77 N.Y.S. 1022 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1902
The judgment appealed from was entered upon the decision of the court without a jury. That decision contains specific findings of fact. It contains but one conclusion of law, to wit, that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment against the defendant for the sum of $3,000, with interest thereon from September 5, 1899, besides costs, and an additional allowance of 5 per cent., granted upon the subject-matter of said action, to be taxed in accordance with the rules and practice of this court. To that decision a general exception was filed, in which the defendant excepted to the decision filed, and to each and every part thereof. The facts are mainly stipulated, and there are no exceptions to rulings upon the evidence. Respondents claim that the general exception of the appellant presents no question for review. They cite several authorities that hold that a general exception is unavailing. This rule seems to be held in Drake v. Iron Mine, 156 N. Y. 90, 50 N. E. 785. In that case, Judge Gray, writing for the court, says:
“What is thereby contemplated is, not a general exception to the rulings, but an ‘exception to a ruling.’ The present case furnishes a good illustration of the untenability of a general exception, for in the five conclusions of law, some of the rulings were clearly correct, within the appellant’s argument. The court is not required to search through the case to find support for the appellant’s general contention that the judgment is erroneous. It is not called upon to exercise its discretion upon the review of - a case, unless the question or questions of law are specifically pointed out by appropriate exceptions to the rulings made upon the trial, which define the error or errors relied upon to reverse the judgment.”
The failure to find specifically upon the several propositions of law involved, and the summing up of the conclusion of the court in one general finding, to the effect that the plaintiff is entitled to judgment, might well be held to be a short decision, under section 1022 of the Code, to which a general exception alone would be required. Where, however, there is a single conclusion of law, a general exception, as here stated, should be held equivalent to an exception to that ruling of law, and is as effective to enable the appellant to review any facts upon which the ruling is based as if the exception had been in form to that single conclusion of law. Neither respondent nor the court can be misled. The reason of the rule failing, the court will not forfeit appellant’s right of review by a purely technical application thereof.
Upon the merits, I find no legal warrant for the bringing of this action. The claim is upon a contract made with a town through its town board for the construction of abutments for a bridge. That contract was confessedly invalid, unless it was given life by the legislature. By chapter 163 of the Laws of 1901, it was provided that this contract was legalized and confirmed in all respects. Assuming, for the argument, that the act was effective to accomplish its purpose, this action, then, is simply an action to enforce a contract, or for damages for its breach. In Bell v. Town of Esopus, 49 Barb. 506, it is held that
615.
It seems clear, therefore, that this judgment is improper, and should be reversed, with costs; and, as the action is unauthorized, the complaint should be dismissed, with costs.
Judgment and order reversed, with costs, and complaint dismissed, with costs. All concur.