Coleman v. Semmes

| Miss. | Jan 15, 1879

Lead Opinion

Campbell, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Mrs. Coleman must be held bound by her husband’s acts in his dealings with James M. Semmes, as disclosed by this x’ecord.

She permitted her husband to deal with her property and manage her pecuniary matters as he pleased. He was her brother’s guardian, and her representative. He acted for his wife with her knowledge and consent, and for his ward, in establishing their plantation in Panola, after the sale of the plantation in Lowndes, which was sold, by agreement of all parties, for the purpose of transferring their planting interest to Panola. Mrs. Coleman confided every thing to her husband.

The two must be considered as one in reference to the transactions had with Semmes. Coleman’s settlements must be upheld as his wife’s, aud her rights must be adjudged accordingly ; for he represented her, and acted for her, aud she is concluded by his acts.

The division of the property of Mrs. Coleman and her brother, in 1860, and the agreement in accordance with the award of Sledge, in 1871, fixed the rights of the parties to it, and by these transactions and subsequent events their rights must be determined. The legal title of the east half of section 11 was vested in the wife of Semmes by the deed of Coleman, made April 4, 1867, and it is to be treated as if it were vested in Semmes himself. That conveyance was doubtless made in recognition of the claim Semmes had on Coleman by reason of the division of land in 1860, and subsequent events; and whether intended as a mere security, or to keep the property in the family in spite of contemplated bankruptcy, and therefore so made as to be successfully defended in case of attack as without legal consideration, the deed had the effect to put the legal title in Mrs. Semmes, and subsequently it was recognized as being in her, and the settlement made by Sledge in 1871 was upon this assumption. The adjustment of 1871 was conformed to by Mrs. Coleman in her relinquishment of claim to the Boliver lands, but the $2,000 stipulated to be paid to Sledge for Semmes has not been paid, in whole or in part; and, manifestly, the legal title of Mrs. Semmes, devolved by descent upon her children, cannot be divested without performance of the conditions on which it was stipulated to be done.

Whatever rights the parties have, grow out of the agreement in pursuance of the award of Sledge. All differences were submitted to Sledge, and the agreement made in pursuance of his award is the measure of the rights of the parties.

We are not unmindful of the fact that Mrs. Coleman was a married woman, and under the legal disabilities of one, but she could do as she chose with her money derived from the sale of the land in Lowndes ; and having permitted her husband to use it as his own, to buy land and take the title to himself, to stand forth in all matters as owner, and to make contracts upon that basis, she cannot be permitted to undo what he did, except on the terms on which he may be permitted to do so.

We reverse the decree only for the purpose of dismissing the bill without prejudice to the right of Mrs. Coleman to exhibit a bill to enforce any right she may have by reason of the agreement on the terms .of award by Sledge, if she shall be so advised, but all costs of this case in both courts shall be paid by appellants..

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Concurrence Opinion

Chalmers, J.,

concurring.

The testimony establishes knowledge on the part of Mrs. Coleman that her husband, in his dealings with his former ward, was treating the land, the legal title to which was in his name, as his own property, or as the joint property of his ward and wife, and that the settlements and agreements between them were assented to by the ward on that basis, or, at least, in the belief that Mrs. Coleman acquiesced in them, and would never interpose any equitable rights of hers in opposition to them. That such was the common understanding between all the parties I entertain no doubt. Inasmuch, however, as Semmes was fully aware of his sister’s (Mrs. Coleman’s) equitable ownership of the land, he could not, in my opinion, resist the assertion by her of her rights if the investment of her money had taken place under the Code of 1857 or that of 1871, since under both Codes the husband who has invested his wife’s means in property, the title to which is taken in his name, is made an express trustee for her, and her rights may be asserted against all who have notice of them. Code 1857, p. 336, art. 24; Code 1871, sect. 1779.

But the investment, in this case, occurred in February, 1857, when we had no such principle in our law. Mrs. Coleman, therefore, is not to be regarded as a wife, but like a person sui juris, who has permitted another, clothed with the legal title to her property, to deal with it as his own, and upon the faith of it to come under obligations concerning it to others. As a person sui juris would not be allowed to defeat such obligations • by setting up a resulting trust in the property, so, under the circumstances of this case, Mrs. Coleman will not. She had a perfect right to give her money to her husband. With her money he bought land, taking title in himself. Whether she was aware of the fact or not, she permitted him for years to treat it as his own, and in all the dealings with her younger brother, his ward, to divide one portion and pledge the other as if it was either his own property or the common estate of his ward and of his wife. That she had general knowledge of these things, if not specific information of the details, there can be no doubt.

Being protected by no special statute, a court of chancery will not set up for her a resulting trust, to the injury of her brother, who settled with his former guardian on the faith of her acquiescence in her husband’s acts. A resulting trust will never be set up where it will operate as a fraud, or work injustice to third persons.