Cole v. StateCole v. State
1. The appellants were indicted for selling "a quantity of hydromorphone.” A chemist employed by the state crime lab testified that the samples he received tested positive for the presence of hydromorphone. He further testified that the pills in evidence were also known by the proprietary name of Dilaudid; he did not test the substance to determine if it was hydromorphone
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in its pure state but it was his belief the pills were "some sort of salt” of hydromorphone, probably hydromorphone hydrochloride, consisting of hydromorphone (the "base”) and chlorine. A defense witness identified the substance as Dilaudid, "a trademark name for hydromorphone,” though he also testified the pills were hydromorphone hydrochloride, a salt of the free agent hydromorphone manufactured for use in dosage form and having greater water solubility. Reliance is placed in
Williamson v. State,
In
De Palma v. State, 225
Ga. 465 (
The indictments here charged the appellants with the unlawful sale of a "quantity of hydromorphone” in violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. Apparently the appellants are willing to concede that the sale of some substance took place; what they contest is that the state has proven that substance to be what has been alleged — "a quantity of hydromorphone.” All witnesses agree that the substance contains hydromorphone, whether or not in its free state or as the base of a salt thereof. Dilaudid, a proprietary name for the drugs, has been identified as hydromorphone hydrochloride, a dosage drug, differing from pure hydromorphone therefore in its greater water solubility.
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Code Ann. § 79A-807 (b) (1) (xi) defines hydromorphone or a salt thereof as a "controlled substance.” "One of the main purposes of the indictment is to give the person charged notice of that particular crime against which he must defend. Most 'variances’ take nothing away from the perfectly adequate notice contained in the indictment.”
Green v. State,
Williamson
was decided under the old Drug Abuse Control Act, since repealed. In an addendum to that opinion itself it was recognized that its holding would not be viable under the Georgia Controlled Substances Act. 134 Ga. App. pp. 867-868. For this reason and in light of the recent judicial expression of disapproval of overly-technical application of the fatal variance rule, we decline to follow
Williamson
and limit it to its facts. Indeed,
Williamson
may never have been good law. See
Tischmak v. State,
2. The remaining enumeration of error is without merit.
Loder v. State,
Judgments affirmed.