COGLEY v. CITY OF BUTLERCOGLEY v. CITY OF BUTLER
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV, United States District Judge
Plaintiff James Andrew Cogley (“Cogley“) filed his first amended complaint (ECF No. 5) against Defendants City of Butler, Butler City Police Department, Sergeant Jeremy Walters (“Walters“) in his individual and official capacities, and Officer Jacob May (“May“) in his individual and official capacities, (collectively, “Defendants“). He asserts several federal law claims for Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure; Fourth Amendment unreasonable continued seizure/retention of property; violation of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s procedural due process clause; violation of the Fourteenth Amendment‘s substantive due process clause; failure to intervene; civil rights conspiracy; violation of the First Amendment for denial of access to communication; violation of the First Amendment for denial of access to communication; and a Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) claim for failure to train and supervise against the City of Butler. Cogley also brings claims under Pennsylvania Law for conversion; trespass to chattels (split into two separate claims); breach of oral contract; and invasion of privacy. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Cogley‘s amended complaint for failure to state a claim, or in the alternative, to treat their motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 8, 9). The Court will not convert Defendants’ motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Cogley, a resident of Butler County, Pennsylvania, has been a real estate investor engaging in buying, selling, and renting real estate properties since November 2006. (ECF No. 5, ¶ 1, 10). Cogley has used two cell phones—one for personal use and one solely for rental property management—since 2007. (Id. ¶ 11).
On March 17, 2023, Cogley was at his residence on Walker Avenue in Butler, Pennsylvania, negotiating a sale of his real estate property with two private individuals. (Id. ¶ 12).
He was “holding approximately $3,000.00 in earnest money received from the prospective buyers to enter into contracts. The money was either still in or partially in paper bank bands.” (Id. ¶ 13).
During Cogley‘s interaction with the prospective buyers, May arrived on scene, intercepted Cogley “at the side of his residence” and executed his arrest “pursuant to an alleged warrant issued by State Parole (“PBPP“).” (Id. ¶ 14). Soon after, Walters and another officer (Officer Doctor) arrived on scene, along with a Butler County Probation Officer (John Doe), who “came to the front side of Cogley‘s property.” (Id. ¶ 15). After placing him under arrest, May escorted Cogley to his patrol vehicle, parked near the residence driveway. (Id. ¶ 16). May then began searching Cogley‘s person. A wallet and approximately $3,000.00 in cash were found in Cogley‘s pockets. (Id. ¶ 17). Cogley was an active drug addict at the time of the arrest, and while conducting the search, May found “several items of paraphernalia on [Cogley‘s] person.” (Id.).
According to Cogley, May proceeded to tell Walters—the supervising officer—“that he observed suspected drug paraphernalia on [Cogley‘s] kitchen table. Thereafter, Cogley “was transferred from [ ] May‘s patrol vehicle to Officer Doctor‘s patrol vehicle while Officer Doctor and Defendant Walters accompanied him. (Id. ¶¶ 25–26). According to Cogley, “[u]nder the supervision and direction of [ ] Walters, [ ] May left the scene to obtain a search warrant for [Cogley‘s] residence based on the alleged drug paraphernalia,” taking Cogley‘s confiscated wallet, money, and cell phones with him in his patrol car. (Id. ¶¶ 27–28).
While Cogley was in processing at BCP, May and Officer Doctor came back to return his $2,700.00 of seized cash, explaining “we did not find enough drugs to keep your money,” despite, as Cogley contends, the fact that no drugs were found. (Id. ¶¶ 30–31). During the interaction, Cogley “demanded the return of his cell phones,” to which May refused, and he left with Officer Doctor. (Id. ¶ 32).
Several hours later, Cogley was arraigned “on a single charge of possession of drug paraphernalia and committed to BCP in lieu of a $10,000 bond.” (Id. ¶ 34).
“On April 28, 2023, [Cogley] initiated legal action regarding the unlawful seizure of his cell phones by filing a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas.” (Id. ¶ 35). On May 9, 2023, the petition was personally served upon Defendants by the sheriff, but “Defendants did not file any response, objection, or appearance in the [m]andamus action, despite having full notice of the unlawful retention of the property.” (Id. ¶ 45). On June 6, 2023, Defendants were again served with an amended petition, “directing a response within 20 days,” and Defendants again failed to “file any response, objection, or appearance in the [m]andamus action, despite having full notice of the unlawful retention of property.” (Id.). The court of common pleas granted the petition on July 6, 2023, “expressly ordering the return of the seized cell phones.” (Id. ¶ 46). Cogley asserts that “Defendants still failed to comply with the order and did not return the phones until November 17, 2023, when [Cogley] retrieved them from the City Solicitor,” approximately eight months after the original seizure, and four months after the mandamus order. (Id.).
According to Cogley, the information his family member provided revealed that “Defendants had failed to secure [his] residence” even though “Walters specifically assured [him] that his residence and property would be secured after the search.” (Id. ¶¶ 40–41). He asserts that the back door was left “unsecured” and unlocked, the door to the basement “was left unlocked and unsecured,” and “a front bedroom window was left unlocked,” all of which provided “easy access for damage and theft.” (Id. ¶ 42).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule“) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A plaintiff must allege sufficient facts that, if accepted as true, state a claim for relief plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. See Doe v. Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 340 (3d Cir. 2022); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). Although a court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, it is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
The “plausibility” standard required for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss is not akin to a “probability” requirement but asks for more than sheer “possibility.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, the complaint‘s factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations are true even if doubtful in fact. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility is present when a plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that a defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Even if the complaint‘s well-pleaded facts lead to a plausible inference, that inference alone will not entitle a plaintiff to relief. Id., 556 U.S. at 682. The complaint must support the inference with facts to plausibly justify that inferential leap. Id.
Generally, a court may not consider an extraneous document when reviewing a motion to dismiss. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). If parties present matters outside the pleadings and the court does not exclude them, the motion must be converted to a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, however, a court may consider attachments to it without converting the motion into one for summary judgment if they are integral to the allegations in the complaint and are authentic. See In re Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (holding that a court may consider a “document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint“); ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994) (same); Fallon v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr. of Se. Pa., 877 F.3d 487, 493 (3d Cir. 2017) (same); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.“); see also Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a court may consider an “undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff‘s claims are based on the document“).
Initially, the Court must confront Defendants’ request to consider their Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule“) 56. (ECF No. 9). Defendants suggest that Cogley “bases his Complaint on the assertion that Defendants violated several of his constitutional rights,” including the unreasonable seizure of his cell phones, “yet, [Cogley] has already addressed this through litigation in the Court of Common Pleas of Butler County in 2023,” when he filed a Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Prohibition for their return, which was granted pursuant to an order of court (“the Order“). (Id. at 6). Defendants attached a copy of the Order to their motion to dismiss and further requests that the Court take judicial notice of the docket entries for that litigation. (Id.). Defendants additionally explain that Cogley “references the incident reports for the two underlying investigations related to the seizure of his cellular telephones” and attaches a copy of those incident reports to their motion to dismiss the amended complaint. (Id. at 6–7) (citing ECF Nos. 8-3 & 8-4). Defendants argue that if the attached documents are considered by the Court, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56” as opposed to Rule 12(b)(6). (Id. at 5) (citing Caste v. Cohen, 840 F.2d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1998)).
The Court disagrees and will not convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has expressed that when deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “courts generally consider only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form the basis of a claim.” Shelley v. Wilson, 339 F. App‘x 136, 137 n. 2 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 222 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004)). The Court notes that the Order granting Cogley‘s petition for writ of mandamus in the underlying action is referenced and relied upon in Cogley‘s amended complaint, referenced and relied upon in the Defendants’ motion to dismiss, and attached as an exhibit to the motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 35, 45–47, 52, 92, 100–101, 108, 116; ECF No. 9, p. 6; ECF No. 8-2). Additionally, a court may take judicial notice of another court‘s publicly filed docket entries. Orabi v. Att‘y Gen. of the U.S., 738 F.3d 535, 537 n.1 (3d Cir. 1968). As such, the Order may be considered by the Court without converting Defendants’ motion into one for summary judgment.
The cited documents fall within the scope of material the Court can consider without requiring it to convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. The Court will commence its analysis of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Cogley‘s federal claims.1
Cogley pursues multiple claims against May and Walters under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging they violated several of his constitutional rights. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citing Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981)). Cogley clearly establishes that both May and Walters are/were “sworn law enforcement officer[s] employed by the Butler City Police Department at all times relevant hereto, acting under the color of state law.” (ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 4–5) (emphasis added). Cogley‘s § 1983 claims consist of allegations that May and Walters violated his constitutional rights, specifically those conferred by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Cogley additionally brings constitutional claims against the City of Butler under the theory of liability provided by Monell. (ECF No. 5, ¶ 98). The Court will examine the City of Butler‘s liability separately.
For the reasons stated below, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss as it relates to some, but not all, of the constitutional claims.
1. Cogley sufficiently pleads his Fourth Amendment unreasonable search and seizure claim against Defendants.
The Fourth Amendment, at its core, provides the utmost protection to one‘s home—upholding “the right of a man to retreat into his home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion.” Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). A Fourth Amendment unreasonable search is the result of the government‘s intrusion into an area, without a lawful warrant, in which an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy, the expectation being one that society is willing to recognize. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 340 A.3d 297, 307 (2025). An unreasonable seizure occurs when a government actor meaningfully interferes “with an individual‘s possessory interests in that property.” Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 63 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). “A search or seizure conducted without a warrant ‘is presumptively unreasonable ... subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated exceptions.‘” Commonwealth v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888, 896 (2024) (quoting Interest of T.W., 261 A.3d 409, 416 (2021)).
Defendants, through their brief supporting the motion to dismiss, admit that they did not obtain a search warrant to lawfully enter Cogley‘s home and seize his property, but they maintain that several exceptions apply to justify their entrance. First, Defendants assert that Cogley, upon telling May that his cell phones were on the kitchen table inside his residence, “thereby expand[ed] the scope of the search of his person incident to his lawful arrest and consent[ed] to [ ] May‘s entrance into his kitchen.” (ECF No. 9, p. 6). Defendants attempt to invoke both a search incident to a lawful arrest exception, along with consent exceptions, to excuse their warrantless entrance into Cogley‘s home. Additionally, Defendants contend that the officer‘s seizure of the cell phones was justified under the plain view doctrine. (Id. at 8).
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found that the officers’ search of a defendant‘s home was not incident to his arrest and failed to justify a warrantless search where defendant was arrested outside of his residence and had already been in custody prior to the officers searching his home. Commonwealth v. Wright, 742 A.2d 661, 665 (1999).
The scope of a search incident to arrest only permits the search of the arrestee and his “immediate vicinity,” that is, the area within the arrestee‘s reach at the time of his arrest “from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.” Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 33–34 (1970) (further clarifying that “[i]f a search of a house is to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place inside the house” (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925))). The facts alleged here show that May and Walters’ actions were not incident to Cogley‘s arrest. As in Wright, 742 A.2d at 665, Cogley was not initially arrested inside his residence, but intercepted by May outside of his home. Additionally, Cogley was handcuffed and escorted to the police vehicle where May executed a pat-down search. As pled, the initial search of Cogley‘s person was lawful but the alleged search conducted by May after the pat down exceeded the scope of legality. It was not until after May concluded the pat-down search and placed the items found on Cogley‘s person in the patrol vehicle that Cogley made the request for his friends to retrieve his phones. Cogley‘s residence, where the contested search was made, was neither within the immediate vicinity in which the arrest was made nor contemporaneous with the arrest itself.5
Defendants allege that Cogley and his two friends gave consent to search the residence. They maintain that Cogley “told [ ] May that his cell phones were located in the kitchen of his residence,” which purportedly indicated that Cogley was voluntarily expanding the scope of the search. (ECF No. 9, pp. 7–8). And, according to Defendants, May and Walters obtained the additional consent to search the residence from Cogley‘s friends, who allowed the officers to search the residence. (Id. at 8). Based on the facts stated in the amended complaint, the Court disagrees with Defendants’ contention. The totality of circumstances surrounding Cogley‘s alleged consent do not support Defendants’ position. Cogley asserts that he asked for one of his friends to retrieve his cell phones. Such a request cannot be construed as voluntary consent for May, or any other officer on the scene, to enter his residence. The Court does not find his request to be sufficiently specific or unequivocal to be understood as a consent to search. See Commonwealth v. Dunne, 690 A.2d 1233, 1236 (Pa. Super. 1997) (“In order for consent to be valid, it must be ‘unequivocal, specific, and voluntary.‘” (quoting Commonwealth v. Gibson, 638 A.2d 203, 207 (1994))).
The facts, as stated in Cogley‘s amended complaint, do not demonstrate that May and Walters could have perceived Cogley‘s friends, standing on his porch outside of his residence, as individuals possessing apparent authority over Cogley‘s residence. Defendants fail to provide the Court with any reason to support their argument that May and Walters, acting as reasonable police officers, could have believed that Cogley‘s friends had the requisite authority to consent to the contested search. (ECF No. 9, p. 8 (Defendants only assert that the officers identified themselves and the friends let them into Cogley‘s house)); See U.S. v. Murray, 821 F.3d 386, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2016) (“When an individual possesses only apparent, rather than actual, common authority, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the police officer‘s entry is ‘based upon the consent of a third party whom the police, at the time of the entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority over the premises, but who in fact does not do so.‘” (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990))).
Cogley has additionally alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim that the officers conducted an illegal seizure under the Fourth Amendment. “A ‘seizure’ of property occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an individual‘s possessory interest in that property.” Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 113. Cogley asserts that, “[o]n March 17, 2023, [ ] May entered [Cogley‘s] residence without [his] consent and without a warrant to enter the home, and seized [Cogley‘s] two personal cell phones after [he] specifically requested that one of his friends retrieve them instead.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 89). The facts clearly demonstrate that the officers did not possess a warrant to search Cogley‘s home for purposes of seizing his cell phones. (Id. at ¶ 53) (“[I]n[o] search warrant for [Cogley‘s] cell phones existed at the time they were seized on March 17, 2023.“). Additionally, Cogley alleges that “May entered [Cogley‘s] residence through the kitchen door without permission and retrieved the two cell phones himself” then “placed the cell phones on the front passenger floor of his patrol vehicle” and “left the scene to obtain a search warrant for [Cogley‘s] residence” while “[Cogley‘s] wallet, money, and cell phones remained in [May‘s] possession inside his patrol car.” (Id. at ¶¶ 23–24, 27–28). Cogley satisfies the pleading requirement to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—his possessory interest in the cell phones taken from his home was meaningfully interfered with when May took them to his patrol vehicle and carried them off the premises without legal justification.
In support of applying the plain view doctrine, Defendants assert that Cogley‘s “cell phones were seized as evidence in connection with an overdose death, and separate search warrants were obtained for [his] cell phones.” (ECF No. 9, p. 2). But, per the amended complaint, the warrants were applied for and obtained on May 13, 2023, almost two months after the search of Cogley‘s residence and seizure of his cell phones, which occurred on March 17, 2023. (ECF Nos. 5 & 8-4, p. 4). Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that “[b]elief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a warrant. Such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause.” Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. at 33. Even if Cogley‘s cell phones were instrumentalities of a crime that the officers believed he committed, and they were made aware of the phones’ locations, they still needed to obtain consent before conducting a search. Additionally, Defendants’ assertion that Cogley‘s “cell phones were seized as evidence in an overdose death where [Cogley] was a person of interest and retained for the investigative process,” relates to an extraneous matter and is unpersuasive. (ECF No. 9, p. 9). The officers were not arresting Cogley for his alleged involvement in the overdose death, thus the cell phones had no established nexus to the specific criminal conduct that was the subject of the arrest warrant—a “technical parole violation.” (ECF No. 5, p. 4); See United States v. Lacosta-Franco, No. 2:26-CR-27, 2026 WL 906682, at *6–7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2026) (finding that there was no nexus between the charged drug possession offenses and the cell phones because the government‘s attempt to support its search of the cell phones was based on suspicion of conspiracy, but conspiracy was not a charge brought against the defendant which led to her arrest. Searches lacking nexus between the items seized and the crime are unconstitutional).
2. Cogley sufficiently pleads Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure and retention of property against May and Walters.
Courts in this circuit have explained that “the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally prohibits the seizure of property without the issuance of a warrant.” United States v. Williams, 813 F. Supp. 3d 503, 516 (E.D. Pa. 2016). However, the Supreme Court has held that “certain warrantless seizures of personal property without an exception to the warrant requirement are appropriate. But those seizures are typically analogous to a Terry stop: brief detentions based on articulable facts which are limited in scope to fulfill a specific investigatory purpose.” Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983)). A court must view the duration for which seized property is held with scrutiny “because the infringement of an individual‘s possessory interests compounds with ‘each passing day.‘” United States v. Brown, No. 1:21-CR-251, 2023 WL 8702145, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 15, 2023) (citing United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 235 (3d Cir. 2011)).
“An individual‘s phone must be afforded heightened protection as it ‘is the digital equivalent of its owner‘s home, capable of holding a universe of private information.‘” United States v. Williams, 813 F. Supp. 3d at 515 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2012)). Of course, warrantless seizures of a cell phone are sometimes justified. For instance, a court in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that a defendant‘s claim that an officer‘s conduct violated her Fourth Amendment rights by seizing her cell phone and retaining it for an unreasonable period of time was without merit because her incarceration was “wholly concurrent with the Government‘s seizure of her phone,” and since “[a]s a practical matter, cellphones are not permitted in jail” defendant‘s “status as an inmate” resulted in a diminished property interest in her cellphone. Lacosta-Franco, 2026 WL 906682, at *6.
In conducting the balancing test, the Court must first analyze Cogley‘s property interest at stake and then turn to its examination of the Defendants’ purported rationale for the delay. United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d at 235–36. Cogley alleges that “[s]ince 2007, [he] has maintained two active phone lines: one personal line and one used exclusively for rental property management.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 11). After he was detained, Cogley requested that one of his friends retrieve his cell phones from the kitchen table so that he “could access contact numbers and prevent loss or theft of the phones during his detention.” (Id. ¶ 21). Instead, the officers seized Cogley‘s cell phones. He alleges that May entered his home and seized his two cell phones from the kitchen table. (Id. at 89). “At the time of this seizure, there existed no search warrant for [Cogley‘s] residence, no warrant for [his] cell phones, and no probable cause to believe [the] phones contained evidence of a crime.” (Id. ¶ 91). It was not until May 9, 2023, almost two months after the date of the seizure, and following Cogley‘s mandamus petition,6 that Defendants obtained a warrant for the cell phones. (Id. ¶ 92).
Several relevant factors are helpful in establishing Cogley‘s property interest. First, the length of the delay is illustrative—“‘[t]he longer the police take to seek a warrant, the greater the infringement on the person‘s possessory interest will be, for the obvious reason that a longer seizure is a greater infringement on possession than a shorter one.‘” United States v. Wright, 534 F. Supp. 3d 416, 423–24 (M.D. Pa. 2021) (quoting United States v. Burgard, 675 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 2012)). To determine if the length of the seizure is unreasonable, the Court must “take into account whether the police diligently pursue[d] their investigation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983)); see also Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 333 (2001) (the delay should be “no longer than reasonably necessary for the police, acting with diligence, to obtain a warrant.“).
According to Defendants, Cogley‘s unreasonable continued seizure and retention of property claim “is meritless where [Cogley‘s] cell phones were seized as evidence in an overdose death where [he] was a person of interest and retained for the investigative process.” (ECF No. 9, p. 9). Defendants further assert that Cogley‘s claims for unlawful seizures are moot because his devices were returned to him. (ECF No. 9, p. 2).
When reviewing the allegations in the amended complaint, and Defendants’ attempt to contradict the Fourth Amendment claims, the Court finds that Cogley has sufficiently shown that Defendants were neither diligent in obtaining a warrant nor responsive to his petitions. See Williams, 813 F. Supp. 3d at 520 (“Rather than a brief Terry-style seizure of property to expeditiously fulfill an investigatory purpose, this was a full deprivation of property which extended for several days before a warrant was obtained.“).
Still, Cogley‘s allegations differ from those where courts have found insufficient possessory interests to state a claim for unreasonable continued seizure of property. Several courts, including the Third Circuit, have explained that “defendants who ‘never sought return of the property’ cannot argue that delay adversely affected Fourth Amendment rights.‘” United States v. Wright, 534 F. Supp. 3d at 427 (quoting Stabile, 633 F.3d at 236). Cogley asserts that he sought return of his cell phones several times, including an immediate request upon arriving at BCP on March 17, 2023, and initiating legal action on April 28, 2023, “by filing a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Butler County Court of Common Pleas” seeking “the immediate return of his cell phones.” (ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 32, 34, 45, 61).
3. Cogley fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim pursuant to § 1983.
Cogley‘s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim will be dismissed with prejudice. The Third Circuit employs a “two-stage analysis” to a plaintiff‘s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim pursuant to § 1983, “inquiring (1) whether ‘the asserted individual interests are encompassed within the fourteenth amendment‘s protection of “life, liberty, or property“‘; and (2) whether the procedures available provided the plaintiff with ‘due process of law.‘” Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Robb v. City of Phila., 733 F.2d 286, 292 (3d Cir. 1984)). Cogley‘s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim arises from May and Walters’ alleged seizure and retention of his cell phones. (ECF No. 5, ¶106). He asserts that May and Walters failed to provide him with “notice of any procedure or process to retrieve the [cell phones], that he “was never served with any warrant relating to his cell phones” or “provided [with] any documentation advising him of how to contest the seizure or seek return of [the cell phones],” and that “Defendants continued to retain [his] phones even after [he] obtained a Mandamus Order from the Butler County Court of Common Pleas… .” (Id. ¶¶ 107–08). Cogley‘s contention that May and Walters’ “refusal to provide any notice or process, combined with the prolonged retention of [his] phones, deprived [him] of property without due process of law,” is unavailing. (Id. ¶ 110).
Finally, Cogley has adequately pled that the City of Butler may be liable for its failure to train and supervise.16
Further, to allege a failure to train, supervise, or discipline under Monell, “the Third Circuit has required a plaintiff to show that a municipality has ‘contemporaneous knowledge of the offending incident or knowledge of a prior pattern of similar incidents and circumstances under which the supervisor‘s actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of approval to the offending subordinate.” Simpson v. Ferry, 202 F. Supp. 3d 444, 454 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting Rosembert v. Borough of E. Lansdowne, No. 13-CV-2826, 2016 WL 161592, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 2016)). The plaintiff is required to “prove that the deficiency in training actually caused [the constitutional violation at issue].” Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d at 180 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391).
the City of Butler failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline its police officers, including [] May and Walters, in the following areas:
a. The constitutional limitations governing entry into private residences;
b. The requirement of probable cause and judicial authorization prior to seizing or retaining personal property such as cell phones;
c. The duty to provide notice and due process to property owners after seizure; and
d. The obligation to prevent and report unlawful searches, seizures, and property damage committed by other officers.
(ECF No. 5, ¶ 150).
The Court has found that Cogley plausibly alleged constitutional violations for unlawful search and seizure, and further finds that he sufficiently identified “a failure to provide specific training that has a causal nexus with [his] injuries” and sufficiently “demonstrate[s] that the absence of that specific training can reasonably be said to reflect a deliberate indifference to whether the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred.” In addition to referencing the same violative conduct he experienced in 2015, Cogley asserts that the City of Butler‘s “need for more or different training was so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in constitutional violations, that [its] policymakers can be said to have been deliberately indifferent to those violations.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 152) (citing City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 390; Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty., 749 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 2014)). The Court agrees. Given the fact that police officers are frequently tasked with executing arrest warrants, and thus often confront situations in which
Violation of the Fourth Amendment is the obvious consequence of insufficient training on lawful search and seizure practices, including what justifies searching and seizing property in the absence of a warrant. Although Cogley‘s allegations are somewhat vague, at this stage of proceedings it is improper to dismiss his Monell claim against the City of Butler. See O‘Donnell v. Cumberland Cnty., 195 F. Supp. 3d 724, 731–32 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (finding a constitutional injury is the predictable and obvious result of a county‘s alleged “failure to train its employees in the proper use of their authority to arrest and incarcerate individuals.” And even where plaintiff‘s allegation was “admittedly vague, and lack[ed] reference to specific prior instances that would demonstrate Defendants’ supposed ‘prior notice,’ it was nonetheless sufficient” at the motion to dismiss stage to state a Monell claim).17
The Court thus denies Defendants’ motion to dismiss Cogley‘s claims for failure to train and supervise.
B. State Common Law Claims
The scope of immunity provided under the PSTCA is broad but includes eight narrow exceptions for “negligent acts” under § 8542(b). Since Cogley does not bring any claims against Defendants for negligent acts, the exceptions are inapplicable. For allegations of intentional conduct, however, the PSTCA extends immunity to municipalities and to public officials in their official capacities, acting within the scope of their official duties. Walker v. N. Wales Borough, 395 F. Supp. 2d 219, 230 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Kane v. Chester Cnty. Dept. of Children, Youth & Fams. 10 F. Supp. 3d 671, 695 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
Cogley brings his state law claims for conversion, along with two claims for trespass to chattels, against Defendants May, Walters, and the City of Butler. (ECF No. 5). The remaining
The Court, however, will proceed with its analysis of Cogley‘s intentional tort claims brought against Walters and May in their individual capacities. Although the PSTCA grants the same immunity to employees as it does to their municipal employer, it does not shield employees sued in their individual capacities “from liability where [their] conduct constitutes a ‘crime, actual fraud, actual malice, or willful misconduct.‘” Milbourne v. Baker, No. 11-CV-1866, 2012 WL 1889148, at *5 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2012) (citing Pa. C.S.A. § 8545). Pennsylvania courts, along with courts in this circuit, have held that “[a] police officer engages in willful misconduct if he commits an intentional tort subjectively knowing that his or her conduct is wrong.” Goodlin v. Rose, No. 23-2304, 2025 WL 2423745, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 2025) (citing Walker v. N. Whales Borough, 395 F. Supp. 2d 219, 231 (E.D. Pa. 2005)). But “[i]n order to exclude police officers from the protection of immunity under the [PSTCA], the police officer‘s ‘willful misconduct’ must be established in addition to the elements of an intentional tort.” Booker v. City of Phila., No. 12-CV-402, 2017 WL 1177094, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 29, 2017) (quoting Gremo v. Karlin, 363 F.
1. Cogley has sufficiently pled his claim for conversion.
Under Pennsylvania law, “conversion is the ‘deprivation of another‘s right of property, or use or possession of a chattel, or other interference therewith, without the owner‘s consent and without legal justification.‘” Universal Premium Acceptance Corp. v. York Bank & Tr. Co., 69 F.3d 695, 704 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Cenna v. U.S., 402 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1968)). Cogley alleges that “May intentionally and unlawfully exercised dominion and control over [his] two cell phones, immediately depriving [him] of his possessory rights.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 56). As stated in the amended complaint, May entered his residence without Cogley‘s consent and seized the cell phones while Walters, who acted as the alleged supervisor on the scene, “either personally directed the seizure or knowingly permitted and approved [] May‘s unlawful conduct.” (Id. ¶¶ 58–59). According to Cogley, May and Walters lacked any “lawful justification or warrant authority to seize the phones at the time.” (Id. ¶ 60). Cogley was without possession of his cell phones for a period of almost eight months. (Id. ¶¶ 61–62). He asserts that “May and Walters knowingly and intentionally interfered with [his] exclusive possessory rights in his property, constituting conversion under Pennsylvania law,” and by doing so “while acting within the scope of their employment with the City of Butler … the City of Butler is vicariously liable for their conduct.” (Id. ¶ 64).
Defendants assert that Cogley “has not alleged the Defendants did anything other than act in good faith within the scope of their official duties.” (ECF No. 9, p. 16). According to Defendants, the amended complaint only alleges that May searched Cogley‘s home and seized his cell phones. They argue that the search of Cogley‘s home that led to officers’ seizure of his phones “was pursuant to a warrant based on probable cause” and the cell phones “were seized as evidence in connection with an overdose death where [Cogley] was a person of interest.” (Id.). But, as the Court has already found, Cogley has sufficiently alleged that the search was not supported by a warrant—the only warrant that existed was one for Cogley‘s arrest—and the seizure was further unlawful because May and Walters did not have a warrant to seize the phones, nor did any exceptions apply which would excuse their warrantless entrance into Cogley‘s residence where they found the cell phones. Thus, there existed no lawful justification to intentionally interfere with Cogley‘s use or possession of his cell phones. See Bamont v. Pa. Soc‘y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 163 F. Supp. 3d. 138, 155 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (finding that a seizure resulting from execution of a valid search warrant constitutes a lawful justification to defeat a conversion claim).
by an act of the [City], its employee, or any other persons,” even where the “employee of the [City] who is liable in his individual capacity for civil damages caused by acts which are within the scope of his office or duties“; however, they fail to recognize that the PSTCA will not apply in such a situation as this one, where Cogley has pled that May and Walters engaged in “willful misconduct.” (ECF No. 9, pp. 15–16) (quoting Kokinda v. Breiner, 557 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (M.D. Pa. 2008)).
Cogley alleges that May and Walters’ conduct constituted conversion under Pennsylvania law and caused an injury to his person or property which arose from or was “reasonably related to[] the office or the performance of the duties of [May and Walters].” Id. The factual allegations in the amended complaint clearly demonstrate that May and Walters seized his cell phone while executing Cogley‘s arrest pursuant to a PBPP warrant. (ECF No. 5, ¶¶ 14, 60–63). The Court finds that Cogley has sufficiently alleged that May and Walters intentionally interfered with his possessory rights of his cell phones when they entered his residence without the authority to do so and seized them. Moreover, May and Walters likely had the intent to seize his cell phones even though they did not possess a warrant because, as Defendants assert in their motion to dismiss, they seized the phones “as evidence in connection with an overdose death where [Cogley] was a person of interest.” (ECF No. 9, p. 16). 21
But May and Walters did not arrest Cogley in connection with his suspected involvement in that overdose death, nor did they have any reason to enter the residence after Cogley was arrested. Still, while Walters was present and supervising, May entered Cogley‘s residence and seized his cell phones. The facts, as recited above, show that Cogley has provided sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for conversion—an intentional tort—against May and Walters in their individual capacities. The Court further finds that Cogley has pled facts that allow the court to infer that their conduct was “willful.” Thus, Defendants are precluded from asserting immunity under the PSTCA.22
Defendants motion to dismiss will be denied as to Cogley‘s conversion claim against Walters and May in their individual capacities.
2. Cogley has not stated a plausible claim for trespass to chattels arising from the alleged “property damage” and “trashing of residence.”
Cogley‘s trespass to chattels claim falls short. He fails to allege that May and Walters were involved in “trashing” his residence and taking the missing items. See Ickes v. Grassmeyer, 30 F. Supp. 3d 375, 402 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (granting motions to dismiss with respect to plaintiff‘s trespass and conversion claims because plaintiff failed to “specifically allege that [the named defendant] was involved in the seizure or destruction of his personal property.“). Moreover, there are no facts, other than conclusory assertions, that show May and Walters had the requisite intention to dispossess or intermeddle with his personal property. See QVC, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 3d at 600 (finding that plaintiff failed to “allege facts from which the court can infer that any of the Defendants intended to exercise control of” the plaintiff‘s chattel). Accordingly, the Court will
3. Cogley alleges a sufficient invasion of privacy claim against May and Walters.
An invasion of privacy action includes four separate and distinct torts: “(1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) appropriation of name or likeness, (3) publicity given to private life and (4) publicity placing the person in a false light.” Harris by Harris v. Easton Pub. Co., 483 A.2d 1377, 1383 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (citing Marks v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 331 A.2d 424 (1975)). Cogley alleges two separate invasion of privacy claims against May and Walters. First, he asserts that “[u]pon information and belief, [] May accessed or attempted to access [his] private cell phone contents without lawful authority, constituting an unlawful intrusion upon [his] seclusion.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 87). Second, Cogley contends that “May also entered [his] residence without [his] permission to seize [his] cell phones, despite [Cogley] specifically requesting that a friend retrieve the phone instead. This warrantless, unauthorized entry constitutes a separate invasion of privacy under Pennsylvania law.” (Id. ¶ 89). The Court notes that Cogley specified his invasion of privacy action for the former allegation is pursued as a claim for intrusion upon seclusion. Although Cogley does not specify which of the four applicable torts he brings the latter invasion of privacy
The Court finds that Cogley fails to state a claim for intrusion upon seclusion related to his personal cell phones. Pennsylvania uses the definition of intrusion upon seclusion provided by the Second Restatement of Torts: “One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.” Doe by and through Doe v. Boyertown Area Sch. Dist., 897 F.3d 518, 537 (3d Cir. 2018); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1965). Cogley‘s initial assertion that he “had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents and data stored on his personal cell phones” is correct; however, he fails to allege any facts that otherwise satisfy the elements of an intrusion upon seclusion claim. (ECF No. 5, ¶ 86). Cogley makes only conclusory statements, contending that “[u]pon information and belief, [ ] May accessed or attempted to access [his] private cell phone contents without lawful authority, constituting an unlawful intrusion upon [his] seclusion.” (Id. ¶ 87). Cogley makes no assertion, and provides no factual basis, for the Court to infer that May had the requisite intent to intrude upon his seclusion in taking, and possibly accessing, the cell phones. Although Pennsylvania courts have not defined “intent” in the context of intrusion upon seclusion claims, the Third Circuit has predicted that Pennsylvania courts would find intent if the tortfeasor “believes, or is substantially certain, that he lacks the necessary legal or personal permission to commit the intrusive act.” O‘Donnell v. U.S., 891 F.2d 1079, 1083 (3d Cir. 1989). Cogley does not allege that May or Walters actually accessed his private cell phone contents. He also fails to provide any facts that May or Walters, themselves, believed or were substantially certain that they did not have the authority to access the cell phones’ contents. See Minor v. Cumberland Twp., 258
Additionally, Cogley fails to allege how the attempted, or successful, access of his cell phones was a substantial invasion that was highly offensive. He merely claims that their “conduct was intentional, highly offensive, and caused [him] emotional harm, dignitary injury, and loss of privacy.” (ECF No. 5, ¶ 90). Those statements fail to satisfy the pleading standard, and the Court is not given any facts to infer that he experienced a substantial invasion that was highly offensive.
Conversely, the Court finds that Cogley sufficiently pled an intrusion upon seclusion claim as it relates to May‘s entrance into his residence “without [Cogley‘s] permission to seize [his] cell phones, despite [his] specific[] request[] that a friend retrieve the phones instead.” (Id. ¶ 89). Cogley has provided the Court with a sufficient factual basis to establish that it is plausible that May and Walters knew, or were substantially certain, that they neither had personal permission, nor a lawful justification, to enter the residence. Throughout the amended complaint, Cogley maintains that May and Walters were never given consent to enter the residence, and the facts, taken as true, do not demonstrate that any circumstances existed that would provide a lawful justification for their entrance. The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B explains, through illustration, that “a warrantless search of a home qualifies as a physical intrusion into a place where the plaintiff has secluded himself.” Muhammad v. U.S., 884 F. Supp. 2d 306, 317 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B). Moreover, courts in this circuit have found defendants who enter plaintiff‘s home in violation of the Fourth Amendment have engaged in “an invasion [that] would be highly offensive to an ordinary reasonable person.” Merring v. City of Carbondale., 558 F. Supp. 2d 540, 549 (M.D. Pa. 2008).
Accordingly, Cogley has stated a plausible claim for intrusion upon seclusion as it relates to May‘s entrance into his residence. He has not, however, pled an intrusion upon seclusion claim for access to the contents of his cell phones. The Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to his invasion of privacy claim for May‘s entrance into his residence; however, the Court will grant, without prejudice, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Cogley‘s invasion of privacy claim for intrusion upon seclusion into his cell phones.
4. Cogley fails to state a claim for breach of oral contract.
Further, Cogley attempts, but fails, to establish any consideration to support contract formation. If “there is no agreement or even a discussion as to any of the essential terms of an alleged bargain, such as time or manner of performance, or price or consideration, the ‘agreement’ is too indefinite for a party to reasonably believe that it could be enforceable in an action at law.” Ecore Int‘l, Inc., 343 at 490 (emphasis in original) (quoting Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006)). Consideration, defined as “an act, forbearance, or return promise bargained for or given in exchange for the original promise,” is required to form a contract. Mucci v. Home Depot, No. 00-4946, 2001 WL 1609851, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2001). “The test for consideration is ‘whether the promisee, at the instance of the promisor, has suffered any detriment, or whether, in return for the promise, he has done something that he was not bound to do, or has promised to do some act, or has abstained from doing something.‘” Omaha v. Markowitz, 434 F. Supp. 3d 303, 315 (E.D. Pa. 2020) (quoting Mikso v. Kida, 172 A. 101, 102 (1934)). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has further found that “[i]f the promisee suffered any detriment, however slight, or though he has suffered no real detriment, if he has done what he was not otherwise bound to do, in return for the promise, he has given the consideration, and the court will not ask whether the promisor was benefited.” Mikso v. Kida, 172 A. 101, 102 (1934).
In his brief opposing Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Cogley insists that “by cooperating with officers’ transition of custody, relinquishing control of the premises, and relying on Walters’ assurance that the residence would be secured, [he] undertook actions he was not otherwise
WILLIAM S. STICKMAN IV
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Notes
In any action brought against an employee of a local agency for damages on account of an injury to a person or property based upon claims arising from, or reasonably