way whose arbitrary to decide designation of agreement’s settlement The either will not enforce best. It therefore is marked con- in press size stands specific a version, allow will instead remedies but agreements that de- prior trast restitution, par- and send rescission ranges; it in terms of press sizes scribed exactly ways. This is separate ties their that a the inference support does it a does where allows court what the by the referenced press sizes was range of grounds obligation on the contractual out of a no there is ambi- designation: Because inAs or of mutual impossibility mistake. of the settlement the terms guity in situations, no it as there were is those if ment, precluded is consider- the court all, suggestion that though the interpret evidence ing extrinsic metaphor. just is was formed” “no contract terms used. meaning of the believe, literally as Professor should not We us, that Chirelstein Op. at WL did and never exist. does not thereupon granted sum- district court The you that need Whether counterclaim the Union’s mary judgment on to form a contract meeting of the minds enough It clear compel arbitration. usually matter. metaphoric doesn’t or literal set- acceptance that Colfax’s way. the same typically either supports The result unambiguously tlement were ever as no contract off is a collective position that there the Union’s it is like this one in But cases formed. containing an arbitra- noted, dispositive. only As the court decides point The whole of the lawsuit is the issue Interpreting whether a contract exists. whether a contract existed between the non, vel argued Colfax, contract is the If by arbitrator’s task. no meet- as whether there ing contract, “meeting was a literally of the minds means no term, on an requisite essential of contract liberty the arbitrator would not be at —under formation. majority finds that req- AT Technologies, & T Inc. v. Communica- “meeting uisite of the minds” exists because America, tions Workers 475 U.S. “agree[d] obviously to an ambigu- (1986) S.Ct. 89 L.Ed.2d 648 find—to term,” ous acknowledging that “the actual meeting there has been no of the minds. If terms of the 1991 were muddied meeting minds, Judge there were no of the in gave that the Union argues, McDade there would be no contract signed, that Colfax making possible for it to arbitrate. The arbitrator —whose had different understand- job only interpret have inter- —-would ings.” Rather finding than that these “dif- preted job. himself out of a Judge Posner ferent understandings” resulted in an ambi- by seeing avoids catch-22 the doctrine guity necessitating the admission of extrinsic metaphor. ultimately as I persuaded am evidence on the formation, issue of contract suitable, that this view is more and therefore majority observes that “it is common for agree Judge Posner that the arbitrator contracting parties agree is, to sig- could still find there to of the nify agreement a term to which each —to minds, and therefore allow rescission and party attaches a meaning.” different Since restitution.1 language manning change is obvi- (or note, ously ambiguous though I surely preferably, also more “pat- dictum at ently” ambiguous, point, in clearly ambiguity this Union has con- itself) language arises from the ceded its briefs only that the court has and Colfax nothing did clarify signifying before determined that there is his bargain- a collective assent, a contract was ing agreement despite formed binding Colfax to arbitration ambiguous term. To hold and that otherwise is found proceed. arbitration should I by majority to be inconsistent with con- should think the Union would now have diffi- tract principles awarding law recision for culty “la- asserting that an arbitral award was ambiguity” tent patent as distinct from the precluded by prior judicial determination. ambiguity involved the case before us. I majority’s share the view that Colfax had to McDADE, Judge, concurring. District interpretation know its was not plausible interpretation of language I novel, concur in realistic, the rather manning change accepted and that Colfax approach majority resolving being wrong the risk of issue of contract finding formation assigned risk, Having to the term. taken the parties agreed or had a *8 consequences Colfax must now face the of a minds” to execute a contract which contained dispute with the Union on this I issue. also ambiguous relating change to a majority’s share the view that it was the the four-color explicit purpose of the arbitration clause to presses. A analysis more traditional would require disputes arbitration of all such “aris- remandment to the district ing out of application interpretation” court for the admission of extrinsic evidence of the contract. on the issue of contract formation once it was determined that language of the sum- Having concluded that awas con- mary setting change forth the in tract which should be submitted to arbitra- requirements ambiguous. was pursuant terms, tion I agree to its cannot 1. actually That an through arbitrator would ever highly do such arbitration. This is desirable in thing highly unlikely. Perhaps seems to me eyes of most courts and I should think even important consequence most being of there more so in the view of most I see arbitrators. bargaining agreement particular widespread in a scuttling little risk of a of labor con- workplace is that conflicts there will be fraternity. settled tracts the arbitral has the the arbitrator majority the deci- anew authority to consider

right or already made. The this court

sion which ways. There have it both

majority cannot and a minds” “meeting of the awas

either not a formed, or there no contract be- therefore having decided This court parties.

tween purview of the beyond the former, the existence to decide function

arbitrator’s apply function of a contract —her To hold otherwise contract.

interpret arbitrator reverse license be to forma- as to contract court finding of this and not court

tion, belonging duty

the arbitrator. America, STATES

UNITED

Plaintiff-Appellee, Defendant-Appellant. YOUNG,

Allen

No. 93-1138. Appeals, Court States

United Circuit.

Seventh 8, 1994.

Argued Feb. 1, April

Decided

Case Details

Case Name: Colfax Envelope Corporation v. Local No. 458-3m, Chicago Graphic Communications International Union, Afl-Cio
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date Published: Apr 1, 1994
Citation: 20 F.3d 750
Docket Number: 93-3010
Court Abbreviation: 7th Cir.
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