185 Iowa 1080 | Iowa | 1919
Lead Opinion
“Q. I will ask you what would have been the fair and reasonable market value at Grand Island, Nebraska, of the nine carloads of horses and mules which you shipped from Billings, Montana, on or about the 12-th day of August, 1916, had they arrived at Grand Island, Nebraska, in the usual and ordinary course of shipment of such horses, between such points.”
The meaning and significance of the foregoing hypothetical question can be understood only in the light of the record as it stood when the testimony was given. At that time, amendments to the petition were on file wherein it was alleged that, in the forwarding of the shipment from Alliance, there had been rough handling of the train between Alliance and Grand Island, and that such rough handling had resulted in the killing of a horse and in the throwing down of several others, to their injury. Plaintiff himself testified in support of these allegations. Plaintiff then testified to the -actual value of the horses at Grand Island, Nebraska, as $60 each. In answer to the above hypothetical question, he testified that the horses would have been worth at Grand Island $110 each, “had they arrived at Grand Island in the usual and ordinary course of shipment of such horses between -such points.” Clearly, damages resulting from the rough handling were included in his estimate. Plaintiff’s last amendment, filed after the close of the evidence, eliminated all claim for damages for rough
2' ?iageIofSiivear" of°<iamagc:eilco donar eqviivalent to a find-ins of no damage. II. In overruling the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict, the trial judge put the ruling, in effect, upon the ground that he deemed the plaintiff’s case without merit, and that the great weight of the evidence was against him. We think the record fairly sustains-the trial court in the . view thus expressed. It was, therefore, a sufficient reason for the ruling. Hubbard v. Town of Mason City, 64 Iowa 245.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). The verdict fixes the damages of plaintiff at one dollar. I think the motion of plain tiff to set aside the verdict ought to have been sustained. Had defendant, instead of plaintiff, made such motion, that, too, would have been well made. Setting the verdict aside on the motion of the court would have been proper. That such concurrent right to destroy this verdict exists, is due to the fact that the verdict is an outlaw; is not the creature of judicial consideration. If the jury believed the plaintiff, no theory of the evidence sustains that his loss is paid for by a dollar. If the plaintiff was not believed, there is no warrant for finding that defendant owed plaintiff just a dollar, and for compelling defendant to pay the costs of suit. To me, this proves that the verdict is captious, is regardless of the evidence, and neither party has had a fair trial. It may be that the majority is proceeding under the sanction of a rule prevailing in some of the states, that,