225 Ga. 646 | Ga. | 1969
Sheldon B. Cohen, a stockholder in Peach-tree Medical Building, Inc., brought an action against the corporation, its president, J. Wendell Glass and other stockholders named in the complaint, seeking to restrain the issuance of shares of stock to certain of the named individual defendants pursuant to stock options which allegedly had been previously granted to the defendants in violation of the plaintiff's preemptive rights guaranteed to him under the provisions of Section 1 of the Act approved February 15, 1952 (Ga. L. 1952, pp. 198, 199; Code Ann. § 22-1831.1) which Act added a new “Section 12A” to the Corporation Act of 1938 (Ga. L. 1938, pp. 214, 227). The judge of the superior court, before whom the case was heard, after hearing oral testimony and receiving voluminous documentary evidence, passed an order denying the relief prayed for and dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff was barred by laches
The evidence authorized the judge to find that the corporation in question was organized by about 16 individuals in 1960, the charter having been granted on August 15, 1960. The charter did not deny preemptive rights. The plaintiff was not one of the original incorporators but became a stockholder on March 9, 1962. When he purchased his stock he was required to pay interest on the purchase price of the stock at the rate of 8% per annum from December 31, 1960, to the date it was paid for. The original charter did. not authorize the issuance of debentures and stock options but it was amended in January 1963 pursuant to a resolution passed by the stockholders in July 1962 so as to authorize the issuance of options to purchase the corporation’s stock “to such persons and upon such terms and conditions, for such price and consideration as the board of directors may authorize upon the approval of the majority of the stockholders.” No resolution or vote of the stockholders authorizing the issuance of stock options or fixing the terms therefor was ever taken by the stockholders after the amendment of the charter. However, the judge was authorized to find that stock options dated December 31, 1962, were issued to the individual defendants.
In April 1963 the plaintiff and the defendant corporation entered into a buy and sell agreement limiting his right to dispose of his shares of stock in the corporation. (Such an agreement was entered into between the corporation and all other stockholders.) This agreement provided, among other things, for the redemption of the stock by the corporation in the event of the death of the stockholder, said agreement being funded by an insurance policy currently taken out by the corporation. This agreement also embodied, among its other terms, provisions relating to the evaluation and redemption of stock options. The plaintiff, on cross examination, ad
We think that these facts authorized the trial court to apply the equitable doctrine of laches to the plaintiff’s complaint and to dismiss the same. The plaintiff contended in his testimony on the trial of the case that one of the reasons why he did not sooner take action to have the stock options canceled was because he did not understand the meaning of the term and therefore did not know what a stock option was. However, he did not show any reason why a simple inquiry would not have revealed to him the meaning of the term. “If by negligence one voluntarily remains ignorant of a fact materially affecting his interest and subsequently loses a right or property, he should not expect a court of equity to do that for him which he refused to do for himself.” McCullough v. Kirby, 204 Ga. 738, 744 (51 SE2d 812). See also, in this connection: Manget Realty Co. v. Carolina Realty Co., 169 Ga. 495, 504 (150 SE 828), and Hutchinson v. King, 192 Ga. 402, 403 (15 SE2d 523). “Notice sufficient to excite attention and put a party on inquiry shall be notice of every
Judgment affirmed.