132 Minn. 22 | Minn. | 1916
This action was brought to recover for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff by reason of the failure of defendant to comply with the provisions of the act of Congress, approved April 14, 1910, known as the Supplemental Safety Appliance Act, imposing upon all interstate railroad companies the duty of maintaining upon their cars in secure condition certain steps, ladders, brakes, hand-holds and other equipment designed for use by employees in the discharge of their duties. The action was dismissed on the trial below, at the close of plaintiff’s ease, and plaintiff appealed from an order denying a new trial.
The act of Congress in question was supplemental to and an extension of the safety appliance act of 1893, and subsequent amendments, and was evidently enacted for a twofold purpose: (1) To add to and enlarge the scope of the prior enactments; and (2) to authorize the interstate commission to promulgate an order fixing a uniform standard of car equipment for all railroad companies engaged in interstate traffic, and to require such roads to conform their cars and equipment to such standard. And, to afford ample opportunity for a compliance with such order, the commission was authorized, by section 3 of the act, to fix a time within which the order should be -complied with. An order was made by the commission prescribing a uniform standard of equipment, and, long prior to the date of plaintiff’s injury, the time for compliance with the standard so fixed and prescribed was extended until some time in 1916; the precise date is not important. Plaintiff received his injury in June, 1914. • The precise contention of defendant is that the order of the commission extending the time for compliance with the prescribed uniform equipment suspended the supplemental act in its entirety, and that the provisions of section 2, declaring it unlawful for any railroad company to employ in it's train service after July 1, 1911, any car not equipped as therein provided, were under suspension and not in force at the time plaintiff was injured. We are unable to concur in this contention.
Section 4 provides a penalty for a violation of the act, and for the recovery thereof as provided by the act of 1893.
The sole purpose of this part of the statute was to impose upon the railroads the absolute duty of maintaining their car equipments in safe condition for use. The language is clear and positive, and declares that on and after the date named it shall be unlawful to use such cars when not so equipped. It will not, as we read it, admit of qualification by judicial construction, and was intended to apply to cars in use at the time the act was passed as well as those thereafter brought into service. Section 3, upon which defendant relies in support of the contention that section 2 was under suspension, relates to an entirely different branch of the same subject, and clearly was not intended as a qualification of the express provisions of section 2. It was evidently deemed that the safety of the traveling public, as well as railroad employees engaged in the train service, would best be protected by some uniform method or standard of ear equipment applicable to all interstate roads, and to that end authority to fix such standard was, by section 3, vested in the interstate commission. The reasons for the requirement of uniformity in equipment are plain. The cars of different roads operating throughout the states are promiscuously hauled, all are not equipped in the same manner; and a train composed of cars differently supplied with the appliances referred to in the statute, results in confusion to the employees, and adds materially to the dangers connected with their work. With a uniformity of equipment confusion is eliminated and danger of injury lessened. So it seems clear that the sole purpose of section 3 was to authorize the commission to prescribe a uniform standard for the equip
Order reversed.