45 N.Y. 38 | NY | 1871
The plaintiff was interested to the extent of one-fourth in the profits or losses of a shipment of coffee undertaken by him jointly with other parties. After the adventure had been begun, and before the coffee had reached its port of destination, it was mutually agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the latter should have one-half interest in the plaintiff's one-fourth interest in the adventure. The speculation resulted in a loss, and this action was brought to recover one-half of the plaintiff's proportion of such loss. It is now claimed on the part of the defendant that no valid contract was made between him and the plaintiff; that inasmuch as the plaintiff had embarked in the speculation before and without reference to any arrangement with the defendant, and the defendant had not done or contributed anything to aid in the joint enterprise, there was no partnership, and no consideration for the undertaking of the plaintiff to give him one-half of the profits; that therefore the defendant could not have enforced payment of half the profits, if the adventure had been successful, and consequently no agreement on his part to contribute to the loss can be implied.
This argument assumes that the agreement was simply that the defendant should have one-half of the profits, which the plaintiff might make out of the adventure, in case it should *41 prove successful. But such was not the agreement proved. The agreement was that the defendant should share with the plaintiff in the adventure, and it seems to have been clearly understood that he should participate in the result, whether it should prove a profit or a loss. That it might result in a loss was contemplated by the parties. There is evidence in the case that the possibility of that event was the subject of conversation between them at the time of making the contract; that the hope was then expressed that the plaintiff would not be compelled to call upon the defendant to contribute to a loss; and that afterward, when they did call upon him to contribute, he did not dispute his liability, but sought to reduce the amount by claiming a portion of the plaintiff's commissions.
The evidence fully justified a finding that, in consideration of the agreement by the plaintiffs to account to the defendant for half the profits in case of success, the defendant undertook to bear half the loss in the contrary event; and the intendment is, that the referee did so find. Indeed, such is a proper construction of the actual finding. It is a clear case of mutual promises; and the obligation of each party was a good consideration for that of the other. (Briggs v. Tillotson, 8 Johns., 304.)
The evidence was conflicting as to whether the defendant was to share in the commissions. The referee found in the plaintiffs' favor on that point, and the court below, at General Term, refused to interfere with that finding. We cannot disturb it.
The agreement was not within the statute of frauds. It was not an agreement for the sale of any personal property or chose in action, but an executory agreement, whereby one party undertook to bear one part of a possible loss, in consideration of a share of an expected profit.
The judgment of reversal and order granting a new trial should be reversed, and the judgment for the plaintiffs entered on the report of the referee should be affirmed, with costs.
All the judges concurring. *42
Order of General Term reversed, and judgment for the plaintiffs affirmed.
