Plaintiff, Colburn Randel, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his Title VII action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Randel contends that the district court erred in determining that (1) he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim of racial discrimination, and (2) he did not timely appeal his claim for reprisal. Concluding that the district court is correct with respect to the racial discrimination claim, but incorrect with respect to the reprisal claim, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I
Colburn Randel worked as a computer specialist for the Naval Research Personnel Center. Beginning in 1994, Randel initiated *394 the first of two proceedings against his employer, John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Department of the United States Navy (“the Navy”) alleging discrimination in violation of Title VII.
The first procеeding (“Randel I”) began in March 1994, when Randel filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) complaint of racial discrimination against his supervisor. In June 1994, this complaint was referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for review. The EEOC did not render a decision within 180 days, and therefore, on April 19, 1995, Ran-del filed his complaint in federal district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1).
The second proceeding (“Randel II”) began on October 14,1994, one month after the Navy fired Randel allegedly for excessive unexeused absences. Believing that he suffered from major depression due to his work environment, and that he was entitled to sick leаve for this disability, Randel appealed his removal to the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”). Before the MSPB, Randel claimed that the Navy unlawfully fired him, and alleged specifically that his termination constituted both reprisal for his prior EEO complaint and disability discrimination. This appeal to the MSPB did not contain a claim of racial discrimination. The MSPB upheld the Navy’s decision to fire Randel, and on June 13, 1995, Randel appealed the MSPB’s decision to the EEOC. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1).
On August 25, 1995, before the EEOC reached a decision in Randel II, Randel filed an amended complaint in Randel I asserting a claim of disability discrimination. Thus, Rаndel asked the district court to decide his disability discrimination claim as part of Ran-del I, even though the same claim remained pending before the EEOC in Randel II. The district court concluded that Randel had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and dismissed Randel I for lack of subject matter jurisdictiоn.
On August 8, 1996, the EEOC issued its decision in Randel II. The EEOC reached two conclusions. First, it concurred with the MSPB that the Navy did not fire Randel in reprisal for filing the EEO complaint for racial discrimination. Second, it found that contrary to the MSPB’s prior determination, the Navy had discriminated against Randel because of his disability. Additionаlly, the EEOC explained that its decision was final and that upon receipt of its decision Randel had “the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court, based on the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board, WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS. ...” The EEOC then referred the case to the MSPB pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(5)(B). 1 In an opinion and order dated November 12, 1996, the MSPB adopted the EEOC’s decision finding disability discrimination, and notified Randel that he had a right to file a civil action in United States District Court within thirty days after receiving its order.
On December 13, 1996 — thirty days after receiving the MSPB order — Randel appealed the decision оf the EEOC, as confirmed by the MSPB, to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Randel’s petition sought relief on both his reprisal and racial discrimination claims. The Navy moved for dismissal, factually attacking the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion for two reasons. First, the district court held that because Randel did not appeal until ninety-seven days after the August 8th EEOC decision he failed to timely appeal his reprisal claim. Second, it found that Randel never raised a claim of racial discrim *395 ination in any of the proceedings in Randel II, and therefоre failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. For these reasons, the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over both Randel’s reprisal claim and his claim of racial discrimination. Randel appealed timely.
II
This appeal involves the district court’s denial of subject matter jurisdiction over Randel’s claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. We review the district court’s determinations of disputed fact under the “clearly erroneous” standard.
See MDPhysicians & Assoc., Inc. v. State Bd. of Ins.,
As a precondition to filing suit in federal court, Title VII specifically requires a federal employee claiming discrimination to exhaust his administrative remedies.
See Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
A
The Navy contends that Randel failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to his claim of racial discrimination. The EEO charge filed in Randel II makes no reference to race discrimination. It is confined to reprisal and disability discrimination. Randel maintains nоnetheless that the EEOC’s and the MSPB’s findings of no reprisal necessarily include a finding of no racial discrimination. We disagree. To recover on his reprisal claim Randel had to prove that the Navy fired him because he complained to the EEOC; he did not “ ‘need [to] ... prove the underlying claim of disсrimination which led to [his] protest.’ ”
Holifield v. Reno,
B
The district court’s conclusion that Randel did not appeal timely his reprisal claim is, however, a different matter. According to the district court, Randel “should have filed the appeal within thirty days of the August 8, 1996 ruling by the EEOC.” The district court reasoned that because the EEOC and the MSPB agreed as to the reprisal claim on August 8, 1996, the EEOC’s decision on that claim became a final appeal-able decision. Randel argues that a final agency decision did not exist until November 12, 1996, when the MSPB and the EEOC
*396
agreed on both his reprisal and disability-claims. We must decide, therefore, whether the EEOC’s finding of no reprisal became final on August 8, 1996, for purposes of appeal, even though Randel’s disability discrimination claim remained unresolved until November 12, 1996. In other words, we must decide whether the EEOC’s August 8th decision operated to sever Randel’s reprisal claim from the rest of his complaint. We find that our reasoning in
Gomez v. Department of the Air Force,
In Gomez, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC against the Secretary of the Department of the Air Force (“the Air Force”), alleging discrimination based on national origin and handicap. The EEOC rejected the plaintiffs national origin claim, but referred the handicap claim to the MSPB for additional evidence. The EEOC did not take further action on his handicap claim, and therefore, after waiting 180 days frоm when he first filed his petition with the EEOC, the plaintiff submitted his complaint to the district court. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702(e)(1). The district court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff did not file his action within thirty days of the EEOC’s decision on his national origin claim.
On appeal, we reversed. We held that because the EEOC’s оrder never stated that it was severing the plaintiffs national origin claim, and because the regulatory framework did not support piecemeal resolution of the plaintiffs original complaint, the plaintiffs appeal was filed timely with the district court. We carefully noted that the EEOC must provide prior notice to the claimant before severing claims:
We do not mean to suggest that the EEOC could not (or could) adopt a severance procedure in “mixed cases” where only discrimination claims are alleged. Rather, we merely find that in the absence of any prior notice or indication on the part of the EEOC that it may utilize a severance procedure, we hesitate to recognize such a power on its part.... Finding severance, when there is nothing in the record to support the idea that the EEOC utilizes severance in mixed case (or in casеs generally) or that they actually purported to sever in this case, would require a level of after-the-fact judicial improvisation that we are not willing to reach. It would also result in injustice to the claimant who could have had no prior knowledge of such practice.
Id. at 860-61.
We now rеiterate that if the EEOC wishes to use its power of severance it must provide the claimant with clear and unambiguous notice that it has chosen to sever his claims. 2 In the absence of clear direction from the EEOC, the claimant must wait until a final decision has been rendered on the entirety of his оriginal petition for review before appealing either claim to federal district court.
In this case, the EEOC did not provide adequate notice to Randel that it was severing his claims. As Randel notes correctly, the statement setting forth the plaintiffs rights to file a civil action “was unclear аt best.” Thus, Randel waited appropriately until the MSPB rendered its final decision adopting the EEOC’s finding of disability discrimination before appealing timely to federal district court.
C
In addition to arguing that Randel did not file timely his appeal, the Navy suggests another reason why the district court lacked jurisdiction over Randel’s reprisal claim. According to the Navy, by amending his district court complaint in Randel I to include the same claim of disability discrimination then pending in Randel II, Randel circumvented the administrative process and *397 therefore abandoned both his disability and reprisal claims before the EEOC in Randel II. In other words, according to the Navy, once Randel appealed to the EEOC and then prematurely filed the disability discrimination claim in Randel I, the EEOC lost jurisdiction to consider Randel’s entire appeal.
As we read the record, the district court did not fully comprehend the Navy’s argument. It сoncluded that Randel did not abandon his reprisal claim because Randel never amended his complaint in Randel I to include a claim for reprisal. The Navy makes a more nuanced argument. It argues that by amending his complaint in Randel I to include even just the disability discrimination claim, Randel terminated the entire proceeding before the EEOC. Randel never exhausted, therefore, his administrative remedies.
We note that under some circumstances, “abandonment of the administrative process
may
suffice to terminate an administrative proceeding before a final disposition is reached, thus preventing exhaustion and precluding judicial review.”
Vinieratos v. United States Dep’t of Air Force,
Ill
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Randel’s racial discrimination claim, we REVERSE its dismissal of Randel’s reprisal claims, and we REMAND for furthеr proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. Once the EEOC decides to consider a petition, the EEOC may take one of two actions: the EEOC may either (1) concur with the decision of the MSPB, or (2) issue a decision in writing that differs from the decision of the MSPB. If the EEOC concurs with the MSPB’s decision, then the claimant has thirty dаys from receiving notice to appeal to the district court. If the EEOC differs from the MSPB’s decision, then the case is returned to the MSPB. The MSPB may then either concur with the EEOC or reaffirm its original decision. If it concurs with the EEOC, then the administrative proceeding is exhausted and the claimant has thirty days from recеiving notice to appeal to the district court. If it reaffirms its original decision, however, then the case is sent to a Special Panel for further consideration. See 5 U.S.C. § 7702; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1614.310(1998).
. We note that the EEOC has the power to sever in mixed cases where only discrimination claims are alleged. In mixed cases that contain both discrimination and nondiscrimination claims, "the courts have refused to countenance severance of the claims."
Gomez,
. We do not pass judgment on whether Randel abandoned his disability claim by filing the same claim in Randel I. Although both parties briefed this issue, neither party appealed the MSPB's detеrmination on Randel's disability discrimination claim to the district court. That claim, therefore, was not properly presented to the district court, and is not considered on appeal.
See In the Matter of HECI Exploration Co.,