Coleman v. Camp

Jan 15, 1860
Reporters:
Before:
Stone
STONE, J.

If the rights of Mrs. Kemp rested alone on the second clause of the will, we would be ‍​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍strongly inclined to hold, that she took the life-estate in trust for the equal benefit of herself and the children of Washington Kemp, deceased. The same words are employed in that clause to confer on each their respective ‍​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍interests. The fourth clause, however, sheds light on this question, and leaves us no room to doubt, that Mrs. Kemp was the chief object of testator’s bounty; and that his object was simply to incumber her life-estate with ‍​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍the support and education of his grand-children. That clause, after making a devise to testator’s daughter, Mrs. Oahoon, of a tract of land, employs this emphatic language — “ which” [the land devised] “is excepted out of the ‍​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍life-estate heretofore given to my wife.” This is the testator’s exposition of the language found in the, second clause, and confers on Mrs. Kemp a life-estate in the property devised and bequeathed. McCroan v. Pope, 17 Ala. 612.

[2.] Under this view, ‍​​​​‌​​​‌‌​‌​‌​​​‌​​​​​​​‌​​​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​‍complainant had a complete and adequate remedy at law, and his bill was without equity.

Decree of the chancellor affirmed.