|, United Fire <& Casualty Co. (“United Fire”) appeals a judgment finding that the negligent driver, Lovell Ellis, had express or implied permission to use a truck owned by his employer, Water Works Irrigation Inc. (“Water Works”), and insured by United Fire, when he was in a one-car accident that injured his passenger, Raquel Coleman. We affirm.
Factual Background
According to Ms. Coleman, she had met Ellis online and they became romantically involved. Around 5:00 pm on Thursday, January 20, 2011, Ellis called her to say he was at work and wanted to come pick her up around 9:00 pm. Ellis worked for Water Works, in Shreveport, and Ms. Coleman was living in Minden, about 35 miles away. They agreed that he would pick her up at her mother’s house, on East Street, and take her to her apartment at Hillside Apartments, off Industrial Drive, where they would just “hang out.” He arrived between 9:00 and 10:00, driving a Water Works pickup truck and wearing a dirty Water Works uniform. He picked her up and they started to her apartment; however, rounding the curve in Industrial Drive, he lost control of the truck. He zigzagged several times, eventually flipping the truck and landing it on its side in a drainage ditch to the right of the road. Ms. Coleman was able to climb out the upturned passenger window, but she fractured her neck at C7 and sustained other injuries.
Ms. Coleman also testified that as they approached the turn, she was gazing out her open window, but when she saw Ellis had crossed the white fog line, she glanced over and saw he was sending a text on his cell phone. 12She said he was not speeding, but was just not paying attention to the road.
Ms. Coleman also testified that sometime after the incident, Ellis phoned and asked her to lie about the accident by telling insurance adjusters that she and Ellis were “kinfolk” and that he had planned to spend the night with her. She refused, and has never spoken to him since.
Ms. Rigsby, who co-owned Water Works with her husband (and, until late 2011, with another co-owner, Chris Lively), offered the company’s written policy, which gave certain employees “an assigned vehicle to be used solely for company business and commuting to and from work.” This
According to Ms. Rigsby, on the date of the accident it had started raining around noon, so Water Works sent all employees home. Ellis clocked but at 12:30 pm and did not have a job assignment for the next morning. Further, Ellis lived within a mile of Water Works’ shop, on Mt. Zion Road in south Shreveport, was never assigned to any jobs in the Minden area, and neither Ms. Rigsby nor her husband would have ^consented- to let him drive there. She fired him the next day, January 21, for taking the company truck without permission on a personal venture almost 40 miles from his home address and for driving while intoxicated.
A coworker of Ellis’s, Raymond Sheets, confirmed that Ellis had been a service technician for Water Works, had a truck assigned to him, and that both men answered to Lively. However, if Water Works ever had jobs in the Minden area, they sent him, Sheets, to those jobs because he lived nearby, and not Ellis.
Finally, James A. Thomas, a claims representative for United Fire, testified that he interviewed Ellis a few days after the accident. Ellis told him he was going to Mindeii to see a sick aunt, and that Ms. Coleman was his cousin, whom he picked up en route to see the aunt. Ellis also told Thomas that it had been raining that day, so he had not just got off work, and had not just come from a job in Haughton.
Procedural History
Ms. Coleman filed this suit for personal injuries in January 2012, naming United Fire, Ellis and Water Works as defendants. She later dismissed Water Works with a reservation of rights. The matter proceeded to a bench trial, with a stipulated $75,000 cap, in October 2014. The |4witnesses testified as outlined above.
United Fire introduced its business auto policy, which contained an omnibus clause agreeing to pay “all sums an insured must pay as damages because of bodily injury.” The policy also defined an “insured” to include “Anyone else while using with your permission a covered ‘auto’ you own, hire or borrow[.]”
Ellis .absconded before trial, so fhe parties offered his oral deposition, from October 2012, in lieu of his testimony. The deposition is digressive and largely inconsistent with everyone else’s account of events. Ellis insisted that he had worked until 8:30 that night, at a job in Haughton.
Action of the District Court
The district cpurt wrote an opinion rejecting Ellis’s claim of a sudden emergency and finding him 100% at fault, awarding stipulated damages of $24,049.67, and fixing general damages at $23,400. On the crucial issue of insurance coverage, the court cited the Motor Vehicle Liability Law, La. R.S. 32:900', and the broad' interpretation of' permission in the jurisprudence, Manzella v. Doe, 94-2854 (La.12/8/95),
■ United Fire has appealed, raising one assignment of error.
Discussion
By its sole assignment of error, United Fire urges that the court erred in finding .coverage when the evidence was undisputed that,Ellis was not functioning in the course and scope of his employment, had no permission .Into be operating the truck at the time of the accident, and was in direct violation of written company policy regarding permissive use of the vehicle. As a threshold matter, United Fire contends the issue is purely legal, thus taking the case out of manifest error and into de novo review, citing Kevin Assocs. v. Crawford, 2003-0211 (La.1/30/04),
On the merits, United Fire urges that Ms. Coleman and Ellis simply did not prove express or implied permission, so the court should have found no “initial permission,” as in Aycock v. Jenkins Tile Co.,
As noted, United Fire’s “Business Auto Coverage Form” contained an omnibus clause defining an “insured” as, inter alia, “Anyone else while using with your permission a covered ‘auto’ you own, hire or borrow” with exceptions not applicable to this ease. The seminal case of Parks v. Hall,
[T]he policy, by its express terms, i.e., the omnibus clause, was made to cover, as an assured, any one .who was driving the car with the permission of the owner of the insured car. The provisions of the policy do not limit the liability thereunder to causes arising when the permitted driver was using the car either for the owner’s business or under any restricted circumstances. The language is not restricted, but used in its broadest possible sense * * The words used in the clause would be practically meaningless and the object there made nugatory if it were necessary to determine in every case whether, a,t the time and under the circumstances of the accident, the driver' was proceeding within the limitations of .the permission of the assured to use the car..
The jurisprudence has never varied; coverage is extended under the omnibus clause so long as the operator had the named insured’s permission to use the vehicle, regardless of whether its use at the time of the accident was within the contemplation of the named insured at the time permission was granted, and even when a deviation is in violation of specific instructions of the, insured. Waits v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Amer.,
In light of these principles, we detect no manifest error, in the court’s finding of permission. Permission plainly occurred when Water Works gave Ellis the truck and the keys, allowed him to drive it to and from work, and expected him to use it for emergency, calls, any time of day or night. His conduct in driving 35 miles out of his way to pick up a girlfriend was a deviation from the grant of permission, but there was no showing that he intended to steal it or disregard its safe return, thus distinguishing the case from Slain v.
Finally, we note that this ease did not involve the use of a company vehicle by a person who was not an employee, as in Miguez v. Platinum Underwriters Reins., supra. It also did not involve the use of a company vehicle by an employee who never had permission to use the vehicle taken, as in Norton v. Lewis, Campbell v. Verrett and Aycock v. Jenkins Tile Co., supra. This crucial factual distinction makes the cases cited by United Fire inapplicable to the instant case.
Conclusion
For the reasons expressed, the judgment is affirmed. All costs are to be paid by the appellant, United Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. The police report of the accident was not ■introduced into evidence, but Minden City Court records showed that Ellis pled guilty to DWI for the incident.
. The Louisiana Workforce Commission denied his unemployment insurance claim for insufficient base period income, but also found aggravated misconduct connected with the employment. .
. Haughton is about halfway between Shreveport and Minden.