14 A. 73 | N.H. | 1887
Lead Opinion
The ante-nuptial contract in this case was a marriage settlement, complete in itself. It was created by deed duly executed by the parties before marriage. The trusts manifested by the deed are what in equity are deemed executed trusts Equity regards a trust as executed, in distinction from executory, when the settlor has given complete directions for settling his estate, with perfect limitations. In this case there is nothing in the deed indicating any further act to be done by the parties. The contract was made in consideration of marriage, which, in contemplation of law, is not only a valuable consideration to support a marriage settlement, but one of the highest value. Such settlements, when reasonable and fairly made, are upheld from motives of the soundest policy. Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348, 393. This contract was not an unreasonable one. The husband released his right, under the law as it then stood, to reduce to possession the wife's personal estate, and his rights as tenant, by the curtesy in her real estate, although he remained liable for her debts and support. The wife, by the agreement, retained the control and use of her estate, real and personal, for life; and the control and use of the same by her parents for life, in case they should survive her, remainder to her children, if any, otherwise to her husband and his heirs. Non constat that Sargent would have married her unless she had executed the contract. It does not appear that her estate was not enjoyed by her during her married life and afterwards, until her decease, according to the terms of the settlement.
The practical construction put upon the contract by the parties was, that it was a full and complete settlement of the estate of the wife. All and every portion of her estate were definitely settled by the deed in respect to the amount of the interest, and the particular persons who were to take. The limitations leave no part undisposed of. The estates for life and in remainder in the property are limited with the formality required to enable a court of equity to carry the trusts into execution according to the intent of the settlors. If a third person had been interposed as trustee of the estate with the limitations contained in this deed, the settlement would not have been more final or complete, and the same effect would have been given to it. No third person having been constituted trustee, each party is regarded as holding his estate as trustee for the uses of the settlement, so far as may be necessary to carry out the intention of the parties. Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196, 212.
We are without any brief or suggestion from the defendants of the grounds upon which they resist the execution of this trust. If it is contended that the children of Sargent by a former marriage are not within the influence of the consideration for the contract, the answer is, — The parties agreed that the estate of Mrs. Sargent, in the contingency named, should descend to her husband "and his heirs." His heirs are his children by the previous marriage. *451
Whether the word "heirs" is construed to be a word of limitation, or of purchase, the result is the same. If it is a word of limitation, Sargent took a remainder in fee contingent upon the death of Mrs. Sargent without children, and he having died before his wife, the plaintiffs, as his heirs and claiming through him, are entitled to the performance of the contract. If it is a word of purchase, they take as the persons denoted by the instrument for that purpose. In Batchelder v. Lake,
By a marriage settlement the title to the property is changed, and the property to some extent becomes inalienable for a time. The husband and wife, parties to such a settlement, are deemed purchasers in the highest sense and the party in whose favor the settlement is, becomes, in a certain sense, the creditor of the other. Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348, 394, 395.
If from the circumstances under which marriage articles are entered into, or if, from the face of the instrument itself, it appears to have been intended that collateral relatives in a given event should take the estate, and a proper limitation to that effect is contained in them, equity will enforce the trust for their benefit. Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196, 210. The plaintiffs being children of Mr. Sargent by a previous marriage Mrs. Sargent may be presumed to have become interested in their welfare. We think she had them in mind in the use of the word "heirs." They are not, therefore, volunteers, but come within the influence of the consideration of marriage upon which the deed was founded. It has been held that the consideration of marriage, in a marriage settlement, extends to step-children by a former marriage. Jenkins v. Keymis, 1 Ch. Cas. 103 — S.C., 1 Lev. 152; Sch. H. W., s. 349.
Neves v. Scott, 9 How. 196 — S.C., 13 How. 268 — is a case much in point; — see, also, 2 Story Eq. Jur., ss. 983, 1380; 2 Kent Com. 162, 163; Bradish v. Gibbs, 3 Johns. Ch. 523, 540; 1 Perry Trusts, s. 359; Sch. H. W., ss. 348-369; Jervoise v. The Duke of Northumberland, 1 Jac. W. 559; Magniac v. Thompson, 7 Pet. 348.
The plaintiffs, being the beneficial owners and vested with the equitable title, are entitled to a decree against any one standing in the relation of trustee to the estate, to vest the legal title in them; or if the estate has been converted into money, that the proceeds be paid to them. The executor of Mrs. Sargent's will should be made a party to the bill. Application for that purpose can be made at the trial term.
Case discharged.
BINGHAM, J., did not sit: the others concurred. *452
The foregoing opinion was delivered at the December term, 1885 The defendants moved for a rehearing, and the case was amended so as to show that Mrs. Sargent, after the execution of the marriage settlement, acquired property, both real and personal, in addition to what she had at the date of the instrument. A portion of the property thus acquired was derived from the income of the real estate referred to in the instrument.
Addendum
The defendants contend that the parties to the marriage settlement did not intend Sargent should take under it unless he survived his wife; and Moorhouse v. Wainhouse, 1 W. Bl. 637 is cited in support of this position. That case is stated as it appeared from the pleadings, the language of the deed in question not being given. It is difficult, from the meagre report of the case, to see upon what evidence the decision was made. In this case there is nothing in the language of the marriage settlement to indicate that the contingency upon which the estate in remainder was to vest in Sargent depended upon his surviving his wife. If the parties intended that he should take nothing except in that event, we should expect to find their intention so expressed in apt words in the written instrument, and not left to be inferred. The failure or omission to insert such language is evidence from which the contrary intent may be inferred. We fail to see any evidence in the written agreement, or in the circumstances of the parties, that their intention was what the defendants claim it to have been.
It is also contended that the remainder settled upon the husband was contingent and not vested. It is the present right of future enjoyment whenever the possession becomes vacant, and *458
not the certainty that the possession will become vacant before the estate limited in remainder determines, which distinguishes a vested from a contingent remainder. Kennard v. Kennard,
The case has been amended so as to show that Mrs. Sargent acquired property after the ante-nuptial agreement was entered into, a portion of the property so acquired being derived from the income of the real estate of which she was seized at the time of her marriage. A question is thus presented, whether the after acquired property is covered by the agreement. The marriage settlement was made, and the marriage took place, before the statutes of 1846 and 1860 in relation to the rights and property of married women were enacted. See Laws of 1846, c. 327, and 1860, c. 2,342. Sargent by the marriage settlement agreed that he would not intermeddle with, claim, or demand any part of his wife's estate during her life, or the lifetime of her parents, but would permit her to hold, manage, and control the same as if the marriage had not taken place. He thereby released his right to reduce to possession her personal estate and his rights as tenant by the curtesy in her real estate. Suppose after the marriage Mrs. Sargent had received a legacy or gift: can there be any doubt that under this ante-nuptial contract she would have been entitled to the possession, control, and benefit of it during her natural life? And suppose her husband under his right at common law had undertaken to reduce it to possession: can there be any doubt it would have been held that he could not interfere with her possession and control of it, upon the ground that the contract gave her the right to it during her life? Or, suppose Mrs. Sargent had at her marriage a promissory note, or a farm: would not the contract cover the interest upon the note, or the income of the farm, as incident to the principal and to the farm? These examples make it clearly to appear, we think, that the after acquired property is included in the marriage settlement. By it she retained the control and management of "the whole of her property, both real and personal, during her natural life." The language is broad enough to include the after acquired property. No reason appears why she should desire to retain the possession and benefit to herself, parents, and children, of the property she possessed at the time of her marriage, and should leave her after acquired *459 personalty to fall into the possession of her husband to become his absolute property, and her after acquired realty to become encumbered by his estate by the curtesy.
The decree to which the plaintiffs are entitled should include the after acquired property, as well as that belonging to Mrs. Sargent at the time of her marriage.
Case discharged.
All concurred.