Case Information
*1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 41742
MARK D. COLAFRANCESCHI, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) ) Boise, April 2015 Term
v. ) ) 2015 Oрinion No. 69 SHAWN J. BRILEY and ASHLEY ) ROBINSON, ) Filed: July 16, 2015 ) Defendants-Respondents,
) Stephen Kenyon, Clerk ) and
)
KIM BATT-LINCOLN, ) )
Defendant. )
) Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Valley County. Hon. Gerald F. Schroeder, Senior District Judge.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Mark D. Colafranceschi, McCall, pro se appellant.
Elam & Burke, P.A., Boise, for respondent Shawn J. Briley. Joshua S. Evett argued.
Duke Scanlan & Hall, PLLC, Boise, for respondent Ashley Robinson. Kevin J. Scanlan argued.
_______________________________________________
HORTON, Justice.
Mark Colafranceschi brought this action for defamation and professional malpractice against Shawn Briley and Ashley Robinson after a magistrate court appointed Robinson to perform child custody evaluations in two separate cases in which Colafranceschi was a party. The district court dismissed the action, finding that quasi-judicial immunity barred Colafranceschi’s claims. We affirm.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Colafranceschi was the plaintiff in two actions against the mothers of his children. In Colafranceschi v. Ericson (the Ericson Case), Colafranceschi sought to modify his divorce decree to obtain full physical custody of his son, M.C. In Colafranceschi v. Schoonover (the Schoonоver Case), Colafranceschi asked that a temporary custody and visitation order be modified to award him joint legal and physical custody of his son, D.C.
Robinson is a licensed masters social worker. Briley is a licensed clinical social worker and was Robinson’s supervisor.
On February 2, 2011, the magistrate сourt entered an order for a child custody evaluation in the Schoonover Case. The magistrate court appointed Robinson to complete the home study and specified that she was to interview the parties, the child, and collateral contacts in addition to visiting both Schoonоver and Colafranceschi’s homes.
On February 7, 2011, the magistrate court entered a similar order in the Ericson Case. As in the Schoonover Case, the magistrate court appointed Robinson to complete a home study with the same minimum requirements.
Robinson performed the evaluations and filed reрorts in both cases on April 18, 2011. As Colafranceschi’s defamation claim would suggest, the reports did not cast him in a positive light. In both reports, Robinson reported that Colafranceschi had misrepresented his criminal history of domestic violence, failing to disclose his conviction for domestic assault against Ericson.
In the Ericson report, Robinson emphasized Colafranceschi’s history of domestic violence against both mothers of his children and M.C.’s fear of his father. She described Colafranceschi as showing a “consistent pattern” of “intimidat[ing] and threaten[ing] the safety of others. She indicated that Colafranceschi presented a serious threat to kidnap his son and remove him from this country.
In the Schoonover case, in addition to emphasizing Colafranceschi’s history of domestic violence, Robinson wrote at length about collateral contacts’ reports of D.C.’s negative bеhavioral changes following time spent with Colafranceschi. She reported that there were no “signs of affection between father and son.” She concluded that Colafranceschi’s motive for *3 seeking the custody change was “spite and not genuine concern for his child’s well being, safety, оr developmental needs.”
When the Ericson Case came before the magistrate court for hearing, the magistrate judge found that Robinson lacked “the requisite training and experience to testify as an expert witness” and struck her home study report from evidence. Robinson was permitted to tеstify as a fact witness.
On November 16, 2012, Colafranceschi, acting pro se, filed a complaint against Robinson and Briley, alleging professional malpractice and defamation related to the home study reports. After Colafranceschi amended his complaint, Robinson and Briley filed motions to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Both argued that quasi-judicial immunity shielded them from suit. The district court heard the motions to dismiss on April 15, 2013. The district court granted Robinson’s motion to dismiss “with leave to Plaintiff to file an amended complaint” setting forth facts supporting Colafranceschi’s claim that Robinson had obtаined the appointments to conduct the home studies by fraud or misrepresentation. The district court deferred resolving the claims against Briley until after the amended complaint was filed. The district court reasoned that, although Robinson and Briley were entitled to the protection of quasi-judicial immunity bаsed upon the trial court’s home study order, misconduct toward the court resulting in Robinson’s obtaining the appointment might not receive immunity.
Colafranceschi filed his Second Amended Complaint on April 25, 2013. Colafranceschi alleged that “Robinson solicited the services of the court by sending a letter to thе Valley County courts prior” to her appointment, that she and the magistrate judge had lunch, during which “Robinson willfully misrepresented her qualifications to the court staff” for the purpose of obtaining the appointment as child custody evaluator. Colafranceschi alleged that Briley served as Robinson’s supervisor on the case and Briley intentionally and willfully interfered with the child custody evaluation. He also alleged that Briley should not have been Robinson’s supervisor due to a conflict of interest because Briley was Schoonover’s counselor.
Robinson and Briley filed renewed motions to dismiss. Robinsоn and Briley asserted that quasi-judicial immunity protected them from suit and that defects in the appointment process did not result in loss of immunity. The district court dismissed the Second Amended Complaint on September 16, 2013, reasoning as follows:
Reduced to its basics the Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Robinson misrepresеnted to the Court her qualifications to perform the home study. If that be the case, it should not have occurred. Nonetheless that allegation does not defeat the application of the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity to the Defendant. Her background was subject to scrutiny prior to the cоmpletion of the home study. The report itself was subject to scrutiny, and the competence of the evaluator was subject to critical examination concerning her expertise and the contents of the evaluation. If there were an ethical violation, that would be the subject of review by the appropriate supervising authorities. If the Court for which the report was prepared determined that there was insufficient expertise to justify acceptance of the evaluation, the Court could disregard the evaluation. The Plaintiff could challenge the facts and сonclusions of the evaluation by other evidence. In sum, there are remedial avenues short of exposing an evaluator to open ended litigation if there is a perceived flaw in the appointment process.
In high conflict custody cases there is likely discontent in many situations. The рrotection of those who do such evaluations afforded by the principle of quasi-judicial immunity is significant. It should not be lost easily. Allegations of fraud or some other mischief in obtaining an appointment might rise to the level of eliminating the shield, particularly if there are no avenues to remediatе the alleged misconduct. The allegations of the Second Amended Complaint do not rise to that level.
Colafranceschi moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of his Second Amended Complaint. The district court denied the motion and issued final judgments in favor of Briley and Robinson. Colafranceschi timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“[A] district court’s dismissal of a complaint under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) shall be reviewed de
novo.”
Hoffer v. City of Boise
, 151 Idaho 400, 402, 257 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011) (alteration in
original) (quoting
Taylor v. McNichols
,
III. ANALYSIS
Colafranceschi has acted pro se throughout this action and on appeal. “Pro se civil
litigants are not accorded special latitude merеly because they chose to proceed through litigation
without the assistance of an attorney.”
Michalk v. Michalk
,
“When considering a 12(b)(6) motion, we look only to the pleadings to determine
whether a claim for relief has been stated.”
Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Cnty. of Kootenai
, 151
Idaho 405, 409, 258 P.3d 340, 344 (2011). “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
should not be granted ‘unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim that would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief.’ ”
Taylor v. Maile
, 142 Idaho
253, 257,
As notеd, the district court granted Robinson and Briley’s motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) after concluding that quasi-judicial immunity extended to custody evaluators acting for the court and that Colafranceschi’s claim of fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the court appointment did not defeat this immunity. Colafranceschi does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that custody evaluators are entitled to the protection provided by quasi- judicial immunity. Rather, he directs his challenge to the district court’s conclusion that misconduct in securing the appointment does not strip the evaluator of immunity. Colаfranceschi asserts that Robinson’s misrepresentation of her qualifications should eliminate her immunity because an individual who is not qualified to conduct a home study is not entitled to the immunity afforded to qualified professionals. Robinson and Briley respond that an error in the evaluation of a propоsed custody evaluator’s qualification is not a basis for eliminating immunity. We agree.
The only authority that Colafranceschi has identified in support of his contention is the
unreported case of
Kuberka v. Anoka Mediation, Inc.
, No. A05-2490,
We do not find Kuberka to be persuasive authority. Colafranceschi does not argue that Robinson was simply not immune for her actions taken prior to her appointment, as was argued and addressed in Kuberka . Rather, Colafranceschi argues that because Robinson was not properly qualified to perform the home evaluation, she could never be protected by immunity. Kuberka does not support this position.
We find that current existing Idaho case law provides sufficient guidance to decide this
issue. This Court extensively discussed quasi-judicial immunity in
McKay v. Owens
, 130 Idaho
148,
Further, and perhaps more relevant to our decision today, we looked at the policies
underlying quasi-judicial immunity to decide when someone is protected.
Id
. at 157–58, 937
P.2d at 1231–32. We considered the importance of the appointee’s exercise of independent
judgment and the importance of avoiding the pressure that might be brought to bear by the
“intimidating wrath and litigious penchant of disgruntled parents.”
Id
. at 158,
In our view, the emotionally charged nature of child custody disputes creates an even greater potential for retaliatory litigation by disappointed parents. As did the district court, we are unwilling to remove the shield of quasi-judicial immunity due to errors in the process of establishing the qualifications of a parenting time evaluator. We find that the chilling effect on professionals’ willingness to perform this important function outweighs the interests of aggrieved parents. We do so for reasons similar to those we considered in McKay , where we observed that quasi-judicial immunity “does not leave the parties without recourse.” Id. We noted that a guardian ad litem is subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct, that the guardian can be removed by the court, the court can reject the recommendations, and the parties may appeal an adverse decision. Likewise, dissatisfied litigants may request that the evaluator be removed, that the court disregard any report or recommendation, and appeal any adverse decision.
For these reasons, we conclude that Robinson’s motion to dismiss was properly granted as Colafranceschi can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
As to Briley, Colafranceschi argues that because Briley was not specifically appointed by
the court, she is not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Although this Court has not previously
addressed the issue of quasi-judicial immunity for a supervisor, other courts have concluded that
when the claim against a supervisor is dependent upon the claim against the court-appointed
actor, immunity extends to the supervisor.
See, e.g., Awai v. Kotin
,
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing Colafranceschi’s complaint with prejudice and award costs on appeal to Robinson and Briley.
Chief Justice BURDICK and Justices EISMANN, J. JONES and W. JONES, CONCUR .
Notes
[1] Given that the district court dismissed this action pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), this factual background is drawn from the contents of Colafranceschi’s Second Amended Complaint and the attachments thereto.
[2] Colafranceschi’s notice of appeal advances the claim that the district court erred in denying his motion for
reconsideration. We find that this claim has been waived because Colafranceschi did not support this issue on appeal
with authority or argument. “When issues on appeal are not supported by propositions of law, authority, or
argument, they will not be considered . . . . A party waives an issue cited оn appeal if either authority or argument is
lacking, not just if both are lacking.”
Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison
,
[3] Indeed, by rule, this Court has provided: “Any parenting time evaluator appointed by the court or a court approved, stipulated evaluator is performing a judicial function when conducting an evaluation and is entitled to qualified judicial immunity.” I.R.C.P. 16(q); I.R.F.L.P. 719(J). These rules were not in effect at the time of Robinson’s appointment.