Lead Opinion
Opinion
This is one of two separate appeals
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On March 15, 2000, Coldwell Banker entered into a contract with CSC to serve as its exclusive realtor and to assist in the purchase, lease or exchange of certain real property in East Hartford known as Riverview Square. After CSC viewed the property, it directed Coldwell Banker to proceed with negotiations to lease space at the location. On the basis of its contract with CSC and CSC’s interest in the property, Coldwell Banker entered into discussions with the property owner, who expressed a willingness to lease a substantial amount of space to CSC and to pay Coldwell Banker a commission in accordance with its contract with CSC.
Thereafter, CSC contacted Coldwell Banker and requested a meeting to discuss the contract. The meeting was held on April 13, 2000, and also was attended by Cushman’s agents, Grieco and Kelly. At the meeting, Grieco and Kelly represented to Coldwell Banker that Cushman had a simultaneous contract with CSC as its sole and exclusive real estate broker and, therefore, that Cushman would be entitled to the commission on any transaction involving Riverview Square that Cold-well Banker might be in the process of negotiating. As a result of the meeting, CSC requested and obtained a new contract pursuant to which the three parties agreed that CSC would be allowed to select either Coldwell Banker or Cushman to represent it in the Riverview Square transaction, with the company selected receiving 80 percent of the commission and the other company receiving 20 percent. CSC selected Cushman, and Cushman allegedly received a commission of approximately $500,000 following completion of the transaction, none of which it shared with Coldwell Banker.
On April 26, 2002, Coldwell Banker filed a complaint against Cushman, Grieco and Kelly. Coldwell Banker asserted six claims against each defendant, including fraud, violation of a statutory duty, breach of the duty to deal in good faith, interference with contract, breach of contract and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq. The claims were based on allegations that Cushman, CSC, Grieco and Kelly knowingly had made false representations and statements to Coldwell Banker that CSC had a valid broker contract with Cushman during the time that CSC also had a contract with Coldwell Banker. Coldwell Banker further alleged that it had relied on these representations to its detriment in agreeing to release CSC from its contract and in allowing Cushman to receive the 80 percent commission to which Coldwell Banker was entitled.
On August 14, 2002, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, alternatively, to stay the proceedings pursuant to General Statutes § 52-409
On October 15, 2002, the court, Sheldon, J., granted in part the motion to dismiss and granted the motion to stay Coldwell Banker’s “entire action” pending arbitration of certain of its claims. The court determined that all parties were members of the association
Coldwell Banker did not seek to arbitrate its claims against Cushman immediately but chose instead to commence an action against CSC
On December 8, 2005, more than three years after the trial court, Sheldon, J., stayed Coldwell Banker’s action against Cushman, Grieco and Kelly, Coldwell Banker filed a request for arbitration of the claims
On August 2, 2006, the trial court, Bryant, J., granted the joint motion filed by Cushman, Grieco, Kelly and CSC to consolidate the action against Cushman, Grieco and Kelly with the action against CSC. On December 1, 2006, Coldwell Banker filed motions to lift the stays imposed by the trial court in both actions. Cushman and CSC each filed an application to confirm the alleged arbitration award in their respective cases, and Cushman, Grieco and Kelly filed a motion to dismiss the noncontract claims against Cushman and all of the claims against Grieco and Kelly, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims in light of the arbitration award and the fact that arbitration was the exclusive remedy for settling the parties’ dispute. On April 19, 2007, the trial court, Miller, J., granted the applications to confirm the awards and the motion by Cushman, Grieco and Kelly to dismiss the noncontract claims against Cushman and all of the claims against Grieco and Kelly. The court did not act on Coldwell Banker’s motions to lift the stays.
In its memorandum of decision, the trial court concluded that the grievance committee’s dismissals of Coldwell Banker’s requests for arbitration constituted arbitration awards within the meaning of § 52-417 because the dismissals conclusively determined the matters submitted for arbitration, leaving the arbitrator with nothing more to do. Moreover, Coldwell Banker had not contested the dismissals within thirty days. See General Statutes § 52-420 (b).
I
Coldwell Banker first claims that the trial court improperly concluded that the association’s dismissal of its request for arbitration for untimeliness constituted an arbitration award for purposes of § 52-417. Coldwell Banker specifically claims that the dismissal was not an arbitration award because the association refunded the $500 application fee and rejected the submission without appointing an arbitrator, without collecting evidence and without hearing arguments from the parties. Thus, Coldwell Banker claims that the association never rendered a decision on the merits of its claims. Coldwell Banker also contends that the grievance committee may dismiss a request for arbitration for a variety of reasons that do not preclude a subsequent hearing in court, including that the claim is not subject to arbitration under the association’s bylaws, code of ethics and arbitration manual, is too complex for arbitration or involves too little or too much money. Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the grievance committee’s dismissal of an arbitration request for untimeliness would have any different effect.
Cushman responds that the dismissal constituted an arbitration award because the grievance committee followed the instructions in the arbitration manual before reaching its decision, and, therefore, an arbitration occurred. Cushman asserts that the arbitration procedure outlined in the manual consists of two distinct steps, the first being a determination as to whether a hearing is warranted and the second being a determination of the merits by a hearing panel, and that the second step was not required in this case because the request for arbitration was time barred. Cushman further asserts that, because Coldwell Banker chose not to exercise its right to appeal from the grievance committee’s dismissal, it cannot now object to the award. Cushman contends that, in light of the grievance committee’s determination that the claims were substantively arbitrable but time barred, there is nothing left to litigate. It adds that enforcing time limitations promotes the finality of arbitrable disputes and prevents parties from circumventing their contractual obligations. We agree with Coldwell Banker that the dismissal did not constitute an arbitration award.
The parties do not dispute the underlying facts. Accordingly, whether the trial court properly concluded that the grievance committee’s decision constituted an arbitration award subject to confirmation within the meaning of § 52-417 is a question of law that requires our plenary review. See, e.g., Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
We first turn to the governing legal principles. Arbitration is “[a] process of dispute resolution in which a neutral third party (arbitrator) renders a decision after . . . both parties have an opportunity to be heard.” Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). The decision rendered by the arbitrator upon the controversy
In determining whether the grievance committee’s dismissal of the request for arbitration in this case constituted an award, we are initially guided by article 7 of the association’s bylaws,
Section 42 of the association’s arbitration manual sets forth the procedure for reviewing a request for arbitration. Section 42 specifically provides that the committee shall “consider” eleven factors in reviewing such a request. Among these factors is whether “the request for arbitration [was] filed within [180] days after the closing of the transaction, if any, or within [180] days after the facts constituting the arbitrable matter could have been known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, whichever is later . . . .” Other factors to be considered include whether all necessary parties are named in the request, whether an arbitrable issue exists, whether the issue is “too legally complex,” whether the amount in dispute is “too small or too large ... to arbitrate,” and whether there is a “sufficient number of knowledgeable arbitrators available . . . .” Section 42 then provides in relevant part that, following consideration of these eleven factors, “[i]f ... a majority of the [g]rievance [c]ommittee conclude[s] that the matter is properly arbitrable . . . the [g]rievance [c]ommittee shall send the request for arbitration to the [c]hairperson of the [professional [standards [c]ommittee for arbitration by an arbitration [h]earing [p]anel. . . .” Section
“In the event a request for arbitration is dismissed, any deposit submitted by the complainant shall be returned to the complainant.”
We begin our analysis by noting that, “[e]arly in our judicial history we expressed the view that, since arbitration is designed to prevent litigation, it commands much favor from the law. . . . Especially is it to be encouraged as a means of promoting tranquility and the prompt and equitable settlement of disputes in the field of labor relations. ... It is true, however, that the submission should set forth the questions to be resolved in such a manner as to show clearly what disputes are to be arbitrated.” (Citations omitted.) Local 63, Textile Workers Union of America, C.I.O. v. Cheney Bros., supra,
In the present case, we conclude that the grievance committee’s dismissal of the request for arbitration was a discretionary decision made on the basis of one of the eleven considerations set forth in the association’s arbitration manual, in particular, the consideration of timeliness.
Furthermore, in its letter advising Coldwell Banker that it had dismissed the arbitration request, the grievance committee noted that Coldwell Banker could appeal within twenty days to the board of directors and request that the original complaint be forwarded to a hearing panel pursuant to § 42 of the arbitration manual. Such an appeal would not have been allowed if the dismissal had constituted an arbitration award because paragraph five of the arbitration request provides that the party seeking arbitration consents “to abide by the arbitration award and to comply with it promptly.” In fact, paragraph five of the arbitration request provides that, if the party does not comply with an award against it and one of the other parties to the arbitration must obtain judicial confirmation and enforcement of the award, the noncomplying party must agree to pay the costs and reasonable attorney’s
Our conclusion that the dismissal did not constitute an arbitration award also is supported by our decision in Naugatuck v. AFSCME, Council #4, Local 1303,
In the present case, as in Naugatuck, there was no award because the grievance committee did not address and resolve the issues raised in the request for arbitration, and the question of timeliness was not submitted to and determined by the arbitration panel. Consequently, as we previously noted, the dismissal did not conform to the submission. Moreover, the arbitration manual’s description of the grievance committee’s function makes clear that the grievance committee has no authority to make an arbitration award. In distinguishing the roles of the grievance committee and the professional standards committee, § 41 of the arbitration manual states that the latter functions as a court to adjudicate and make decisions on matters involving ethics or arbitration, whereas the grievance committee functions as a gatekeeper to determine whether a matter submitted for arbitration should in fact be arbitrated. Section 42 of the arbitration manual specifies that, after the grievance committee has considered the eleven enumerated factors, it shall determine whether “the matter is properly arbitrable,” and, if so, shall forward the request for arbitration to the professional standards committee “for arbitration by an arbitration [h] earing [p]anel.” (Emphasis added.) Section 41 of the arbitration manual specifically provides that the grievance committee “does not hold hearings” and “does not mediate or arbitrate . . . disputes.” Finally, § 42 provides that, “if the [g]rievance [c]ommittee determines that a matter should not be arbitrated,” that determination may be appealed.
The foregoing provisions establish, without question, that the grievance committee
Cushman concedes that the grievance committee dismissed the arbitration request for untimeliness without reaching the merits but contends that enforcing the limitations regarding timeliness contained in the arbitration agreement, thereby precluding litigation of substantively arbitrable yet untimely commenced claims, promotes the finality of arbitrable disputes in the same manner as a statute of limitations. Cushman also argues that, unless such limitations are enforced, parties will be able to avoid their contractual obligations, safe in the knowledge that Connecticut courts nonetheless will be open to litigate their claims. We disagree.
As we previously discussed, the association’s arbitration manual does not establish strict time limitations for the submission of arbitrable claims that have the same preclusive effect as a statute of limitations. The manual simply provides that whether the submission has been filed within 180 days of the closing of the transaction, or no more than 180 days after the facts constituting the arbitrable matter could have been known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, is one of eleven factors that the grievance committee “shall consider” in reviewing a request for arbitration and in deciding whether the matter is “properly arbitrable . . . .” The eleven factors serve as guideposts, not absolute requirements, to assist the grievance committee in making its decision. Consequently, there are no rules in the code of ethics or the arbitration manual that prohibit the grievance committee from forwarding the arbitration request to the professional standards committee for arbitration on the merits, even if the request is untimely. Correspondingly, there are no rules that prohibit the judicial resolution of claims dismissed for any of the eleven discretionary reasons enumerated in the arbitration manual, such as the complexity of the arbitrable issue, the amount in dispute or an untimely filing, even though arbitration is the favored method of settling disputes. Although Cushman acknowledges that the dismissal of a matter on the basis of its legal complexity or the amount in dispute does not preclude subsequent litigation, it offers no valid reason why a dismissal for untimeliness should be treated differently from a dismissal on any other ground described in the arbitration manual. Accordingly, Cushman’s argument is not persuasive, and we conclude that the grievance committee’s dismissal of Coldwell Banker’s arbitration request did not constitute an arbitration award because a failure to comply with the 180 day filing period does not have the same effect as a failure to comply with a statute of limitations.
Cushman cites Cole v. Clifford, Docket No. DV-00-234,
II
Coldwell Banker next contends that the trial court improperly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the noncontract claims against Cushman and all of the claims against Grieco and Kelly because the court did not mandate arbitration of those claims and Coldwell Banker’s submission was restricted to the contract claims involving Cushman. Cushman responds that the trial court correctly found that the claims were barred by the grievance committee’s decision because the submission was unrestricted and applied to all of Coldwell Banker’s claims and to all of the defendants.
Ill
Cushman argues as an alternate ground for affirmance of the trial court’s dismissal of the noncontract claims against Cushman and all of the claims against Grieco and Kelly that, even if this court determines that the alleged arbitration award applies only to the breach of contract and fraud claims against Cushman and that the remaining claims were not submitted to the grievance committee for arbitration, the trial court has no jurisdiction to consider them because they are
The following additional facts are relevant to our resolution of this claim. In the motion to dismiss the noncontract claims and the claims against Grieco and Kelly, which was filed in conjunction with Cushman’s application to confirm the arbitration award, the defendants argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider those claims because the parties were bound, by virtue of their membership in the association, to submit the claims to arbitration. The defendants further argued that, because the association’s standards of practice provide that arbitration is the exclusive dispute resolution procedure for resolving arbitrable claims, the court was deprived of subject matter jurisdiction “to ever decide the merits of [such] claims . . . .”
Turning to the applicable legal principles, we observe that Practice Book § 63-4 (a) (1) provides in relevant part: “If any appellee wishes to (A) present for review alternate grounds upon which the judgment may be affirmed . . . that appellee shall file a preliminary statement of issues within twenty days from the filing of the appellant’s preliminary statement of the issues.” Practice Book § 60-5 also provides in relevant part: “The court shall not be bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial. . . .”
In the present case, Cushman properly filed a preliminary statement of issues that included the issue of exclusive arbitrability. This court, however, is not bound to consider Cushman’s argument that the grievance committee must make a threshold determination of arbitrability prior to litigation because such a claim was not distinctly raised at trial. See footnote 29 of this opinion; see also, e.g., Gallo v. Barile,
With respect to the noncontract claims, the evidence in the record fails to establish that they fall within the scope of article 17 of the code of ethics. Coldwell Banker and Cushman both rely on standard of practice 17-4 (4) of the association’s code of ethics to support their divergent views. Standard of practice 17-4 (4) provides for the arbitration of noncontractual disputes “[w]here two or more listing brokers claim entitlement to compensation pursuant to open listings with a seller or landlord who agrees to participate in arbitration (or who requests arbitration) and who agrees to be bound by the decision.” Cushman and Coldwell Banker, however, were not “listing brokers,” as that term has been defined in our case law,
With respect to the contract claims against the individual defendants, Judge Sheldon found that Grieco and Kelly were not signatories to the contract and, therefore, that the contract claims against them could not be arbitrated. Neither party disputes this finding. Accordingly, the noncontract claims against the defendants and the contract claims against Grieco and Kelly would not have satisfied the requirements for arbitration in the first instance, even if they had been submitted to the association as individual claims. Accordingly, we reject Cushman’s contention that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed on the alternate ground that each of Coldwell Banker’s remaining claims is exclusively arbitrable.
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings according to law.
In this opinion NORCOTT, PALMER and VERTE-FEUILLE, Js., concurred.
Notes
Our decision in the second appeal, released on the same date as this decision, is Coldwell Banker Manning Realty, Inc. v. Computer Sciences Corp.,
Coldwell Banker also named Joel M. Grieco and Robert E. Kelly as defendants. CSC was not named as a defendant in the present action. We refer to Cushman, Grieco and Kelly collectively as the defendants. We refer to Cushman, Grieco or Kelly individually by name.
The Greater Hartford Association of Realtors, Inc., is a voluntary, professional association of licensed real estate agents and brokers serving the greater Hartford area.
General Statutes § 52-417 provides: “At any time within one year after an award has been rendered and the parties to the arbitration notified thereof, any party to the arbitration may make application to the superior court for the judicial district in which one of the parties resides or, in a controversy concerning land, for the judicial district in which the land is situated or, when the court is not in session, to any judge thereof, for an order confirming the award. The court or judge shall grant such an order confirming the award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in sections 52-418 and 52-419.”
General Statutes § 52-409 provides: “If any action for legal or equitable relief or other proceeding is brought by any party to a written agreement to arbitrate, the court in which the action or proceeding is pending, upon being satisfied that any issue involved in the action or proceeding is referable to arbitration under the agreement, shall, on motion of any party to the arbitration agreement, stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in compliance with the agreement, provided the person making application for the stay shall be ready and willing to proceed with the arbitration.”
In their motion to dismiss or to stay the proceedings, the defendants referred to the following language that the association adopted from the code of ethics of the National Association of Realtors: “In the event of contractual disputes between [realtors] (principals) associated wdth different firms, arising out of their relationship as [realtors], the [realtors] shall submit the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the regulations of their [b]oard or [bjoards, rather than litigate the matter." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.)
In an affidavit dated December 6, 2006, Jeffrey P. Arakelian, chief executive officer of the association, attested that Coldwell Banker, Cushman, Grieco and Kelly were realtors and members of the association in good standing.
CSC was the sole defendant named in that action.
The complaint against CSC alleged fraud, breach of the duty to deal in good faith, breach of contract and violation of CUTPA.
The Appellate Court subsequently granted CSC’s motion to dismiss Coldwell Banker’s appeal from the trial court’s decision granting the motion to stay pending arbitration.
In preparing the arbitration request for submission, Coldwell Banker used a form provided by the association that included the following language: “I request and consent to arbitration through the [a]ssociation in accordance with the [c]ode of [e]thics and [arbitration [m]anual, and I agree to abide by the arbitration award and to comply with it promptly. In the event I do not comply with the arbitration award and it is necessary for any party to this arbitration to obtain judicial confirmation and enforcement of the arbitration award against me, I agree to pay the party obtaining such confirmation the costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in obtaining such confirmation and enforcement.”
Jeffrey P. Arakelian, chief executive officer of the association, attested in an affidavit that, “[i]n accordance with [§] 42 of the [c]ode of [e]thics and [arbitration [m]anual of the National Association of [Realtors] . . . when [the association] receives a request for arbitration, it must be forwarded to the [association’s] [g]rievance [c]ommittee.The [gjrievance [c]ommittee has sole responsibility for determining whether ... a matter is subject to arbitration, including, inter alia, whether it has been submitted within the required time frame and whether the issue relates to a real estate transaction and is properly arbitrable.”
The request for arbitration provided in relevant part: “Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that this application and the allegations contained herein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and this request for arbitration is filed within 180 days after the closing of the transaction, if any, or within 180 days after the facts constituting the arbitrable matter could have been known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, whichever is later.” (Emphasis added.) Coldwell Banker crossed out the first reference to “180 days,” which we have emphasized in italics, but did not cross out the second reference to “180 days.”
As we noted previously, the trial court, Sheldon, J., determined that two of Coldwell Banker’s six claims against Cushman were subject to arbitration.
Coldwell Banker crossed out both references to “180 days” in the request for arbitration of the claims against Cushman. In its earlier request for arbitration of the claims against CSC, however, it crossed out only one reference to “180 days.” See footnote 13 of this opinion.
General Statutes § 52-420 (b) provides: “No motion to vacate, modify or correct an award may be made after thirty days from the notice of the award to the party to the arbitration who makes the motion.”
Coldwell Banker appealed to the Appellate Court from the judgment of the trial court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice Book § 65-1. Although Coldwell Banker’s action against Cushman, Grieco and Kelly was consolidated with the action against CSC for trial, Coldwell Banker opted to take a separate appeal from the trial court’s judgment in each case.
General Statutes § 52-418 (a) provides in relevant part: “Upon the application of any party to an arbitration, the superior court . . . shall make an order vacating the award if it finds any of the following defects ... (4) if the arbitrators have exceeded their powers or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.”
Article 7 of the association’s bylaws, entitled “Professional Standards and Arbitration,” provides:
“Section 1. The responsibility of the [association and of [a]ssociation [m]embers relating to the enforcement of the [c]ode of [e]thics . . . and the arbitration of disputes, and the organization and procedures incident thereto shall be governed by the [c]ode of [e]thics and [a]rbitration [m]anual of the [a]ssociation, which by this reference is made a part of these [b]ylaws . . . .
“Section 2. It shall be the duty and responsibility of every [realtor] [m]ember of this [a]ssociation to abide by the constitution, [b]ylaws and [Rules and [Regulations of the [a]ssociation . . . and to abide by the [c]ode of [e]thics of the [National Association of Realtors], including the duty to arbitrate controversies arising out of real estate transactions as specified by [a]rticle 17 of the [c]ode of [e]thics, and as further defined in accordance with the procedures set forth in the [c]ode of [e]thics and [a]rbitration [m]anual of this [a]ssociation, as from time to time as amended.”
Hereinafter, we refer to the National Association of Realtors by its full name. All references to the “association” are to the Greater Hartford Association of Realtors.
Justice Katz observes in her concurring and dissenting opinion that “[a] . . . principle that is of paramount significance in the present case is that, when arbitration is mandated as the exclusive method of dispute resolution, a dismissal of a request to arbitrate for failure to file the request within mandatory time limits conclusively determines the controversy.” (Emphasis added.) Arbitration, however, is not the exclusive method of dispute resolution in this case, and the issue of whether the 180 day filing period is discretionary or mandatory is an issue that this court must resolve on appeal.
Section 41 of the association’s arbitration manual provides in relevant part: “The function of the [g]rievance [c]ommittee is clearly distinguishable from the function of the [p]rofessional [s]tandards [c]ommittee. The [p]rofessional [s]tandards [c]ommittee is similar to a court. The court adjudicates matters that come before it. The [p]rofessional [s]tandards [c]ommittee makes decisions on matters involving ethics or arbitration.
“If the function of the [p]rofessional [s]tandards [c]ommittee is understood as similar to a court, the function of the [g]rievance [c]ommittee can then be understood as similar to that of the grand jury. A grand jury evaluates potentially criminal conduct to determine whether the evidence and testimony presented [warrant] indictment and trial.
“In a similar manner, the [g]rievance [c]ommittee receives ethics complaints and arbitration requests to determine if, taken as true on their face, a hearing is to be warranted. The [g]rievance [c]ommittee makes only such preliminary evaluation as is necessary to make these decisions. While the [g]rievance [c]ommittee has meetings, it does not hold hearings, and it does not decide whether members have violated the [c]ode of [e]thics. The [g]rievance [c]ommittee does not mediate or arbitrate business disputes. . . ."
We disagree with Justice Katz’ conclusion that certain factors that the grievance committee must consider, including the 180 day filing limitation, are not discretionary in nature. The association’s arbitration manual makes no distinction among the different factors. If, as Justice Katz suggests, the manual had intended certain factors to be considered mandatory and others to be discretionary, it would have included a provision to that effect.
Furthermore, there is no support for the view that the arbitration manual may be construed to mean that the grievance committee must dismiss a request for arbitration if affirmative findings are made with respect to factors other than the amount in dispute and the complexity of the legal issue raised. Although Justice Katz relies on Stratford v. International Assn. of Firefighters, AFL-CIO, Local 998,
Justice Katz also creates an artificial distinction between the factors when she asserts that the 180 day time limitation is mandatory because it is “qualitatively different” from other, concededly discretionary factors that the grievance committee considers, such as the amount in dispute. Findings as to the amount in dispute and the timeliness of an arbitration request are not discretionary in and of themselves but, rather, require the exercise of discretion when the grievance committee decides whether to forward the arbitration request to the hearing panel.
The contention that the arbitration request requires the applicant to declare under penalty of perjury that it is filed within 180 days also has no bearing on whether the filing time is mandatory. As we subsequently note in this opinion, the applicant must agree when filing the arbitration request to abide by any potential arbitration award and to comply with it promptly, whereas the arbitration manual provides for an appeal from the grievance committee’s dismissal of an arbitration request, thus strongly suggesting that a dismissal on the ground of an untimely filing is not an award.
Lastly, merely because the obligation to file an arbitration request within 180 days is not binding does not thereby allow the parties to pursue their claims in another forum or to undermine arbitration as a means of settling disputes because the committee only is required to “consider” the eleven factors and, therefore, a late filing does not necessarily preclude arbitration.
We also note that Justice Katz’ assertion that the 180 day filing period may be mandatory has significant constitutional implications. She correctly notes that 180 days is an exceptionally short period of time in which to bring an arbitration request when compared to the applicable statutes of limitations in most court actions. See, e.g., General Statutes § 52-577 (tort claim shall be brought within three years from “date of the act or omission complained of’); General Statutes § 52-577a (a) (product liability claim shall be brought within three years from date “injury, death or property damage is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered”). In addition, treating the dismissal of an untimely arbitration request as an award when the issue of timeliness has not been submitted to the arbitrator deprives the party filing the request of the right to a fair trial because an award under the terms of the parties’ agreement is final, subject only to confirmation or vacating by the trial court. Accordingly, the party filing the request would have no opportunity to receive a hearing on the issues submitted for arbitration by either the arbitrator or the court. We therefore reject the reasoning of Justice Katz’ concurring and dissenting opinion.
Significantly, none of the cases that Justice Katz cites in her concurring and dissenting opinion for the proposition that “[a] decision that a matter is not arbitrable can be an award” and that “a dismissal of a request to arbitrate for failure to file the request within mandatory time limits is an award” is applicable in the present context because the questions of arbitrability and mandatory time limits in each of the cited cases, unlike in the present case, were specifically raised by the parties and submitted, to an arbitrator or arbitration panel for resolution pursuant to the language contained in the parties’ arbitration agreement. Likewise, to the extent that Justice Katz refers to commentary providing that, “[sjhould the arbitrator declare [that] the dispute [is] not arbitrable, such a declaration would constitute an ‘award’ determinative of the rights of the parties and thus a final judgment . . . subject to immediate appeal by a motion to vacate”; (internal quotation marks omitted) B. Sacks, Comment, “Arbitration in Connecticut: Issues in Judicial Intervention Under the Connecticut Arbitration Statutes,” 17 Conn. L. Rev. 387, 395 (1985); that commentary also is inapposite. From the language that directly precedes this passage, it is clear that what the author meant was that, when the question of whether a matter falls within the scope of the arbitration provision is presented directly to the arbitrator, the arbitrator’s decision that the dispute is not arbitrable constitutes an award. See id., 394-95. The parties in the present case, however, did not submit the question of timeliness to the arbitrator. Consequently, the grievance committee's discretionary dismissal cannot be considered an award, and there is no need to remand the case to the grievance committee for clarification.
The grievance committee’s determination that Coldwell Banker’s submission was not subject to arbitration is not the same as a determination that a matter is nonarbitrable for substantive reasons. As the grievance committee’s report suggests, a matter may be considered arbitrable from a substantive standpoint, as in the present case, but may not be subject to arbitration because the arbitrator declines to arbitrate in the exercise of discretion. We conclude, however, that the effect of a dismissal on these grounds is the same as the effect of a dismissal on the ground of nonarbitrability, and thus rely on cases in which findings of nonarbitrability were not deemed to constitute arbitration awards.
We disagree with Cushman’s contention that Metro Properties, Inc., is inapplicable. Although the basis for the grievance committee’s determination of nonarbitrability in Metro Properties, Inc., was not untimeliness but, rather, a lack of evidence demonstrating a contractual relationship between the parties that would have given rise to a duty to arbitrate; see Metro Properties, Inc. v. Yatsko, supra,
In Daley v. Hartford,
As we noted previously, the trial court concluded that when Coldwell Banker signed the form provided by the association as part of its submission of the dispute for arbitration, it thereby authorized the association to issue a binding determination on any contract or specific noncontract claims arising out of the disputed transaction.
Cushman appears to assert, in its brief to this court, two theories in support of this claim. On the one hand, Cushman contends that Coldwell Banker’s claims are exclusively arbitrable because the agreement provides that they are subject to arbitration alone and never may be considered by the trial court, a position Cushman also took in arguing in support of the motion to dismiss before the trial court following the grievance committee's decision. In other words, “[l]itigation in the courts [simply] is not an option.” On the other hand, Cushman also contends that the remaining claims must be submitted to the grievance committee “for a threshold determination of arbitrability,” and that, “[u]ntil Coldwell [Banker] pursues arbitration of its claims . . . the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over [the] complaint.” This argument clearly anticipates that the court may have subject matter jurisdiction at some point in time following an initial determination of arbitrability by the grievance committee. Cushman, however, did not make this argument before the trial court.
The memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss indicated that the exclusive procedure for dispute resolution that deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction “foreclosfed] the possibility that the merits of arbitrable disputes between realtors of different firms [could] ever be litigated in the courts”; (emphasis in original); and, accordingly, “the court, permanently lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of these claims.” (Emphasis added.)
For the same reason, we reject Coldwell Banker’s contention that we should not consider this alternate ground because it merely is a belated and improper appeal from the trial court’s partial denial of the first motion to dismiss and that the claim should have been raised in a cross appeal.
In the present case, the defendants originally filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to stay the proceedings pending arbitration under § 52-409. Judge Sheldon thus did not dismiss the contract claims against the defendants but granted the motion to stay pending arbitration of the contract claims against Cushman and denied the motion to dismiss the remaining claims against Grieco and Kelly after determining that they were not subject to the arbitration agreement.
In Real Estate Listing Service, Inc. v. Connecticut, Real Estate Commission,
Concurrence Opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part. The crux of the dispute in the present case is whether the dismissal by the grievance committee (grievance committee) of the Greater Hartford Association of Realtors, Inc., of the request for arbitration filed by the plaintiff, Coldwell Banker Manning Realty, Inc., on the ground that the request had not been filed within a specific 180 day time period constituted an award that, in the absence of a motion to vacate, conclusively disposed of the controversy between the parties. The majority concludes that: the 180 day period is a discretionary time limit after which time the grievance committee simply declined to exercise jurisdiction; such a discretionary decision is not an award; and, accordingly, the grievance committee’s decision does not require dismissal of the plaintiffs action in the trial court. The majority’s principal reason for reaching its threshold conclusion is that, because the arbitration agreement (agreement) between the parties in the present case instructs the grievance committee to “consider” certain factors before it decides whether to refer the matter to an arbitration panel for a full evidentiary hearing and some of those factors undoubtedly involve the exercise of discretion, the 180 day period for filing requests for arbitration similarly must be a matter of discretion. The majority therefore has concluded that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed and the case should be remanded to that court for further proceedings on the plaintiffs complaint. I respectfully disagree with the remand portion of the decision as it applies to the claims against the named defendant, Cushman and Wakefield of Connecticut, Inc. (defendant).
I begin with certain relevant principles of arbitration jurisprudence. Our court has not defined what constitutes an award. The few courts that have defined the term have done so in broad terms that provide little guidance in the present matter.
A decision that a matter is not arbitrable can be an award; see Stratford v.
More significantly for our purposes, a dismissal of a request to arbitrate for failure to file the request within mandatory time limits is an award that may be challenged by way of a motion to vacate or that may be confirmed. See, e.g., Patten v. Signator Ins. Agency, Inc.,
A related principle that is of paramount significance in the present case is that, when arbitration is mandated as the exclusive method of dispute resolution, a dismissal
Therefore, I agree with the majority that the dispositive issue in this case is whether the dismissal was a mandatory, jurisdictional requirement, and thus was an award, or whether the dismissal was a mere matter of discretion, and thus was not an award.
Part nine of the arbitration manual sets forth the authority, function and procedures of the grievance committee in arbitration proceedings. As the majority properly points out, this part of the arbitration manual clearly indicates that the grievance committee acts in a gatekeeping capacity, determining whether the request for arbitration should be referred to an arbitration panel for a full evidentiaiy hearing. Part nine, § 42 (B), of the arbitration manual provides in relevant part: “In reviewing a request for arbitration, the [gjrievance [cjommittee shall consider the following [eleven questions] . . . .”
The majority has set forth several reasons why it has concluded that the 180 day time period is discretionary, which I need not repeat. I would agree with the majority that the fact that the grievance committee undoubtedly has discretion to dismiss a request for arbitration under some of the relevant considerations, such as when it deems the amount in dispute too large or too small or the matter too legally complex for the arbitrators,
I disagree, however, with the majority’s implicit conclusion that this construction is the only reasonable one and therefore that the agreement is unambiguous. See Levine v. Advest, Inc.,
First, the grievance committee undoubtedly would be required to dismiss a request for arbitration if it were to answer some of the questions to be considered in the affirmative. For example, the grievance committee must consider whether the matter is arbitrable
Second, the nature of the 180 day time limit is qualitatively different than the aforementioned clearly discretionary factors that the grievance committee considers. A request either is or is not, as a matter of fact, filed within the 180 day period. There is no discretion involved in making that determination. By contrast, whether “the amount in dispute [is] too small or too large for the [b]oard to arbitrate” or “the matter [is] too legally complex, involving issues that the arbitrators may not be able to address in a knowledgeable way” pursuant to part nine, § 42 (B) (9) and (10) of the arbitration manual are matters over which grievance committee members reasonably could disagree. Indeed, there is no qualitative language to guide the grievance committee in deciding under what circumstances an untimely filed claim could be referred to arbitration.
Looking to the arbitration request itself, that form requires the applicant to declare, “[u]nder the penalties of perjury . . . [that] this request for arbitration is filed within 180 days after the closing of the transaction, if any, or within 180 days after the facts constituting the arbitrable matter could have been known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, whichever is later.”
Finally, if the obligation to file a request within 180 days is not binding, the clearly mandatory obligation under the agreement to use arbitration as the exclusive dispute resolution method would become largely illusory. Cf. Cole v. Clifford, supra, 2000 Mont. Dist. LEXIS *23 (stating in case where realtor agreement included express mandate to file request within 180 days, “[i]f a party with a dispute, who has agreed via contract to submit that dispute to mandatory arbitration, is permitted to wait out the limitations period prescribed by the arbitration clause, and then bring litigation in the court system, the very purpose of our state-enacted arbitration statutes has been thwarted”). A party seeking to avoid arbitration could, at the very least, all but guarantee that it will not have to submit to arbitration simply by filing its court action well after the 180 day period has lapsed. After all, the party likely would have three to six years to bring its court action without violating the statute of limitations. This construction of the agreement runs counter to the general rule favoring arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution. New England Pipe Corp. v. Northeast Corridor Foundation,
Similarly, the grievance committee’s decision does not make the basis of its decision clear so that we can determine whether its decision is dispositive of the plaintiffs claims or whether it leaves open the possibility of litigation.
When arbitration decisions are ambiguous, the courts have authority to remand the case, without vacating it, to the arbitral authority to clarify the basis of its decision. See Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s & Cos. Collective,
Therefore, I would conclude that the most appropriate course of action is to reverse the trial court’s decision and direct it to remand the case to the grievance committee for a clarification as to whether: (1) in the exercise of its discretion, the grievance committee declined to refer the matter to arbitration because the request had been filed beyond the 180 day period; or (2) the grievance committee was mandated under the agreement to dismiss the request because it has no jurisdiction over a request made beyond that 180 day period. I further would conclude that, if the grievance committee’s articulation indicates that the dismissal was mandatory and jurisdictional, that articulation is the operative award in this case that triggers the parties’ rights to seek vacation or confirmation.
Therefore, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
I agree with the plaintiff that the trial court’s ruling expressly held that the claims against the individual defendants, Joel M. Grieco and Robert E. Kelly, were not subject to arbitration and that the plaintiff did not expand the scope of arbitration in its submission to include those defendants. The plaintiff listed only the named defendant as a respondent in the request for arbitration and expressly stated in its accompanying letter that the request “is limited [to] matters as set forth in the court’s [attached] ruling. ” Therefore, I would conclude that the grievance committee’s dismissal of the request for arbitration had no effect on the claims against Grieco and Kelly that remained pending before the trial court subject to the conclusion of the arbitration proceedings.
See, e.g., Chillum-Adelphi Volunteer Fire Dept., Inc. v. Button & Goode, Inc.,
The majority relies on Metro Properties, Inc. v. Yatsko,
The majority concludes that this principle is inapplicable because, as I have noted in footnote 6 of this concurring and dissenting opinion, arbitration is not mandated under the operative agreement in the present case if both parties agree and properly notify the arbitration authority that they do not wish to arbitrate the matter. Contrary to the majority’s view, it appears to me that this principle is fully applicable when the parties have not met the prerequisites to avoid their obligation to arbitrate.
I am not inclined to agree with the plaintiff that the fact that there was no evidentiary hearing and that the fee was refunded dictate a conclusion that the grievance committee’s decision is not an award. The parties contractually agreed to accept the arbitration procedures, the plaintiff stipulated to the grievance committee the fact that the request for arbitration had been filed after the 180 day time period had passed; see footnote 12 of this concurring and dissenting opinion; and there is no claim that these procedures are unenforceable. See HH East Parcel v. Handy & Harman,
Article 17 of the code of ethics further provides that arbitration is not required if the parties notify the board in writing that they have chosen not to arbitrate the matter.
Part nine, § 42, of of the arbitration manual provides: “In reviewing a request for arbitration, the [g]rievance [c]ommittee shall consider the following:
“(1) Is the request for arbitration acceptable in the form as received by the committee? If not in proper form, the [c]hairperson may request that the [e]lected [s]ecretary or the [e]xecutive [o]fficer contact the complainant to advise that the request must be submitted in proper form.
“NOTE: If deemed appropriate by the [c]hairperson, a member of the [g]rievance [c]ommittee may be assigned to contact the complainant and to provide procedural assistance to amend the request or resubmit a new request in proper form and with proper content. The [g]rievance [c]ommittee member providing such assistance shall ensure that only procedural assistance is provided to the complainant, and that the complainant understands that the member is not representing the complainant.
“(2) Are all necessary parties named in the request for arbitration? The duty to arbitrate is an obligation of [Realtor] principals. [Realtor] principals include sole proprietors, partners in apartnership, officers or majority shareholders of a corporation, or office managers (including branch office managers) acting on behalf of principals of a real estate firm. . . .
“(3) Was the request for arbitration filed within one hundred eighty (180) days after the closing of the transaction, if any, or within one hundred eighty (180) days after the facts constituting the arbitrable matter could have been known in the exercise of reasonable diligence, whichever is later? . . .
“(4) Are the parties members in good standing or otherwise entitled to invoke arbitration through the [b]oard’s facilities? Were the parties members at the time the facts giving rise to the dispute occurred?
“(5) Is litigation pending in connection with the same transaction?
“NOTE: No arbitration shall be provided on a matter pending litigation unless the litigation is withdrawn with notice to the [b]oard and request for arbitration, or unless the court refers the matter to the [b] oard for arbitration.
“(6) Is there any reason to conclude that the [b]oard would be unable to provide an impartial [h] earing [p]anel?
“(7) If the facts alleged in the request for arbitration were taken as true on their face, is the matter at issue related to a real estate transaction and is it properly arbitrable, i.e., is there some basis on which an award could be based?
“(8) If an arbitrable issue exists, are the parties required to arbitrate or is their participation voluntary?
“(9) Is the amount in dispute too small or too large for the [b]oard to arbitrate?
“(10) Is the matter too legally complex, involving issues that the arbitrators may not be able to address in a knowledgeable way?
“(11) Is there a sufficient number of knowledgeable arbitrators available?
“If all of the relevant questions have been considered, and a majority of the [g]rievance [c]ommittee conclude that the matter is properly arbitrable by the [b]oard, the [g]rievance [cjommittee shall send the request for arbitration to the [c]hahperson of the [professional [s]tandards [c]ommittee for arbitration by an arbitration [h]earing [p]anel.”
Apparently, the arbitration panels are comprised of other realtors who are association members, not attorneys.
I note, however, that, unlike the agreement in the present case, other realtor arbitration agreements expressly have acknowledged the arbitral authority’s discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction over an otherwise mandatory subject of arbitration, as well as the effect of such a decision. See, e.g., Berke v. Tri Realtors,
I am unclear how our case law concluding that a decision that a matter is arbitrable is not an award advances the majority’s reasoning. In each of the cases in which this court concluded that such a decision was not an award, there was another matter pending before an arbitrator as to the merits of the dispute. Therefore, we have treated such decisions as not being an award solely because they are not final; in other words, they are interlocutory decisions. See State v. Connecticut Employees Union Independent,
As I previously have noted herein, a decision that a matter is not arbitrable is an award. Therefore, it cannot be said that the grievance committee’s gatekeeping function deprives it of authority to render an award when the grievance committee is charged as part of the function to make that determination.
The plaintiff crossed out the language in the arbitration request referring to the 180 day period and stated in a letter that accompanied the request: “Please note that the court ordered arbitration after the 180 day time limit had passed. This request for arbitration, therefore, has been filed after the 180 day time limit has passed. We have amended the request for arbitration to reflect this fact.”
The only evidence submitted to the trial court that bears on this issue is the second supplemental affidavit of Jeffrey P. Arakelian, the president and chief executive officer of the association, who stated therein that “[t]he [g]rievance [c]ommittee has sole responsibility for determining whether or not a matter is subject to arbitration, including, inter alia, whether it has been submitted within the required time frame and whether the issue relates to a real estate transaction and is properly arbitrable.” (Emphasis added.)