53 Ga. App. 533 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
A municipal corporation “is bound to use ordinary care to keep its public streets and sidewalks which are open for public use in a reasonably safe condition for passage.” Herrington v. Macon, 125 Ga. 58, 61 (54 S. E. 71). For a failure to exercise this care, it will be liable for resulting injuries, “no matter by what cause the street or sidewalk may have become defective or unsafe, where the city knew or should have known of the defect in time to repair it or to give warning of its existence.” McFarland v. McCaysville, 39 Ga. App. 739 (148 S. E. 421). The question here presented is not one of first impression, but appears to have been settled in principle by the rulings made in City of Brunswick v. Glogauer, 158 Ga. 792, 801-812 (supra), and the cases there cited and followed. In that case, as in this, the defect appears to have been what should be classed as a minor one. The Supreme Court there further expressed itself as follows: “As appears from the reports of the cases which are fully set out above, the defects in the sidewalks which produced the injuries were minor defects. Those decisions hold in effect that the minor defects under consideration were sufficient upon which to submit to the jury the question of negligence of the city in allowing the sidewalk to remain in such condition, and to support a finding for the plaintiffs. Each of them was rendered by all of the Justices of the court as it was then constituted; and never having been overruled, they are binding as precedents. While the defect in
Even in a case where the petition shows actual knowledge by the plaintiff of the defect, “the mere fact that one using a street or sidewalk may have knowledge of the existence of some defect or obstruction does not always and as a matter of law constitute such contributory negligence as will in and of itself preclude a recovery, if, in view of such knowledge, the injured person exercised reasonable and ordinary care under the circumstances.”
Judgment reversed.