This was an action brought by appellant as’ plaintiff to recover compensation alleged to be due him for services performed for the Works Progress Administration. We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in the trial court.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was sustained, and the judgment appealed from was thereupon entered. The complaint alleges that the action is brought under the Federal Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1938, Sec. 9, 52 Stat. 812, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 721-728, and Administrative Orders Nos. 44 and 48 of the Works Progress Administration; that plaintiff was duly certified as eligible for work relief as required by statute and said administrative orders; that he was given work on October 22, 1932 and assigned to fit men’s clothing, and continued such work until March 29, 1939; that he worked 924 hours, for which he was entitled to receive the sum of $785.40; that he was not paid the wages due him under the provisions of the statutes and the regulations, “which regulations and laws provide for wages based on the prevalent hourly wage scale and that classifications be made according to occupational titles.” It is then alleged that there was due plaintiff the sum of $357.27, the difference between the wages paid and the amount he is entitled to receive as provided by statute and regulations.
To this complaint the defendant interposed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: (1) that the court lacks jurisdiction because Congress has given no consent to be sued in the Act of Congress cited in Paragraph II of the complaint; (2) that the court lacks jurisdiction to review the administrative actions of the head of a department of an agency of the United States; (3) that the complaint fails to state a cause of action against defendant upon which relief can be granted.
Although the case was submitted to the court upon this motion to dismiss presenting only questions of law, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. In the findings it is recited that the motion to dismiss “is made upon the complaint, the grounds set out in the motion to dismiss and the certified records, all of which papers and records are on file herein.” The court found that Title 1, Section 1 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 721-728, authorized the President of the United States to expend not to exceed the sum of $25,-000,000 for the purpose of providing direct relief for needy persons; that by Presidential Letter No. 2099, dated June 21, 1938, the Administrator of the W.P.A. was authorized to expend not to exceed the sum of $10,000,000 for the purchase of clothing for direct relief to needy persons; that by Executive Order No. 7092, dated July 3, 1935, the President authorized the heads of the Emergency Relief Agencies to classify; the positions of the employees in the Emergency Relief Agencies and fix their rates of compensation, either in accordance with the salary schedule contained in Presidential Executive Order No. 6746, dated June 21, 1934, or in accordance with the provisions of the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, 5 U.S.C.A. § 661 et seq.; that on October 22, 1938, plaintiff was employed in connection with the distribution of the mentioned clothing and classified as a clothing handler; that the rate of pay of plaintiff. was fixed at $75 per month, or $900 per annum; that he was paid from the general administrative funds authorized by Section 1(1) (a) of said Act; that the employment of plaintiff was terminated on March 29, 1939; that he was carried on the pay roll until April 13, 1939; that at no time during his employment did he question his classification or his rate of.pay. The court concluded as a matter of law that the appropriation for the purchase of clothing was for direct relief for needy persons and not intended for the prosecution of a project to create work for the unemployed; that the classification of plaintiff and his rate of pay were matters for administrative action; that the court was without jurisdiction to* review this administrative action; and that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action against the defendant upon which relief could be granted.
As already observed, this case was presented to the trial court upon a motion to dismiss because of the alleged failure of 1he complaint to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Rule 12(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. This motion sup
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planted the general demurrer in an action at law and admits, for the purpose of the motion, all facts which are well pleaded. There was no answer interposed and no evidence introduced, nor was any opportunity afforded plaintiff to introduce evidence in support of the allegations of his complaint. Although the court made findings of fact and conclusions of law, the only facts which the court could properly have considered were those appearing in the complaint, supplemented by such facts as the court judicially knew. While the court must accept as true all well pleaded facts, the motion does not admit facts which the court will take judicial notice are not true, nor does the rule apply to legally impossible facts, nor to facts inadmissible in evidence, nor to facts which appear by a record or document included in the pleadings to be unfounded. Gibbs v. Buck,
In Polk Co. v. Glover, supra [
In the instant case there would seem to have been no occasion for findings of fact or conclusions of law. Nothing in the complaint warranted the. finding that plaintiff was employed and classified as a clothing handler. Nothing in the complaint warranted the finding that plaintiff was paid from the general administrative funds authorized by Section 1(1) (a) of said Act. No allegation of the complaint warranted the finding that at no time during his employment did the plaintiff question his classification or his rate of pay. When a motion to dismiss is interposed the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and it should not be dismissed if it is reasonably conceivable that at the trial the plaintiff might establish a cause of action. Leimer v. State Mutual Life Assur. Co., 8 Cir.,
It is contended by defendant that plaintiff’s receipt of compensation without protest, in the absence of fraud or duress, will preclude his right of recovery. The question is not properly before us because it does not appear from the complaint that he received compensation without protest or objection. However, that question will doubtless be presented on retrial of the action. Great reliance is placed upon the decision of the Supreme Court in United States v. Garlinger,
In that case the plaintiff had performed extra services, but had received all the compensation to which he was entitled under Acts of Congress. In the instant case the question is whether plaintiff has received what was due him. It is possible that facts may be developed which might preclude recovery. On the other hand, equitable considerations might arise to prevent defendant from insisting that plaintiff had been paid in full. The opinion in United States v. Garlinger, supra, suggests fraud and duress as equitable factors, but other factors might be presented, such as mutual mistake or a relationship of trust and confidence. As to that issue the inquiry must be conducted with the benefit of the light that may be thrown upon it by full disclosure of the facts. Rule 8(c) of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires that accord and satisfaction, estoppel, fraud, payment, release, waiver, “and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense” must be set forth affirmatively. If this is to be an issue, defendant must answer the complaint before it can be heard upon it.
The judgment appealed from is therefore reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to grant plaintiff a new trial.