195 A. 540 | Md. | 1937
Harry Cohen, the appellant, in this case alone was indicted on February 26th, 1937, on a charge of riot on the 12th day of February, 1937, at Baltimore City, together with eight named persons and divers other persons to the jurors unknown. There were two counts in the indictment, the first count of the indictment charged Cohen, together with those named and divers other persons with unlawful assembly, and "* * * then and there being so gathered together did make a great noise, riot, tumult and disturbance, and then and there unlawfully, riotously and tumultously remained and continued together for a long space of time, to-wit, for the space of fifteen minutes and more next following, to the great terror and disturbance of the persons thereabouts inhabiting, residing and being and passing and repassing upon the public highway there, to the great terror of the people of the said State, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State."
The second count charged that Harry Cohen, together with the same eight named in the first count and divers other persons to the jurors unknown, being unlawfully assembled, "* * * then and there being so assembled, and *237 gathered together then and there riotously did assault, intimidate and interfere with certain employees of The Yellow Cab Company, a corporation, to-wit, Frank Phelps and certain other persons to the jurors aforesaid unknown, and did destroy certain vehicles, to-wit, certain taxicabs, then and there being, of the property of The Yellow Cab Company, a corporation, to the great disturbance and terror of the people, and against the peace, government and dignity of the State."
The defendant demurred to each count of the indictment and the demurrers were overruled. The defendant thereupon, on the 8th day of March, 1937, filed two special pleas, in which he set out the indictment contained in the record in No. 16 at this Term, ante
p. 216,
In the opinion filed in No. 16 at this Term, this court declared that the State was not confined to the day named in the indictment for the commission of the offense of riot and inciting to riot there charged, and that under that indictment evidence was admissible down to the date of the indictment, not only for the purpose of showing guilty knowledge or intent, but as evidence of the offense charged in the indictment, in the absence of a bill of *238
particulars, which was not requested, the granting of which, however, is in the discretion of the court. Hochheimer, Crim.Law, sec. 126; Dunlop v. United States,
It is so well settled that one cannot be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense that the State's demurrers to the special pleas should have been overruled, and the case should not have proceeded to trial on its merits, and certainly not until there had been a final adjudication of the matters charged in the first indictment, and then, not at all, if that final judgment was "guilty." Ellingham v. State,
Judgment reversed.