47 Pa. Super. 212 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1911
Opinion by
The plaintiff’s action grew out of a prosecution against him for forcible entry and detainer, in which prosecution after the lapse of four or five terms of the court of quarter sessions the grand jury ignored the indictment. If the plaintiff in presenting his case at the trial had rested on the evidence showing that the defendant instituted the criminal proceeding and that the bill was thrown out by the grand jury, he would have presented a prima facie case,
In an action of this character, it is necessary to a recovery that want of probable cause and malice be proved. Want of probable cause having been shown, malice may be inferred, but it is indispensable that it affirmatively appear that the prosecution was instituted without probable cause. Whether an established state of facts amounts to probable cause is a question of law. If there be a dispute as to the facts, the question must go to the jury, but if the facts shown amount to probable cause the court should grant a nonsuit or give binding instructions to the jury as the state of the case may suggest. Where the plaintiff’s own evidence discloses probable cause the presumption in his favor arising from his acquittal in the criminal proceeding or his discharge by the grand jury is not sufficient to take the case to the jury: Mahaffey v. Byers, 151 Pa. 92; Boyd v. Kerr, 216 Pa. 259.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of the guilt of the accused. Where the circumstances are of such a character as to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense, probable cause exists. The question does not turn on the innocence or guilt of the accused but on the prosecutor’s belief of his guilt based upon reasonable grounds: Gilliford v. Windel, 108 Pa. 142; Robitzek v. Daum, 220 Pa. 61.
Had the defendant reasonable ground for believing that the plaintiff had committed a forcible entry and detainer? It is not disputed that the defendant and those under whom he claimed had been in undisturbed possession of the premises for a long time, and the plaintiff admitted
The evidence we think justified the court in holding that the defendant in bringing the prosecution had reasonable ground to believe that the plaintiff was guilty of forcible entry and detainer. There may be a forcible detainer where the entry is made without violence, and notwithstanding the fact therefore that there was no breach of the peace or exhibition of violence when the plaintiff took possession of the farm, the occurrence at the time when the defendant was stopped by the plaintiff and the circumstances of the presence of a considerable number of people, the show of arms, and the expressed determination to prevent the defendant from going on to the premises gave such an appearance of a forcible detainer as might have led a reasonably cautious man to believe that the plaintiff had committed the offense of
The judgment is affirmed.