Thе suit of the appellant as plaintiff upon a policy of war risk insurance was dismissed below as barred by the limitation contained in § 19 of the World War Veterans’ Act of 1924, as amended by the Act of July 3, 1930, U.S.C.Supp. 7, T. 38, ’ § 445, 38 U.S.C.A. § 445 which provides: “No suit * * * shall be allowed * * unless * * * brought within six years after the right accrued for which the claim is made or within one year after July 3, 1930, whichever is the later date.”
There is no dispute that the suit, which was filed Junе 25, 1935, was not within the time limits of the statute. The asserted right of action grew out of alleged total and permanent disability of the soldier in January, 1919. The six year limitation expired in January, 1925, and the suit was not brought within one year after July 3, 1930. Assuming disability of the veteran because insane, this disability was removed by his death on November 11, 1928. Thereafter, under the second proviso of the second pаragraph of § 19 suit might have been brought within three years after the removal of the disability, but this period expired November 11, 1931.
The presently urged right to sue is based upon a claim of estoppel growing out of circumstances to be recited. The vеteran when discharged from the army in 1918 had a government war risk insurance policy in the amount of $10,000. He became totally and permanently disabled from o dementia praecox while the insurance was in force, was admitted to a State institution for the insane on September 5, 1922, and later to a Government sanitarium, where he died November 11, 1928. In December, 1927, the appellant, Judge Advocate of the American Legion for Shelby County, Tennessee, was appointed his guardian. Shortly thereafter he requested a friendly member of Congress to ascertain whether his ward had war risk insurance, and if so in what amount. On Januаry 25, 1928, the Congressman replied that he had been advised by the Veterans’ Bureau that no record had been found of any application for or the issuance of a policy. Some nine and a half months later the veteran died, and the aрpellant was appointed administrator of his estate. In May of 1932 he learned that there was an applicatiоn for war risk insurance signed by the veteran on file in the Regional Office of the Veterans’ Administration in Nashville, Tennessee. Tie fоrthwith filed a claim as administrator of the soldier’s estate, but it was denied on June 3, 1935.
Reduced to simple terms, the argument in support of the claim of estoppel is: That when the United States went into the insurance business, issued policies and provided that’ in case of disagreement it might be sued, it must be assumed to have accepted the ordinary incidents of suits upon private contracts; that the Veterans’ Administration having been authorized by law to disclose information concerning insurance сontracts to those entitled to receive it, had acted within the scope of its authority when it gave the appеllant erroneous information; that the appellant having been deceived by it, and so failing to file timely claim or suit, to thе injury of his ward and later to the estate, the government is now estopped to question his right, to sue upon the contract on the ground that there was want of jurisdiction in the court 'to entertain the suit.
The general rule, of course, is that the United States is neither bound nor es-topped by the acts of its officers and agents in entering into an agreement or arrangement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit, and that those dealing with an agent of the United Stаtes must be held to have notice of the limitation of his authority. Wilber National Bank v. United States, 294 Ú.S. 120,
When the United States creates rights in individuаls against itself it is under no obligation to provide a remedy through the courts. United States v. Babcock,
Affirmed.