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Cole v. BOARD OF ADJ. OF CITY OF HURON
616 N.W.2d 483
S.D.
2000
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*1 disputes Order, on visitation as set settled law Court previous comply [with] the trial court’s Accordingly, previ- forth above. hereby vacates now the Court of the visitation schedule and now enters modification order visitation ous par- requires and the matter visi- schedule should be reversed visitation Guide- appropriate the First Circuit consider- to follow tation remanded ties attached are lines, which copy [of] in the children’s best ation of schedule incorporat- reference and hereto interests.3

ed herein. AMUNDSON, Justice, joins this divide the parties shall That the 3. 2. dissent as Issue equally. visitation summer may choose whether That [father]

4. a con- to be for the visitation

he wants in two of time or divided period

secutive guide- pursuant time blocks of 2000 SD 119 notify [mother] must [Father] lines. COLE, Petitioner Chris W. to the summer year as May 1 of each Appellee, arrangements. visitation visitation shall weekend 5. [Father’s] v. desire [mother’s] with

be coordinated OF BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT at the same together the children have (the City commis- CITY OF HURON present. step daughter time as her Defendant, thereas), acting sion alter- be on an visitation shall Weekend at the times set weekend schedule native guidelines. forth with Stores, Inc., Intervenor General Appellant. and conclusions findings These court modi- that the trial clearly establish No. 21210. punish- as visitation schedule fied father’s Dakota. of South Supreme Court prior with compliance lack of ment for his orders, arrangement as an visitation April on Briefs Considered perti- interests. The children’s best 11, 2000. Reassigned July reflect no findings and conclusions nent 30, 2000. Aug. Decided children’s whatsoever of the consideration interests, prior only father’s violation on infringement and his

visitation orders clearly This violates interests.

mother’s record, ignore trial and we and conclusions ably majority reviews 3. While the Here, the pronouncements). where father trial describing various instances oral court's rights, it visitation mother’s single finding failed honor findings support its conclusions fail court's conclusion identifies not a establishing find- the trial court’s judgment. While the trial court’s consideration accurately might detail ings and conclusions regard best interests the children’s require- visitation of certain father’s violation ments, that it is not the It fundamental visitation. com- contain the essential fail to through a cold to sift function of this court children’s best ponent of consideration support pick and choose evidence record Thus, re- should be this matter interests. party position or the other. ive of one may so that visitation and remanded versed Rather, findings court's we examine the trial chil- from the appropriately be considered they support its whether of fact to ascertain solely on the point and not of view dren’s judgment or of law and ultimate conclusions viola- Father’s the actions of father. basis of M.H., v. determination. See E.H. statutorily rights is tion of mother’s visitation (S.D. sup 1994)(findings of fact must 25-4A) (See ch. contempt SDCL punishable as judgment). See port of law and conclusions summarily with a met and should not Peterson, 2000 SD v. also State ex rel. Steffen rights own visitation in his reduction (Supreme best interests. might the children’s findings not be in limited to written Court’s review is *2 Gary

Todd D. Wilkinson and W. Schu- Wilkinson, DeSmet, macher, Wilkinson & Dakota, Attorneys petitioner South appellee. Burns, Freeman, and Jeff we held that the circuit court failed to use

Rodney Jr. Manolis, Freeman, Churchill, & the proper Kludt standard of review. The case Dakota, Shelton, Huron, Attorneys Cole, South reversed and remanded. See appellant. for intervenor 1999 SD 592 N.W.2d 175. *3 remand, again [¶ On the circuit court 6.] (on GILBERTSON, reassign- Justice reversed the Board’s decision. It conclud-

ment). ed that the of the variance was Adjustment The Huron Board of [¶ 1.] “illegal juris- and in excess of Board’s] [the (Board) Casey’s granted a variance Gen- diction” any because “failed to make Stores, Inc, Floyd Peterson and An- eral finding ‘that there exists conditions Cole, an thony (Casey’s). Chris W. Stahl depriva- which constitute an unreasonable ” owner, granted a adjoining property tion of The circuit use.’ court concluded circuit court. The by writ of certiorari “granting the variance was Casey’s appeals. circuit court reversed and merely privilege, which is clear- We reverse. ly prohibited by City’s Zoning Ordi- nances.” AND FACTS PROCEDURE Casey’s appeals, raising the follow- [¶ 7.] appeal This is the second these [¶ 2.] ing issue: underlying this parties. The basic facts Whether the circuit court exceeded its Adj., in v. Bd. appeal are recited Cole jurisdiction reviewing in Huron, 54, 592 1999 SD N.W.2d de decision novo. necessary for resolution of 175. The facts appeal this follow. OF REVIEW STANDARD 1997, 25, Casey’s On November

[¶ 3.] a variance for three lots on a applied for Zoning interpret ordinances are highway in Huron. Two busy corner of a according statutory ed to the rules of by of the lots were vacant and owned any construction and rules of construc lot, The third with a house Peterson.1 in tion included the ordinances them thereon, situated was owned Stahl. The of an interpretation selves. ordi permis- application, requested question presents nance of law which gas to construct a station and conve- sion interpreting we review de novo. When properties. nience store on the ordinance, an we must assume that the request The was met with ordi legislative body meant what public hearing and a was held opposition says give its words and nance 12, 15, January on December 1997. On phrases plain meaning and effect. 1998, the Board the variance presented to Because this matter was 14, 1998, Casey’s. January Cole filed On certiorari, scope trial court our on appealed for writ certiorari questions review is limited decision circuit court. Board’s officers, courts, inferior whether boards, jurisdiction had The circuit court reversed the and tribunals regularly pur- they action of and whether have Board’s decision “[t]he authority upon them. Casey’s a variance was sued the conferred courts, officers, boards, or compliance City’s in not done ‘When such jurisdiction over the sub- Casey’s appealed and tribunals have ordinances.” property presented public county from a citizen 1. Evidence was at the hear- obtained recovery delinquent "Murphy” for property was used as a named that the vacant county for 27 public skating The taxes. The owned rink from 1927 to 1997. 1997, when, at a Department years June of sold it Parks & Recreation maintained Peterson, only who was the property through years, even when auction to those private persons property. owned the bidder. ject party, matter and of the their action decision as illegal and in excess of its will be pro- jurisdiction.”); sustained unless in their Willard v. Civil Service ceedings did Falls, some act 297, 298, Board Sioux 75 S.D. forbidden law neglected required to do some act N.W.2d (noting that review by laiv.’ of a circuit court’s proceedings on certiora- ri extends a determination of Cole, 54, 4, 1999 SD 592 N.W.2d at 176 whether jurisdic- the board acted without (quoting Spearfish Peters v. ETJ Plan- jurisdiction); tion or ¶¶ exceeded its Kirby v. Comm’n, ning 5-6, Court, Circuit McCook County, 10 (internal S.D. citations omit- 40-1, 71 N.W. ted)) (stating (emphasis original). “the questions to be considered *4 court a [on writ of certiorari] are whether ANALYSIS AND DECISION court, the upon it, the record before ex- Casey’s argues [¶8.] that the circuit jurisdiction, ceeded its or whether that court in examining erred the merits of the court has regularly failed to pursue the variance, Board’s decision to grant the in- court.”). authority of such stead of restricting its review to whether or not According City acted in of Huron excess its Ordi- jurisdiction. Thus, 23.04.028, nance a applicant contends variance that must court, prove by a preponderance the circuit “in findings of fact of the that conclusions the variance usurped contrary of law has is not the authori- to the ty public interest, and discretion of the and that if Board ... the variance is granted, analyzing and there replacing special the exists Board’s find- conditions ings unwarranted, which [with own.” constitute an its] or un- hardship, reasonable which “constitutes an 21-31-1,2 [¶ 9.] Pursuant to SDCL deprivation unreasonable of use as distin- question presented on certiorari guished from grant the mere privi- of a “is whether the lower tribunal exceeded its lege.” jurisdiction.” I, 54, 10, Cole 1999 SD N.W.2d at 177. Hamerly See also City v. [¶ 11.] Instead of reviewing wheth ¶43, Lennox Bd. Adj., er the Board jurisdiction exceeded its in of of (stating that “the granting variance, the circuit court circuit court ... should its judg merits, [limit] tried the case on analyzing ment to a reversal of the Board’s final City Huron Ordinance 23.04.0283 and con- provides: 2. SDCL 21-31-1 ib) any hearing In concerning requested variance, A may writ of granted by applicant certiorari be carries the burden Courts, Supreme and circuit when proving inferior of request complies courts, officers, boards, or tribunals have necessary findings and that the jurisdiction, exceeded their and there is no of a keeping variance is in spirit with the nor, appeal writ of error or judgment in the chapter. intent of this court, any plain, speedy, other (c) variance, a the board of ad- adequate remedy. justment prescribe any shall conditions and safeguards that it necessary deems to be Huron Ordinance 23.04.028 entitled - Fact,” desirable. may granted Such variance Findings "Variance provides: upon finding (a) that there exists an unwar- A may to the strict hardship, ranted which application constitutes an un- chapter of this as will not be interest, deprivation contrary where, reasonable of use as distin- ow- conditions, guished special from the privilege. a mere literal a enforce- provisions ment of the adjustment title The board may will result find that in hardship, unwarranted which constitutes some or following all of the conditions ex- deprivation an unreasonable of use as dis- ist: tinguished from privi- the mere of a plight applicant is due to lege, spirit and so that the of the title shall unique property; circumstances of their be observed justice and substantial done. circuit in sup- judgment [¶ 13.] The court’s there was no evidence eluding that eight findings fact and this ease stated porting law, cir- the variance. The justify eight conclusions of and reversed the condition opinion far to state in its cuit court went as decision such upon findings Board’s based “merely grant[ed] Ca- Board had that the After an examination of conclusions. - determining privilege,” instead sey’s fact and of law findings conclusions unrea- an unwarranted or court, the existence of by the circuit we entered reach but hardship. sonable [circuit] one conclusion—that “the court in petition effect tried the de novo I: This stated Cole Court upon made its own determinations Findings from the quite It is clear petition merits of the there- of Law and Fact and Conclusions by substituting its discretion for that of opinion, the memorandum incorporated Zoning App. the Board.” See Board v. utilize the correct trial court did not Bank, American Fletcher Nat. 139 Ind. review for writ of certiora- standard of (1965). App. 205 N.E.2d the record ri. The trial court reviewed ilarly, Board’s We ing....” status of the to examine evidence de supporting cial condition to conclusion determining novo, have here, the circuit court reviewed the ¶54, 11, 592 N.W.2d at 177. Sim- record de at said, taking Willard, the correctness of “certiorari cannot be used (emphasis there was no evidence into consideration the justify the variance. novo, finding in 75 S.D. at for the finding added). drawing purpose a find- *5 spe- variance will be three N.W.2d 312 17(3) visions of the ordinance will result interest, unnecessary hardship and ditions, spirit [1] will 14.] In to decide this part substantial of the ordinance shall be a literal enforcement of the [2] test contained not (S.D.1980) where, owing granted be justice Madison v. contrary type where done. we of an issue. A to [3] to SDCL 11-4- applied it: Clarke, so that the the observed public pro con in The circuit court’s memoran- opinion that one of Id. at 313. “[n]ot memorandum opinion incorporated findings into its Adjustment’s findings sup- the dum Board of ports a conclusion of law that Casey’s has conceded criteria [1] in favor of noted, tran- limited of the proof prove by “[a] a as review met burden it[s] proceedings show there script the second below preponderance of evidence that sup- would for was evidence submitted which prong City of Huron’s test the a effect that this port findings [sic] been the granting a variance has public the against variance would not be met....” (2) integrity comprehensive applicant plight of the is not due to The plan; the neighborhood or conditions of the circumstances zone; (7) this variance will not be The (3) unique render The circumstances which neighborhood injurious or other- to the property incapable being used in health, public wise detrimental chapter compliance with this have welfare; safety or by any created actions of been caused or variance, (8) compliance an area That for applicant; chapter application of this the strict with (4) requested The variance is the minimum setbacks, area, frontage, governing side- necessary the rea- variance which is for density yards, height, will unrea- bulk or property; sonable use of the prevent using sonably the owner from (5) requested can be The variance purpose; property permitted applicant justice to the as with substantial the land in for a use That area; property well as other owners in the yield return question cannot a reasonable will That the of this variance purpose allowed in if used for harmony general purpose with the zone. chapter while maintain- and intent interest.” As far as criteria [2] the circuit In making a determination of the merits, the circuit court hardship usurped court conceded a claim of can be the- Board’s exper administrative function and made as has been vacant for in dealing tise problems of the many years and was lost for taxes to the community of Huron. See Falvo v. Ker that, county.4 Beyond when it was offered ner, 222 A.D. 225 N.Y.S. by the county public, for sale Peter- (1927) (stating that “[t]he determination of son was the sole bidder. function, the board was an administrative [¶ 15.] While the Court tried to seize on which should not be by interfered with “may” unnecessary isolated word cause proof courts the absence of hardship, the fact is that proper- while this board had abused the discretion with ty residential, was zoned it was of so little by which it was clothed the ordinance cre previous private value that the owner it.”); Fletcher, ating American 205 N.E.2d effect donated it to the in lieu of (noting at 324 “it must recognized by retaining ownership paying taxes the trial court that the Board is an admin certainly provide thereon. These facts body especially expertise istrative in the evidentiary support justify needed zoning problems particular jurisdic of its tion”). Board’s actions under the scope limited

review for concerning certiorari criteria Board has wide dis [2], Finally [3], as to criteria made in deciding cretion whether or not to grant which supported by the evi- ordinance, a variance a zoning and in dence and not overturned the circuit decision, reviewing that the circuit court court: may not substitute its for that discretion the Board. Id. scope This limitation on That Highway North part is that prevents review “courts from usurping pol of Huron affected the vari- *6 icy decisions from other gov branches of application currently ance a state ernment.” Bell v. Township Bass Riv highway presently subject and of to exten- er, 304, N.J.Super. 208, 196 482 A.2d 212 sive commercial traffic and the (Ct.Law Div.1984). Thus, courts must not of the said variance should not substan- review the a petition merits of or evidence noise, tially congestion, increase or oth- in the absence a showing of that the Board erwise disrupt neighborhood. “acted fraudulently arbitrary or or will The further found that grant- “[t]he ful disregard undisputed indisputa and ing of a variance for a convenience store Cole, 54, ble proof.” ¶10, 1999 SD harmony will inbe with general pur- Willard, N.W.2d at 177 (citing at S.D. pose ordinances, and intent of the 801). 63 N.W.2d at This is the stan while maintaining integrity of the com- dard of review which should have been prehensive plan.” utilized the circuit court upon its review 4. The circuit court stated: is contrasted and conflicted (8). by Finding number The evidence (9) Finding prop- number states that the Finding also confirms number that the erty many years has been vacant for purchased current owners never intend- acquired delinquent for taxes. The ing it to be marketed as a residential Hearing ultimate Officer finds that [sic] property. this subordinate fact "evidences a lack of was, Here the circuit court conceded there marketability of those lots for residential minimum, at a a conflict in the evidence. development, therefore use of such land improperly proceeded It then to resolve this purpose for some commercial may be by conducting conflict a de necessary novo review. If for the reasonable use of the question property." properly jurisdiction, [emphasis original]. one of A re- view then a purpose of the record for the conflict the evidence limited itself testing legality proceedings, required establishes there was the shows that support support there is evidence the Board's determination to (9). Finding that impact [number] a variance. ¶43, 14, Instead, Adj., the circuit Casey’s petition. Furthermore, cannot “certiorari the Board’s replaced analyzed court purpose for the own, used to examine evidence substituting judg- findings with its determining the correctness of a find determining Board in ment for that fraud, ing, at least in the absence of adequate to be facts were whether undisput arbitrary disregard willful and hardship. an unwarranted as classified indisputable proof ed and wherein credibil despite improperly did so The circuit court involved.” ity of witnesses is not Willard of the find- careful review declaring “[a] Falls, v. Service Bd. Sioux 75 S.D. Civil there indicate Board] ings [of (quoting State disputed facts.” many were Minne Grey ex rel. v. Circuit Court of and remand to We reverse 18.] [¶ County, haha 58 S.D. 235 N.W. proceedings court for further circuit (1931)). of re- proper standard application view. This record reflects that the cir [¶ 24.] court, Willard, limited its per properly

cuit Justice, MILLER, Chief legality of the variance review to the KONENKAMP, compli AMUNDSON Board’s Justices, 11-4-17(3). ultimately concur. It ance with SDCL illegally the variance was concluded SABERS, Justice, dissents. 20.]

[¶ there was no “existence granted because un conditions which constitute an SABERS, (dissenting). Justice ” hardship.... or unreasonable warranted AP- 1. THE CIRCUIT COURT rationale, In its the circuit court examined STANDARD PLIED THE PROPER finding of fact number 9 which IN DETERMINING REVIEW OF that the vacant lots “evidences provides OF THAT THE BOARD’S GRANT marketability of those lots resi lack of THE VARIANCE WAS ILLEGAL. of such development; dential therefore use majority opin- disagree I with the 22.] purpose may be land for some commercial court the circuit ion’s determination necessary for the reasonable use of novo, the Board’s record de reviewed added). The Board property.” (emphasis for that substituting its discretion “thereby determined that refusal also *7 of the Board.” proper for commercial use of the substantially impair appropri its appeal, ty in “could prior we stated 23.] As [¶ and the land “can development” or on certiorari ate use only question presented “the return if used yield not a reasonable tribunal exceeded its whether the lower is allowed in that zone.” purpose for a Adj., v. Bd. jurisdiction.” Cole of of necessity Huron, 54, 10, findings fail to establish These 592 N.W.2d omitted). (citations Thus, possibility, which is merely provide for the circuit 176 unnecessary satisfy the insufficient “confined to a review of review is court’s 11—4— set forth under SDCL zoning hardship test municipality’s of the legality correctly deter- 17.5 The circuit court City Lennox Bd. Hamerly v. decision.” of 5. A determines justice done. the ordinance hardship, and [1] est, a literal enforcement ordinance variance can be [2] will not be where, owing that it: shall be observed [3] will result contrary granted only if the Board so that the of the provisions spirit of the unnecessary conditions, substantial inter of nance 23.04.028 test). by majority opinion, is whether there was exceeded its SDCL gally granted the variance to ance to cuit court did decision, Issue of 11-4-17(3). 2 Casey’s. I no also jurisdiction not err in showing conclude that case, In (adopting See also Huron determining which was that the reviewing the Board’s this because Casey’s the Board ille- strict not reached three-prong City Ordi- applica- the cir- a vari- Board 490

mined that this conflicts with application” Ca- of the ordinance to appli sey’s purchased admission unnecessary cant would cause hardship. without intending to market as We previously have “unnecessary defined property.6 residential hardship” require a hardship that force, “substantial and compelling of The circuit court and this court 25.] merely for reasons of convenience prof evidence, must look at the as well as the Clarke, it.” City Madison v. 288 thereof, sufficiency to ascertain whether (S.D.1980) 314 (citing Deardorf jurisdiction. exceeded See Bd. Adj. Planning Zoning Adj. Graziano v. Bd. Des v. Comm’n, (Iowa Moines, 1982) (re- 254 Iowa 323 N.W.2d 118 N.W.2d (1962)). More viewing specifically, unnecessary certiorari action and reversing variance). hardship the board’s demonstrated when: Al- though the circuit court does not deter- (1) the land in question cannot yield a mine the of a finding,” “correctness reasonable return if used for a circuit court and this court must analyze purpose zone; allowed a finding” “correctness of when ascer- plight of the owner is due to taining whether the Board acted with unique circumstances and not to the “willful or arbitrary disregard of undisput- general neighbor- conditions in the Willard, ed indisputable proof.” may hood which reflect the unrea- N.W.2d at precisely 801. This is what the sonableness of the ordinance circuit court did here. itself; and Accordingly, an there is insuffi- showing cient to support the claim that the use to be authorized the vari- circuit court used the wrong standard of ance will not alter the essential char- fact, review. the circuit court ex- acter locality. of the pressed and complied with the proper (citations Deardorf, 118 N.W.2d at 81 omit- Willard, standard of review citing ted) added).7 (emphasis The burden was N.W.2d at 801. Hamerly, See also on the applicant to show all three ele- ¶43, 14, SD 578 N.W.2d at 569 (stating ments. Greenawalt v. Zoning Bd. Adj. that the circuit court’s review is “confined City Davenport, to a review legality municipal- (1984). “A failure to demonstrate one of decision.”). ity’s zoning Therefore, the cir- requires them deny [B]oard to cuit court applied the correct standard of (citations application.” omitted). Id. review in determining whether the vari- ance in compliance with A. Reasonable Return SDCL 11-4-17 and the ordinances City of Huron. was required prove

[¶ 27.] Because the circuit court’s review that question land in yield cannot *8 proper, was the second issue must also be reasonable return only if used pur- for a addressed. pose allowed in that zone. “An ordinance deprives a landowner of a reasonable re- 2. THE 28.] BOARD EXCEEDED ITS turn if all ‘productive use the land’ is IN JURISDICTION A GRANTING (citation omitted). denied.” Id. To show a VARIANCE TO CASEY’S. deprivation “productive of all use of the indicated, As land,”

[¶ 29.] the may Board applicant the must show that the grant a if it variance finds that “strict property has changed and the “uses for

tion of the Casey’s ordinance to would cause 7. This incorporated standard is also into Hu- unnecessary hardship. ron Ordinance 23.04.028. 2, infra, analysis See Issue why for an the Board's illegal. of this variance was granting proper- of the variance where the longer are no originally zoned is was which (1) However, subject multiple listing, granting ty the the Id. feasible.” (2) comparatively the to similar struc- upheld priced when will not be (3) tures, people value of the to 41 with no offers is that the shown presented evidence home, “depreciated single-family has purchase land been to as applicant’s a variance or that it would zoning regulations, presented evidence was that the prof- more him to maintain a permit impractical” would to maintain “difficult omitted). (citation Id. single-family itable use.” as a home in property zoning regulations). accordance with the Board, Here, granting county, bought The fact that the fact that the va- found that the indisputa- at a tax sale is not property for county acquired lots were cant property ble evidence that the is not mar- lack of mar- taxes “evidences a delinquent today. purposes ketable for residential for de- ketability of those lots residential showing at a should attempt Some better indicated, con- velopment.” As have been offered. use of the the commercial cluded “may necessary for reason- land addressing the reasonable re- It also deter- property.” able use property, turn of one court determined a variance mined that a refusal nor depreciated that neither value financial property “could commercial use of in a appropriate loss is an indicator vari- or impair appropriate use substantially case: ance yield a land “cannot development” appear It does not from record pur- for a if used reasonable return subject unfit for a conform- area is zone.” Neither of allowed in that pose use, may not although such use be as are sufficient to estab- the italicized words lots as as inviting and the desirable necessity. lish lots in the use district. some other However, is depreciated sole consideration value does [¶ 32.] “[T]he such capable land or is peculiar whether the structure fall the class of within in a reasonable manner which being necessary used circumstances exceptional applicable zoning consistent with the of á use variance. sustain the Zoning AmJur2d provisions.” so, property desiring owners If other (1992). § A review of the Planning at a a use zone property sell their offered no record discloses nonconforming purposes premium for variances, that the construction evidence show use frequently seek would not feasible. single-family residences was destroy tend to of which would that if the they present Nor evidence did system the whole greatly impair single-family were used to construct land zoning.

residences, return would be unreason- Zoning Adj., 571 So.2d v. Bd. Brock deprived of a or that would be able (citation (Ala.Civ.App.1990) land. Zimmer- productive use of the See omitted). Furthermore, O’Meara, 1140, 245 N.W. 215 Iowa man v. is “entitled use” of “best nothing (stating “[t]here Bd. in a variance case.” weight or no little an unneces- to indicate that in the record Dauphin Upham Joint Zoning Adj. v. of Venture, if imposed” applicant will be sary hardship (Ala.Civ.App. 688 So.2d variance). was denied omitted). 1996) (citations applicant’s improper also an *9 Further, situation is show own economic Casey’s failed to

[¶33.] unnecessary hard establishing basis for person be to a that the lots could not sold Madison, at 314 ship. City property the conform- who would use of disadvantages (stating “[economic that requirements. See zoning ance with the ‘unnecessary hard Levine, ... do not constitute 147 A.D.2d Sheeley v. ”). ship.’ (upholding the N.Y.S.2d Here, sup- evidence not That Highway part

[¶ 35.] the does North is that Casey’s City would en- the port by conclusion Huron affected the vari- currently “a beneficial use application dure loss of all of the ance is [and] subject if the variance was denied. property” highway presently The state to any establishing extensive traffic record void of commercial and the the variance not any reasons the cannot be used said should noise, substantially the zoning congestion, accordance with ordinances. increase or adequate disrupt neighborhood[,] does the make find- otherwise the Board Nor to ings support example, the same. For and that the Board made find- also several Board the found that the Administra- ings referring health, “public safety to or had stated operation tor the of a example, welfare.” For the found Board would an “inap- convenience store not be that: propriate” use of the land. This finding The granting bring of a variance will support affords little to the determination to changes neighborhood, the but these unnecessary hardship. necessarily will not changes injurious be public or otherwise to detrimental the case, In a Appeal similar In re health, safety or welfare. McClure, 415 Pa. 203 A.2d (1964), a was to variance construct findings merely The support above in an single-family bank area zoned for determination that the Board to attempted concluded, residences. The board on two accomplish rezoning by vari- granting a occasions, that the land was not suitable stated, ance Casey’s. As zoning laws for residential In reversing use. health, are designed promote “public board, the court McClure determined: safety and welfare.” See SDCL 11-6-2. This is not the used standard to determine Such the land not suit- [that fact, whether a variance. be- for able residential does not ... use] cause variances underlying circumvent the command the even if ordinances, purpose zoning should thereby interest would not be granted sparingly only be when adversely rule, general affected. As a if shown application the strict land, matter, as a practical cannot zoning ordinances results in an unneces- purposes, be utilized residential then sary hardship. the land be should an appeal rezoned legislative body.

to the rezoning Such The findings sup- above further cannot accomplished port and must not be a determination that the Board’s deci- guise under the of a variance. sion satisfy did not prong second unnecessary hardship test: “the plight of added). Id. at 537 (emphasis See also unique is due to owner circumstances Graziano, 323 N.W.2d at 237 (stating general not conditions in the board alter zoning “[t]he cannot ordi- neighborhood which may the unrea- reflect by granting nances variances.... zoning sonableness ordinance it- power to change zoning restrictions added). (emphasis Clearly, self” zoning belongs commission prong findings was not satisfied as these council.”).8 city A variance can reflect that the Board determined that the pretense used as a to change modify a zoning place ordinance in was unreason- ordinance; zoning governing body able due to the location Highway 37 and power has the to do that. Madi- the growth city. Again, son, 288 N.W.2d 314. at accomplish through can not what majority points 37.] The opinion out can accomplished mod- properly that the Board ifying found: ordinances. application prior withdrew their change applying for zon- for a variance. *10 lished, jurisdiction the Board exceeded its appears obvious 39.] It Huron) (and and we should affirm. bite should to petition and rezone bullet to shortcut attempt

rather than to by variance. See

proper proceedings Bd. Pennington County v.

Schrank 62, Comm’r, (pro- N.W.2d 90 County’s to that the amendment

viding a conditional zoning ordinances rendered 2000 SD 123 to be previously determined permit, use Chong SHYKES, C. Claimant valid). be granted, to As stated illegally Appellant, and Schrank, community a the decision of how “ zoned or ‘rests with is to be rezoned v. ” body.’ (quoting Id. legislative local INN, RAPID CITY HILTON 411, Falls, v. Sioux 82 S.D. Tillo Employer Appellee, and (1966) (other 415, 147 N.W.2d and omitted)). citation Co., Traveler’s Insurance Insurer presented In light Appellee, and Board, Casey’s attempted to accom- could plish, through what in the by a accomplished modification Systems, Inc., Packaging Custom zoning ordinances. Because Employer Appellee, public designed promote are laws welfare,

health, safety power grant spar- a variance should be exercised Co., Traveler’s Insurance Insurer ingly and accordance with Appellee. Therefore, personal welfare. “conditions Nos. 21109. land-owner are not relevant granted.” whether a variance should be Supreme Court of South Dakota. Louis S.W.2d County, Hutchens v. St. (Mo.Ct.App.1993). other on 2000. Considered Briefs Feb. words, a variance should Decided Sept. permit such a simply because would profit to obtain a from greater the owner of the property.

the sale or use bears applicant An for a variance unneces- great proving burden hardship will if the variance is

sary result establish, Casey’s failed before

denied. Board, all deprived that would be if the variance

productive use of land Therefore, granted.

was not yield that the land could not

conclusion pur- if for the

reasonable return used allowed,

pose is error and renders illegal. of the variance unneces- showing no of an

[¶ 42.] Since hardship attempted or estab-

sary

Case Details

Case Name: Cole v. BOARD OF ADJ. OF CITY OF HURON
Court Name: South Dakota Supreme Court
Date Published: Aug 30, 2000
Citation: 616 N.W.2d 483
Docket Number: 21210
Court Abbreviation: S.D.
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