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Coles v. United States
808 A.2d 485
D.C.
2002
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*1 remanded to the Board The case is finding The Board’s of recklessness 339. consistent with proceedings further based, large part, on what opinion. pattern Board deemed “an extensive Because we conclude

misappropriation.” Remanded. pattern of misappropriation such existed, pattern or at that no such least evidence, by the it follows that

was shown Bar failed to meet its

the Office of Counsel Although Edwards did proof.

burden of

engage commingling, instances of some slip her although record-keeping COLES, Appellant, Paul

shod, least, say we do not have proof pattern before us sufficient of a requiring misconduct that rises to a level STATES, Appellee. UNITED the sanction of disbarment. deci “[0]ur No. 00-CF-1570. sions, by implication, rejected clear can be proposition recklessness Appeals. District of Columbia Court by inadequate record-keeping alone shown April 2002. Submitted commingling misappro combined with Anderson, priation.” In re A.2d at 340 Decided Oct. (D.C. Reed,

(citing In re

1996), Choroszej, re (D.C.1992)). do mean

We not to minimize the serious- conduct, imply

ness Edwards’ or to

reckless misappropriation and the resul- possible

tant sanction of disbarment is not

as an ultimate result in this case. We hold

only that such a conclusion simply

supported by substantial evidence Evans,

record before us. In re See (D.C.1990). 1141, 1142 We therefore in-

remand this matter to the Board with whether, given our

structions to reconsider

ruling misappropri- that Edwards did Fashaw, Kim, any

ate or White

funds, Bar Counsel has established that her

the manner which Edwards handled displayed

clients’ funds reckless “disre-

gard safety and welfare.” [the funds’] Anderson, In re 778 A.2d at 338. discretion,

Board, may also reassess mitigating proffered by circumstances

any whether a

Ms. Edwards and determine appropriate.

sanction of disbarment is still *2 DC, Wagner, Washington, ap-

Brenda C. court, pointed by ap- filed a brief pellant. Howard, Jr.,

Roscoe C. United States Fisher, Attorney, and John R. Elizabeth Trosman, Albert, and Janet E. Assistant Attorneys, filed a brief for United States appellee. RUIZ,

Before and SCHWELB KING, Judges, Associate Senior Judge.

SCHWELB, Judge: Associate trial, After a deadlocked at his first charges Paul was retried on a man who began to chase spotted fire- robbery1 possession of a wallet, loader,” “speed discarded a crime of during arm the commission of doc- cap, personal and some (PFCV)2 stocking black relating to violence appre- he was shortly before uments gunpoint of Redoduane Abderrafe. Paul man turned out to be hended. guilty at his second trial found Coles *3 Coles, case. Officers counts, appeals. on both and he now had handgun which Coles also recovered that the trial primary Coles’ contention is in the chase. dropped earlier allegedly by error re- judge committed reversible cross-examination of stricting 1998, Coles’ 22, jury returned grand July On disagree and af- prosecution witness. We indictment a nine-count firm. three him with involvement charging robberies, was the one of which separate first of Mr. Abderrafe. Coles’ I. Rhonda Reid Judge was held before trial THE EVIDENCE 5 to October from October Winston un- guilty found jury 1999. The Coles trial, prosecution present- At Coles’ in connec- of ammunition possession lawful which, credited, evidence if established ed robbery, but dead- the Abderrafe tion with night July late at two and PFCV locked on the he gunpoint men robbed Abderrafe at as the conviction for charges.3 We affirmed in Georgetown walked down a street short- in Coles v. United possession ammunition ly completed after he his work shift as a 99-CV-1017, Memorandum No. waiter at a local restaurant. After (D.C. March Judgment and Opinion tips robbers took the that Abderrafe had earned, one of the men ordered him to From October to October “[g]o your go turn back. Just —don’t Judge trial before jury second was held

straight.” The men then fled on foot. two respect M. Greene with instructed, Natalia Combs Abderrafe continued to walk as robbery and PFCV. charges of armed immediately he almost encountered Of- the second trial found Coles Joseph Metropolitan ficer Thomas appeal fol- on both counts. This guilty Department. Police Abderrafe told Offi- lowed. robbed, cer Thomas

he described one of the two robbers to the II. tall, officer as “not too not too short” and military wearing pants [a] as “tan IMPEACHMENT THE ATTEMPTED information, white Based on this shirt.” FOR BIAS lookout over Officer Thomas broadcast a only issue raised Coles police radio. consideration plenary which merits appeal limiting in the erred working officers whether the police Several Goodwine, a of Kurt broadcast. the cross-examination Georgetown area monitored the We discern leads, prosecution.4 for the they witness pursuing After several other 22-2901, robbery (1996), acquitted of armed Coles was §§ -3202 recodi- 1. D.C.Code weapons charges in relation related 22-2801, (2001). §§ -4502 fied as D.C.Code charged in the that were other two incidents indictment. 22-3204(b), § recodified 2. D.C.Code (2001). 22-4504(b) § D.C.Code dis- remaining warrant little claims 4. Coles’ argues convictions for that his cussion. He attorney attempted then to cross- legal error or of discretion. Coles’ abuse view, our the limitation of which Coles regarding employ- examine Goodwine very complains pertained to a matter complaint ment discrimination little, value, any, probative and its exclu- January allegedly filed justified by potential sion was dis- Navy Depart- at the superior Goodwine’s tracting from the issue at hand. as to the rele- judge inquired ment. The least, very At the prof- and counsel question, vance of the reasonably so conclude. fine of fered that bi- would demonstrate that Goodwine was Background. A. explained Counsel ased Coles. ease-in-chief, prosecution’s During man- had been called as a that Goodwine *4 Goodwine testified that he had sold defen- Department of the agement witness the handgun, dant Coles a Smith and Wesson on Navy hearing in an administrative loader, well a speed as as ammunition and in complaint. Subsequently, Coles’ Janu- employed by when the two men were the 2000, affi- ary had stated an Goodwine Department Navy approximately of the that “had a deleterious effect davit Coles five the trial. iden- before Goodwine of the section because none of morale 2, by tified Exhibit No. its Government’s we number, his motivation and that he. us could understand weapon serial as the 2 sold to Exhibit No. was the heading.”5 Coles. all where this was see allegedly dropped that handgun Coles had did not judge indicated that she see during pursuit of him. the officers’ On provided complaint how the discrimination cross-examination, acknowl- Goodwine evi- with a motive to fabricate edged that he no documentation of the in an falsely implicating dence Coles handgun sale of the to and he was if robbery. pointed out that armed She precise unable to recall either the date of proposed questioning permitted, the paid the transaction or the exact amount the prosecutor the would have him Coles. provides per- merge, we have of Criminal Procedure armed and PFCV but Rules part: tinent previously rejected See Han this contention. any party may assign portion No as error States, 845, (D.C. A.2d na v. United 666 856 charge the or omission therefrom un- 1995) ("The merge count does not [PFCV] party objects that thereto before less count”); . .. the armed Thomas with verdict, stating jury retires consider 647, (D.C. 1992) v. United distinctly party the matter to which that ("[T]he Columbia] Council the District of [of grounds objection. objects and the of the offense [of PFCV] did not intend ... circumstances, we review Under these merge subject with an offense to the en error, plain Johnson v. United penalty provision hanced [D.C.Code 1544, 461, 466-67, S.Ct. 22-]3202.”). § (1997), L.Ed.2d 718 and find none. that, reinstructing complains Coles also agree dissenting 5. We with our col- cannot jury respect with elements of league quoted language rises to the that the robbery, judge the definition omitted "expression] an animus” [of] level of property away.” of the words "carried the Indeed, view, in our Coles. Post at 491. The element itself was not omitted from phrases "demonstrabl[e] like "animus” and reinstruction, previously judge had and the bias,” reality when id. at overstate meaning as to the instructed dealing here with considers that we are one language question. associating alleged falsely an motive for object infra, pp. attorney robbery. did not to the rein- 490- Coles’ with an armed Superior Rule 30 of the Court's struction. omitted). ques- “A line of bring position. out the witness’ Coles’ at- marks should, if torney that be acknowledged tioning may, so: disallowed “Oh, question.” ex- probative then that its the trial court concludes try plained propose substantially outweighed by that she did value is 281; matter regarded what she collateral id. see of unfair danger prejudice,” (namely, rights wrongs of Good- v. Mercer also with (D.C.1999), wine’s criticism of Coles connection case): the discrimination from may divert attention of The trial has try I’m not that the issue hand. going [discrimination] know, think, I you always case. is “wide latitude insofar as Confrontation relevant, true, impose when is concerned to reasonable Clause examination,” given, the circum- affidavit was limits on cross Delaware Arsdall, given, stances under which was 475 U.S. Van (1986), administrative action where this witness for she has 89 L.Ed.2d just he was called as seeing responsibility “the side- to have been one of does not take over the circus.” show Ed- any that he action discriminators or took W. CleaRY, McCoRmick Evidence waRD your client, (3d I how that ed.1984). don’t see § at 89 *5 probative is of bias terms of—I’m case, In the present proposed

going to turn this into some discrimina- im designed cross-examination tion trial. bias: peach Goodwine for attorney argued Coles’ then that Good- “curry wine’s motive was to with his favor in the “common law Bias is a term used judge disagreed boss.” The and declined relationship of evidence” to describe permit cross-examination. party and a witness which between slant, lead uncon- might the witness Legal Analysis. B. otherwise, sciously testimony or A criminal defendant’s against party. may of or be favor Bias is prosecution cross-examine witnesses like, dislike, or by induced a witness’ protected by the Confrontation Clause self- party, of a or the witness’ fear Alaska, the Sixth Amendment. Davis v. interest. 308, 315, 1105, 415 94 39 S.Ct. Abel, 52, 45, v. 469 U.S. 105 States United (1974); L.Ed.2d 347 Lawrence v. United (1984). 465, Bias is 83 450 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d States, 374, (D.C.1984). That 482 A.2d 376 relevant,” Hollingsworth v. “always Unit- however, v. right, is not unlimited. Reed (D.C.1987), States, 973, (D.C.1982), 531 A.2d 979 ed States, 1173, 452 A.2d 1176 United has Supreme Court established denied, “[t]he 839, rt. 464 U.S. 104 S.Ct. ce any (1983). questioning the refusal to allow 132, “[D]espite 78 L.Ed.2d 127 of bias from which facts indicative Amendment, has about the trial court Sixth reasonably draw adverse jury could lim impose reasonable broad discretion ... an error of constitutional inferences on on concerns cross-examination based harassment, dimension, rights about, violating the defendant’s things, among other issues, Clause.” the wit secured the Confrontation prejudice, confusion States, 1124, A.2d safety, interrogation repeti Ford v. United ness’ or that is (D.C.1988) original) (citing Gray (emphasis only marginally or relevant.” tive Arsdall, 678-79, States, 274, 475 U.S. at supra, 280-81 Van ton v. United A.2d 1431). Here, (D.C.2000) (citations allowed quotation internal regarding slightly admitted; no cross-examination prove may Good- bias be bias, however, purported wine’s which was rejecting such evidence is within to have stemmed from discrimina- the discretionary power Coles’ of the trial court.” Jackson, 301, complaint. tion But State 340 N.C. 457 S.E.2d (1995). 862, 870 party posing prof- must fer to sup- the court some facts which “Proportionality is of im- consummate port genuine belief that the witness is judicious adjudication,” portance Allen asserted, biased in the manner v. United 603 A.2d there specific personal is a bias on (D.C.1992) (en banc), and, the foregoing part pro- and that demonstrate, principle authorities posed questions probative are of bias. preclusion of all re- Barnes v. United 905 garding possible a witness’ bias violates (D.C.1992) added) (emphasis (quoting the applied Constitution must be with a Porter v. 996 measure of common sense. Trivial moti- (D.C.1989)). vations are If insufficient. Jones acciden- tally

“The trial ... has discre steps Smith’s toe and momentari- in determining corn, tion whether particular ly pain evi inflicts a little Smith’s dence is relevant or motive.” might reasonably provide a motive for State, him, White v. push Md. Smith to curse Jones or even to (1991) (quoting person reasonable would view it as McCoRmick on Evi Indeed, § supra, eyes dence, a motive to throw acid into Jones’ great court has “a deal of discretion” through to shoot Jones the heart. The making present may determination. Id. case “[T]he be as extreme as showing burden of the relevance of partic foregoing hypothetical, expres- but an *6 ular to evidence the issue of bias rests on sion of in dissatisfaction with Coles’ role State, proponent.” Chambers 866 the in proceeding discrimination which S.W.2d 26-27 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). merely Goodwine was a witness reason- Moreover, “not everything ably appeared judge tends to show to the trial provide to bias, may very and courts exclude evidence that a unpersuasive motive indeed for only marginally purpose.” helping is useful for this frame a to man for armed v. Lanz-Terry, by fabricating five-year-old State a N.W.2d sale of a (Minn.1995). tending only handgun.6 Athough judge “Evidence the did id., According dissenting colleague, Judge suggests, 6. to our Ruiz also that reversal unnecessary was for the defense to show that though is even "need warranted there was no proffered magnitude "the was of a appel- to doubt that Goodwine sold a 'framing’ would cause Goodwine to assist in they together lant at some time while worked Post, appellant.” surely p. 494. But an im- Corps.” (Emphasis origi- the for Marine in partial jury rationally could not conclude that nal.) hypothesis Her seems to be al- mistakenly had believed he though purchased weapon from handgun, sold Coles or that Goodwine be- Goodwine, Coles’ discrimination suit could lieved that he the serial number of the knew angered have so Goodwine that he would record, weapon when he did not. On this provide weapon serial number for the false telling Goodwine was the or either truth just inculpate he sold to Coles Coles in an intentionally framed Coles for an armed rob- robbery. armed We are satisfied that this bery, judge reasonably and the concluded that possibility sufficiently is remote to ensure that proffered Coles had not kind evidence it, impartial jury reasonably no reasonably jury believe of bias which could lead the framing judge reasonably believe that such deliberate had and the so conclude. occurred. terms, It is that alle- case. no secret precisely these crimination express herself was are that this is what she of unlawful discrimination tend gations we satisfied point by attention, re driving at. To articulate proposed and the capture one’s Barnes, language to this court’s a signif- sort would have supra, proffer the defense did not amount jury. of the potential distracting icant bias,” at personal to the “specific circumstances, perceive we these Under lay a foundation for cross- required on the of discretion legal error or abuse proffer of bias examination bias. judge’s trial part.7 best, at and thus inad marginal quite equate require judge permit III. Lanz-Terry, inquiry. line of Cf. CONCLUSION 640; Jackson, su supra, N.W.2d at

pra, 457 S.E.2d reasons, foregoing For the Coles’ convic- Moreover, the trial situation before the hereby are tions potential rife with the for confu- Affirmed. sion the issue and for distraction of from the whether Coles RUIZ, Judge, dissenting: Associate guilty: innocent or law, principles well-established Under Impeachment is a dispassionate present is good proffer faith of bias once study capacities and character of court, to the should learn ed trial tradi- regarded is our bias, probative of a witness’s unless credibility. tion an attack upon “substantially value of the out evidence adversary system Under our of trials by prejudice. risk of undue weighed” an opponent opportu- must be Clayborne v. nity to meet attack evidence (D.C.2000). case, de sustaining rehabilitating witness. 962-63 that Kurt proffered fense counsel Good- § supra, Evidence, McCormick wine, prosecution witness important (emphasis original). Accordingly, attempt to secure government’s second permitted the line robbery, Paul Coles’s conviction for defense, proffered pros testi was biased Coles. Goodwine ecution would had the to reha *7 very fied that he had sold to Coles Goodwine, presumably bilitate would and robbery. in the weapon used by attempting so that done show a supported by of bias was sworn proffer his comments about Coles were accurate affidavit, signed by Goodwine several justified and and did reflect against months he testified before defendant. expressed animus in which the witness then have been from the diverted through the appellant. Viewed guilt innocence or to the merits Coles’ trial court did legal dispute proper and lens—which a collateral between Goodwine sufficient, proffer arose in the context of a dis- not do—the which primarily lapse being on the evidently thought implausible, dissent as based 7. The we, and that would fabricate On the con- so do Goodwine sale. of time since the handgun the sale of a five earlier that would invent trary, notion way devastating order retaliate in such simply one several so old transaction against Coles’ actions in the discrimination improbability showing the of the de- factors dialogue case. between We do read the theory. fense’s entire “motive to fabricate” quoted court counsel 1 of the and footnote trial judge precluded the cross-examina The majority, recognizing this well-es- delving tion as matter,” into a “collateral tablished principle conceding that the trial judge without “allowed no assessing prejudice. light cross-examination regarding [the purported witness’s] bias” defense counsel’s proffer and impor against appellant, nevertheless decides tance of the allegedly biased err, the trial judge did not finding jury, not the trial judge, should have de justification in oft-repeated maxim that termined weight, what if any, to afford a trial court retains broad discretion to Goodwine’s testimony light of the bias impose “reasonable limits” on cross-exami- he had appellant. See id. at 963 See, e.g., nation. Brown v. United (“[Pjrobative bias, evidence of proba like (D.C.1996). 683 A.2d this, While tive evidence generally, should not be ex general true, as a proposition, just it is cluded because of ‘crabbed notions of rele as certain permissible that “the scope of ”) vance or juries.’ excessive mistrust of cross-examination ‘must be limited with (quoting Allen v. United the utmost caution and solicitude for the 1219, 1224(D.C.1992)(en banc)). ” defendant’s Sixth rights.’ Amendment Springer, 388 A.2d at 855 (quoting United “[T]he of confrontation and cross- v. Houghton, States 554 F.2d examination is an essential and fundamen- (1st Cir.1977)). “The broad discretion af- requirement tal for the kind of fair trial forded court as to the extent of which is this country’s constitutional goal.” ... justify ‘cannot Tex., 400, 405, Pointer v. State 380 U.S. curtailment which keeps from the rel- (1965) (hold- 85 S.Ct. 13 L.Ed.2d 923 evant important bearing facts on the ing the Confrontation applicable Clause ” trustworthiness of crucial testimony.’ through states the Fourteenth Amend- Bennett v. ment). particular importance Of to this (D.C.2002) McCloud, (quoting case is recognition proper “a important function of the constitutionally In order to guarantee balance the protected right of cross-examination” is Clause, Confrontation which is violated the “exposure of a witness’ motivation in when there is a “refusal ques to allow any Arsdall, testifying.” Delaware v. Van tioning about facts indicative of bias from 673, 678-79, could reasonably draw ad (1986). L.Ed.2d 674 pro- So crucial to the Brown, verse reliability,” inferences of tection aof defendant’s constitutional A.2d at firmly and the pos embedded rights aspect is this of courtroom examina- tulate that the “right to cross-examination tion, that it has served as the impetus for subject ‘is imposed reasonable limits our persistent ” declarations “bias is the discretion of the trial judge,’ id. always proper subject of cross-examina- Scull, *8 (quoting 1164), 564 A.2d at we have States, tion.” Scull v. United 564 A.2d a established basic require foundational (D.C.1989) 1161, 1165 (citing Springer v. ment before permitting inquiry about a States, (D.C. United 388 A.2d possible witness’s partiality. bias or When 1978) added)). (emphasis “Bias” encom- opposing objects counsel to bias cross-ex passes both a personal witness’s bias for or amination, the proffer examiner must to against particular a party and the wit- the court genuine “the basis for her belief See, ness’s motive to e.g., lie. McCloud v. that her questioning well-grounded is States, (D.C. United 781 A.2d hence that the answers may probative be Clayborne, bias.” See 751 A.2d at 963 brief line of indication (citing strong Jones v. United (D.C.1986)). regarding This requirement questioning requested is Good- feelings as this have “flexible as well lenient.” Id. When towards Coles would wine’s met, requirement unduly is the trial harassed the jury, foundational confused to prejudicial court’s broad discretion exclude such or otherwise so been diminished, necessarily it testimony is constitution to Coles’s justify impairing only a for proper is where foundation such confront against the witness al to not laid trial court Guzman, 790; has been that a Clay him. 769 A.2d at See it in may preclude entirety. See Guz- 963; borne, v. see also Davis A.2d man v. 308, 319, United Alaska, 415 (D.C.2001) (citing Ray (1974) (holding that peti 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (D.C.1993)). para right of confrontation was tioner’s juve policy protecting to mount state’s Proposed

I. The Cross-Examination any nile embarrassment offenders and. a. The Proffer Bias witness). counsel met his initial Defense burden judge denied defense counsel’s The par- a for proposing examine witness request to cross-examine Goodwine based tiality by providing good a faith basis erroneous belief that founda- her demonstrably believe that Goodwine was had been met. requirement tional not against biased Coles. not Counsel it judge found precisely, More communicated to the trial his well- discrimination difficult to believe prosecution founded belief that the witness against Good- brought by appellant suit against biased Coles because had have employer wine’s Good- against filed a suit discrimination “perjure himself’ about wine the motive Navy, where at Marine Goodwine worked majority to Coles. sale Corps Headquarters, produced but also also to believe that Coles’s suit seems (the documentary evidence witness’s affi- against Navy “marginal” because davit) which corroborated that belief. provided very unpersuasive “a motive Though against all employ- lawsuits an a helping to frame man indeed necessarily er would sour employee five-year- a by fabricating armed plaintiff, it was clear handgun.” ante at 490- old sale of did. In an one affidavit filed an admin- They points, miss two crucial one proceeding concerning charge istrative degree. The another of perspective and discrimination, that, stated relevant whether deleterious effect “[Coles] had sufficient reason believes Goodwine morale of the section none of us because outright testifying untruth in fabricate an could understand motivation and we that he sold the used could all heading.” see where but whether Goodwine’s lawsuit, according proffer, to counsel’s should evident animus Coles supervisor, implicated Goodwine’s (who that it could been revealed to so possibly gave Goodwine relationship “the be- whether consider management called as a witness might ... party and witness proceeding) further motiva- tween administrative slant, unconsciously in order to lead the witness testify tion to *9 otherwise, in favor of testimony his curry with Presented with favor his boss. Guzman, against party.” proffer, trial court should have Abel, States upon (quoting United excluded the cross-examination 45, 52, U.S. 83 L.Ed.2d 450 tied to have the benefit of the defense (1984)). requirement theory There was no they before them so that could prove defense counsel to make an informed proffered judgment bias as to the weight to magnitude place was of a on [the which would cause testimo- witness’s] Davis, ny.” Goodwine to assist in S.Ct. 1105. “framing” appellant. Nor was there even the need to doubt that b. Abuse of Discretion gun

Goodwine sold a to appellant at some time they together while worked for the putting Even aside the sufficiency of Corps. Marine But knowledge with the proffer, Coles’s the trial erred in not that Goodwine held a against appel bias allowing requested bringing lant for against lawsuit his em primarily because her decision was based ployer which Goodwine felt “had a delete upon consideration of irrelevant and section,” rious effect on the morale of [his] improper factor. Defense prof- counsel a reasonable might have more careful that, January fered ly scrutinized the veracity of Goodwine’s had filed discrimination claim statement that he identify weap (for former employer whom Goodwine still on used in the as the worked), produced and had an affidavit he sold years Coles several earlier because signed January Goodwine had he remembered its serial number. “The year 2000—the same testified in exposure may of bias be a crucial determi case—in relation to that employment dis- nant in jury’s assessment of the trust conference, crimination claim. At a bench worthiness of a Clayborne, witness.” judge erroneously focused on the (internal A.2d at 962 quotation and cita date of Goodwine’s affidavit in relation to omitted). tions It is not for specu us to alleged gun.1 sale of the fact late as to whether would have may Goodwine have sold the to appel- accepted appellant’s reasoning line of years lant five or more before Coles filed counsel permitted fully Navy defense the action bearing had no it; rather, present jurors “the were enti- on whether held a 1. The Court: When was the suit filed? because none of us could understand his motivation and we could all see where this January Defense Counsel: In of 1999. heading.” That’s where the bias is long The Court: So it was how after this stating involved. He's that Mr. Coles' ac- gun]? incident [the sale of the - tions contributed to testifying Defense Counsel: The man is The Court: When was the affidavit? today. affidavit, January Defense Counsel: The signed 14th of 2000. That's when he it. The Court: The suit was filed in '99? Right, testify- Defense Counsel: but he’s Prosecutor: I believe that Mr. Goodwine ing today. management was called as a witness The Court: And so? Department Navy in an administra- goes Defense Counsel: So it to bias. I proceeding. tive -mean Well, The Court: I don’t see how give this witness motive to favor person The Court: How is this involved? Government and to lie about a sale that Is he to have been the discrimina- happened several earlier. A suit that is tor? brought and an that’s No, Defense Counsel: but he did—he did affidavit going I don’t see how that would—it's stating make some statements that —his ex- try some act collateral matter. words are Mr. Coles—"He had a delete- added). (emphasis

rious effect on the morale of the section *10 that his comments attempting that action show initiating civil justified in against him accurate and time Goodwine testified Coles were the about sub- proper criminal trial. To be the Coles. the not reflect bias” and did ject inquiry, giving of an incident rise impeach- This ante at 491. confuses See precede testimony need the with untrue statements proof with of ment allegedly biased. See person the who is impeach- for bias. Where impeachment 378, 381 v. United Best bias, absolutely no it makes is for ment (D.C.1974). the rela- temporal The closer Coles’s action difference whether tionship giving between the incident rise genuinely under- employer former his trial, the the probative. bias and more fellow of Goodwine’s mined the morale that majority acknowledge not The does of evaluating the possibility workers. incorrectly the analyzed trial the bias, “subjective the belief’ it is witness’s rela- proffer by focusing temporal on the issue, it is to the “since is central tionship purported between the witness’s Scull, produce can this belief that bias.” gun testi- sale of the five before his Thus, only pertinent the 1165. trial, mony relationship at the criminal whether, at the time was consideration appellant’s proffer that was irrelevant subjec- gave testimony, Goodwine he year the same testified that that Goodwine had harmed his work tively thought Coles criminal also against Coles trial he unit, regardless of whether Goodwine in an that “had a swore affidavit way. doubt justified feeling No deleterious effect on the morale of right have would had government Navy of the of section” which Goodwine depth of resentment probe Goodwine’s Thus, part. the trial court erred every in which case it because “failed to consider a relevant raised. But there is no record basis bias is factor,” and fac- upon improper “relied cross-exam- majority’s for the concern that States, 398 tor.” See Johnson v. United diverted ination for bias would have (D.C.1979).2 354, 365 the em- jury’s attention into the merits of Fading grasp the relevance of claim, actual discrimination or its ployment proffer, was more con- on work unit. effect Goodwine’s matter,” trying cerned over a “collateral justifies the majority The also though exploration even there was on judge’s exclusion of cross-examination scope the mat- questioning what the unlawful “allegations ground majority sup- need ter would to be. capture one’s atten- tend to discrimination plies judge’s its own rationale for the trial tion, and the matters, trying about collateral concern significant potential have had a would had stating that the cross-examination at 491. jury.” ante allowed, distracting have government would so, it not be a “by assuming this is to rehabilitate Even Goodwine agree "age” armed majority to think could 2. The seems (five years) charges, sale to which Goodwine held in The second PFCV 1999. veracity, the trial, testified, testified somehow attests was held in at which Goodwine really implication being that if Goodwine had years after the more than three October appellant, wanted to frame he would gun to be the sale robbery. For armed See ante more recent sale. fabricated relevant, preceded the 1997 to have lying must have at note Even a witness noted, robbery. As armed regard charged, however. for the crime some sale; merely specify date of place took in "1994-1995.” testified that it was trial, July where the 1997. The first *11 ever, sufficient reason to preclude bias cross- apply and we the constitutional (as altogether examination opposed to rea- Chapman harmless error test of v. Califor- sonably limiting government’s nia, re-di- 18, 22-2, 824, 386 U.S. 87 S.Ct. rect). I precisely note that it is because (1967), L.Ed.2d 705 whenever “the allegations of discrimination are notewor- precludes court ‘a meaningful degree of thy that it is reasonable to think that the cross-examination’ establish bias.” believed, could well have as counsel Grayton 274, v. United 745 A.2d proffered, that Coles’s discrimination law- (D.C.2000) Flores, (quoting 698 A.2d at captured suit the attention of Goodwine 479). and his fellow workers. case, In though even defense coun- sum, In proffer of bias in this case sel was able to ask about the lack of require court, sufficient to the trial documentary evidence of Goodwine’s sale absent a showing of prejudice, serious to of and Goodwine’s allow cross-examination on the issue of inability year to recall the of the sale or Goodwine’s documented resentment to price at which he sold the —deficien-

wards judicial Coles. An exercise of dis cies which the easily dismiss as cretion, broad, however will be reversed unimportant details —the trial court’s rul- it “appears it was exercised on ing prohibited defense counsel from expos- grounds, reasons, clearly or for untenable ing Goodwine’s bias and motive to lie. or to an clearly extent unreasonable.” Thus, an entirely separate line of relevant Johnson, 398 A.2d at (quoting Brin questioning precluded, depriving ap- Harkins, (Del. ghurst 122 A. pellant “meaningful of a degree of cross- 1923)). I thus conclude that the trial court id.; Flores, examination.” See 698 A.2d at erred in excluding the bias cross-examina 479; Scull, Therefore, 564 A.2d at 1164. tion of Kurt Goodwine. conviction, order to affirm I Coles’s would have to .conclude Prejudice II. cross-p.xa.mina.- court’s error limiting Whether that error warranted reversal tion of Goodwine for bias was nonetheless appellant’s “depend[s] upon conviction beyond harmless a reasonable doubt. See scope permitted cross-examination Chapman, 22-24, 386 U.S. at 87 S.Ct. 824. by the trial court measured our do, This I Chapman cannot as under the assessment of the appropriate degree of standard it must be clear that Coles would necessitated the sub- have been convicted without Goodwine’s ject matter thereof as well as other cir- Flores, testimony. 480- prevailed cumstances at trial.” 81; Scull, 564 A.2d at 1166. Flores v. United (D.C.1997) government’s case Coles for (quoting Springer, 388 armed robbery problematic, to say If the issue on cross-examination is collateral, Notably, least. merely officers of the Metro- or where ample cross- politan Department Police examination has who testified already been allowed on a issue, particular impeached Coles were with numer- curtailment of cross-ex- prior amination does not ous inconsistencies their implicate the Sixth state- Amendment, ments and obvious apply we the less strin- variations their ac- gent “harmless counts of the surrounding error” test set forth in events Coles’s instance, apprehension Kotteakos v. United 328 U.S. and arrest. For (1946). 90 L.Ed. officer who was able directly violated, The Confrontation Clause is how- connect weapon produced Coles to the light five earlier. to Coles gotten that he had sold trial first testified my evaluation of *12 first doubt and jury’s the appellant’s look at “whole face” good case, I government’s in the chasing weaknesses two three seconds while about doubt, cross-examination, however, say, beyond reasonable the cannot him. On been would have convicted tape recording appellant that impeached by officer was testimony even if Goodwine’s police dispatcher a radio made to a of call See United States by jury. the of believed shortly recovery gun after the the Williams, n. U.S.App. D.C. he had been able to stated (cau (2000) 1311 n. 10 only the rear. Simi- F.3d suspect see the from signifi critical Abderrafe, robbery tioning against “assigning the of larly, victim the jury, failure of a different appellant at trial cance the positively who identified argu him, and different evidence of men who robbed admit- which heard as one the ment, agreement”). made identifications reach ted that he on-scene of both Coles the second man I reverse Coles’s conviction robbery pri- in the been involved trial. the case for new remand him marily police had told because officers they thought two men were the the An officer testified that there culprits. place two close the

were men to the where

robbery place took who were observed wearing camouflage

police pants

victim described were worn one of Phyllis BARON, Respondent. In re J. physical robbers.3 There was no evidence tying robbery. Coles to the armed When Member the Bar of the District A first government tried Appeals. Re- On Columbia Court evidence, with time was unsuccessful port and Recommendation rob- securing conviction on Responsibility Board on Professional retrial, bery charge. where or PFCV On 131-00). (BDN brought additional evidence testimony against Coles was Goodwine’s No. 02-BG — 222. gun

that he used the armed had sold of Appeals. District of Court Columbia Coles, a robbery to conviction was secured. in closing argu- Defense efforts counsel’s Sept. Submitted testimony impeach ment Goodwine’s 10, 2002. Decided Oct. gun appellant, about his sale questioning memory his recall from of a he had sold several

serial number earlier, greatly would have been

strengthened if he had been able to show ap- ill-disposed against

that Goodwine was govern-

pellant possibly partial and—the could infer —motivated

ment certainty used say with weapon he had same camouflage wearing only one man a call mentioned impeached with 3. That officer pants. night of which he made on the

Case Details

Case Name: Coles v. United States
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Oct 10, 2002
Citation: 808 A.2d 485
Docket Number: 00-CF-1570
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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