37 Wis. 180 | Wis. | 1875
To defeat a recovery in the action the defendants offered in evidence the tax deed issued to H. 0. Fairchild, November 23, 1868, referred to in the answer, and under which they claimed the premises in controversy. In order to impeach the validity of that deed, and to destroy the title therein granted, the plaintiff offered to show that the grantee, Fairchild, was deputy treasurer at the time he purchased the tax certificates upon which the tax deed was issued, and also that he was deputy treasurer when the tax deed was issued to him. This evidence was objected to and excluded by the court as incompetent and immaterial. The correctness of this ruling is the only matter we need consider; since it is manifest that if the proposed testimony was inadmissible, the tax deed afforded a perfect defense to the action.
It is claimed on the part of the plaintiff, that Fairchild was absolutely prohibited from purchasing the tax certificates and from taking the tax deed, by ch. 276, Laws of 1864 (Tay. Stats., 337-8, §§ 229-231), and that the tax deed was void.
It is now claimed by the counsel for the defendants, that there is nothing in this enactment which prohibits a county treasurer or his deputy from purchasing a tax certificate from other parties than the county; and therefore, if Fairchild was deputy treasurer when he purchased the tax certificate on which the deed issued, and at the date of the deed, still that this in no way affected the validity of the deed, unless he purchased the land at the tax sale or purchased the certificate from the county. It seems to us that this construction of the statute is correct and must prevail.
The statute forbids the doing of two things: first, it prohibits the treasurer or his deputy from purchasing directly or indirectly property sold for taxes at any tax sale; second, it prohibits such officers from purchasing any tax certificate or tax deed held by the county, except, etc. It was not proposed to show that Fairchild was deputy treasurer when the land was sold for taxes in 1861, and then directly or indirectly purchased it at the tax sale; nor was it proposed to show that he purchased the certificates of the county while laboring under the disability. It will be seen that the prohibition in the latter clause is not general. It does not forbid the officer from purchasing a tax certificate or tax deed at all, from any person, but prohibits him from purchasing them from the county. It is said that the intention of the statute was to inhibit the purchase of this species of property by these officers, in order to
We express no opinion upon the other questions discussed by counsel on the argument.
It results from these views that the judgment of the circuit court must be affirmed.
By ike Court.— Judgment affirmed.