83 Neb. 803 | Neb. | 1909
This is an appeal from Butler county, wherein the county of Colfax, appellant, hereinafter called plaintiff, brought an action against the county of Butler, appellee, hereinafter called defendant, to recover $11,050.96, being one-half- the cost of building a wagon bridge by plaintiff over the Platte river. At the conclusion of the trial the court directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the defendant, upon which judgment was rendered, and plaintiff appeals.
The petition, in substance, alleges the continuous and uninterrupted existence ever since 1884 of a public road running north and south through both of said counties, which crosses the Platte river at a point near the city of Schuyler by means of a wooden wagon bridge about one-half mile in length; that on June 6, 1904, the plaintiff’s board of commissioners adopted a resolution by its terms reciting the unsafe condition of the bridge and plaintiff’s desire to repair it, and that defendant be requested to enter into a joint contract with plaintiff providing for each of the said counties to pay one-half of the expense of such repair; that on August 15,1904, the plaintiff’s county board adopted another resolution similar to the resolution of June 6, but, in addition, reciting that “an emergency exists,” and “that the public good requires immediate action,” and providing “that a contract, drawn by’ the
The defendant’s answer denies every allegation of plaintiff’s petition except the one alleging the corporate capacity of the parties litigant, and alleges that certain residents of Schuyler entered into a written agreement with plaintiff to pay $7,000 of the cost of building the bridge in suit, provided the plaintiff would undertake the enterprise, which said agreement was accepted by plaintiff, and in consideration thereof plaintiff contracted for the building of said bridge; that prior to executing said contract and entering upon.the work in pursuance thereof no demand was made on defendant by plaintiff to repair said old bridge or to join in such contract; that plaintiff, instead of repairing said bridge, fraudulently constructed a new bridge with the fraudulent purpose of deceiving and misleading defendant and its taxpayers; that the cost of said bridge was exorbitant; that upwards of $6,000 of the amount sought lo be recovered is for the cost of building ice breaks which are no part of the bridge. The plain
The action is sought to be maintained under sections 6146, 6147 and 6148, Ann. St. 1907, plaintiff relying more particularly upon the proviso clause of said section 6147, which is as follows: “Provided, that if either of such counties shall refuse to enter into contracts to carry out the provisions of this section, for the repair of any such bridge, it shall be lawful for the other of said counties to enter into such contract for all needful repairs, and recover by suit from the county so in default such proportion of the cost of making such repairs as it ought to pay, not exceeding one-half of the full amount so expended.” In the specification of errors relied on, counsel for plaintiff in their brief contend: “(1) That the reconstruction of a bridge which was partly, substantially or wholly destroyed by fire, flood or other casualty is repairs within the meaning of the law imposing upon adjoining counties the duty to repair bridges over streams dividing such counties; (2) that notice by one county to another to join with it in repairing a bridge over a stream between the two counties is sufficient to make the county receiving such notice liable for one-half the expense necessarily incurred in making the bridge safe and passable, even though the work done amounts substantially or wholly to new construction.” They concede in their argument the structure in question is practically a new bridge, but contend the work performed by Colfax county was “repairs” within the meaning of the statute.
Counsel for defendant contend that the notice served on the defendant county was so unreasonable as to time of service and so essentially defective in substance as to relieve the defendant of liability. The proof shows the original bridge was built in 1883 by a railroad company without expense to plaintiff or defendant, and that in March, 1903, a large part of it was taken out by a flood, leaving about 800 feet standing in the center of the stream, which was afterwards discovered to be practically
The plaintiff attempts to prove that a certified copy of the resolution of June 6, 1904, was served on the defendant in the same month by E. C. Egerton, .a member of the county board of Colfax county, who went to David City evidently for that purpose, but, to the mind of the court, in this the plaintiff has utterly failed. Had the June 6 resolution been properly served upon defendant by Egerton, it is not probable plaintiff would have again served it on August 16, 1904, which the record clearly discloses was done at the same time that a copy of the
It is shown by the proof that less than $300 worth of material of the old bridge was used by Colfax county in the construction of the new bridge, and it is fairly infer-able from the record that such old material was so used for the purpose of making the work appear to be “a repair
Plaintiff contends for what we believe to be a strained construction of the word “repairs” as used in the statutes under consideration ■ and as related to the facts of the case at bar. The resolution and the contract by their terms use the word “repairs” in the ordinary sense. The contract with Sheeley expressly provides that “whatever portion of said bridge is still standing and in a condition safe for public travel shall be left as it now is, and the portion repaired and built by said first party shall be joined upon and added thereto.” It has been sliOAvn that plaintiff’s board of commissioners deemed it advisable to adopt a resolution reciting that an emergency existed, and that the public good required immediate action on its part looking toward the repair of the bridge. The emergency to which the resolution refers, it seems from the record, was carefully nurtured from March, 1903, when
We have carefully examined the entire record and find no error therein. The judgment of the district court is right, and is in all things
Affirmed.