5 Blatchf. 56 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern New York | 1862
On the hearing -of this case on its merits, in this court, before the two judges, a division of opinion upon the question of jurisdiction occurred (4 Blatchf. 395 [Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Co., Case No. 12,S52]), which made it necessary, under the act of congress, to certify such division to the supreme court. That court, after argument, were also equally divided in opinion, and, as a consequence, the certificate of division was dismissed, and the cause was remitted to the court below, with directions to proceed therein in conformity to law and the rules and proceedings in such cases provided. According to these rules and proceedings, and in conformity with law, as was intimated by the appellate court on the ■dismissal of the certificate of division, it becomes the duty of this court to enter a decree dismissing the bill, the same principle applying to the case in this court as in the appellate court, in case of a divided opinion. From the decree thus resulting, an appeal may be taken, and the case be reviewed in the court above, the same as if the decree were pronounced by the' judgment of the •court.
It is contended, however, that, conceding this view to be correct, it does not follow that the injunction heretofore granted falls with the dismissal of the bill, or, if it does prima facie, that it is still in the power of this court to continue the injunction until the decision on the appeal, and that the case is a proper one for the exercise of this power. The court cannot agree to either of these positions. The legal result of the division of opinion of the judges, is a dismissal of the bill without any qualification. Indeed, the condition of the court renders any qualification or modification of the dismissal impracticable. The case is out of court, so far as it respects any proceedings except an appeal to revise the decree. The judges are disabled, from the contrariety of opinion, to annex any condition, and it certainly requires no argument to show that, in the case of an unqualified dismissal of a bill, all the incidents fall with it We agree that the chancellor may, in his discretion, direct a modified dismissal, and thereby annex to it such conditions as may seem to him just and equitable. Having the possession and entire control of the cause, this qualified exercise of power is practicable. But such a case is very different from this one, where the dismissal is the result of law, and absolute, and where, from the condition of the court, no modification can be annexed.
It was insisted, that an appeal, when taken within the time and in the mode described by the acts of congress of September 24, 17S9 (1 Stat. 85, § 23), and March 3, 1S03 (2 Stat 244, § 2), will operate, under and by virtue of those acts, to continue the injunction. But it is quite clear that these provisions deal only with the writ of execution founded upon the decree rendered, and which is awarded by it, and have no application to the provisional writ of injunction or other incidental proceedings in the progress of the cause.
It may not be improper to add, in conclusion, that this question was the subject of observation in the course of the discussion of the main questions of the case, in the court above, and that no doubt was entertained in regard to it by any of the judges. Although the question had not been discussed by counsel, it became incidentally involved, on account of the division of opinion in the appellate court. After a full argument before us in this court, we find no ground for changing the opinion.
