Cole v. FortoCole v. Forto
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In the case of Ft. Worth Street Railway v. Rosedale Street Railway, 68 Tex. 163, 7 S. W. 381, an order was granted to restrain the defendant only until the hearing, and it was held that the order lapsed and became of no effect at that time; and in the case of Riggins v. Thompson, 96 Tex. 154, 71 S. W. 14, where the case was set down ror a hearing on a certain day, and the defendants cited to show cause why a permanent injunction should not be granted, and the clerk ordered to issue “a restraining order to defendants pending such hearing,” it was held: “We therefore conclude that the injunction in this case was intended to operate for a fixed period only, and that it comes within the principle acted upon in the case of Ft. Worth Street Railway v. Rosedale Street Railway Company, above cited.” That is, that the order is the same as an order stating in terms that the restraining order should not continue longer than the day set for the hearing as to a permanent injunction. It was said in the Riggins-Thompson Case: “The clerk was required to issue a restrain *352 ing order ‘pending such hearing.’ We think this means the same as if the words had been ‘until and pending such hearing,’ and that the intention was to limit the operation of the order until such time as the parties could be heard upon the issue, whether under the allegations in petition and answer, should one be filed, an injunction, to remain in force until the final disposition of thé case, should be granted. This construction is also indicated by the words employed in the fiat. It is true that a ‘restraining order’ is an injunction, as distinguished from an injunction which is to remain in force during the pendency of the suit.”
In this case the trial judge used the words “temporary restraining order” to be in effect “pending the hearing hereof as above directed,” and “above” it had been directed that the matter of injunction be set down for hearing “at Alice, Tex., on Wednesday, February 5, Á. D. 1913, at 9:30 o’clock a. m.” It comes directly within the purview of the decision in Riggins v. Thompson, and it follows that the temporary restraining order expired on the date mentioned, whether any action was had by the trial judge at that time or not.
It has been held that courts will not interfere by injunction to prevent the collection of taxes because of irregularities in the assessment. Cooley, Taxation, p. 1440; Dutton v. Bank, 53 Kan. 440, 36 Pac. 719; Davis v. Railroad Co., 114 Ind. 364, 16 N. E. 639.
The restraining order is set aside, and the cause remanded.